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Abstract 
 
The establishment of a statutory civil service has been an important element of 
democratisation in the small-island state of the Maldives, an emerging democracy. 
“Civil service”, “democratisation”, and “small-island states” are terms discussed 
widely in the contemporary literature, though not in an integrated manner. By 
synthesising these terms using relevant literature, in a case study approach with 
qualitative data, this study primarily aims to analyse the development of a civil 
service model as part of a process of democratisation in the Maldives. The study also 
aims to identify how certain features of small-island states could affect both 
democratisation and the development of a civil service in the Maldives.  
 
The analysis reveals five main findings. Firstly, the development of the civil service 
model and the negotiation of the civil service Act were part of the democratisation 
process but were in the hands of political elites and involved no wider public 
participation. This was consistent with Welzel‟s model of mass responsive 
democratisation and Huntington‟s transplacement model - which proposes that while 
mass protests and other expressions of opinion are important in triggering 
democratisation processes, these processes are at some stage moved forward by 
negotiation or consensus within or between elites.  
 
Secondly, the civil service Act that emerged was a mix of pre-existing codes of 
practice which had some specifically Maldivian elements but drew on other regional 
administrative codes, together with borrowings based on research into the current 
civil service laws of other countries. The result was a law which was founded on 
some principles commonly described as “Weberian” but adapted to Maldivian 
circumstances.   
 
Thirdly, the choices that the lawmakers made regarding the civil service model were 
motivated by a number of different considerations but the dominant agenda was 
securing a politically neutral civil service largely insulated from the direct patronage 
of the political executive. This was a result of a wider elite negotiation on the future 
extent of executive power. Thus, the issue in drafting that turned out to be most 
important was setting the boundary between the political arm and administrative arm 
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of the executive; many detailed provisions that were not relevant to the dominant 
agenda were carried over from previous Maldivian codes or drawn from the codes of 
other jurisdictions, in either case with little debate.   
 
Fourthly, the transition to democracy is not complete in the Maldives. The process is 
still relatively unstable and fragile. In particular, although the civil service is now 
more firmly founded in law and there is less scope for arbitrary political intervention, 
there is a continuing contest between the political arm and the administrative arm of 
the executive over the boundaries between them. This ongoing contest continues to 
be critical for the prospects of stable democratisation.  
 
Lastly, islandness and smallness did not have a major direct bearing on the process 
of democratisation in the Maldives, although islandness was to some extent a factor 
in the design of the constitutional architecture. Furthermore, smallness and social 
cohesiveness is presently not enough to counter the growing polarisation of society 
which may constitute a threat to the stability of this fragile emerging democracy. The 
Maldives being a small-island state did not have a significant impact on the choice of 
the civil service model. Nonetheless, the social closeness of the small Maldivian 
society may inhibit the separation of public and private life that is important for 
institutionalising a professional civil service.    
       
These findings and others in this research add to the body of exemplary knowledge 
regarding the relationship between the main theoretical concepts of civil service, 
democratisation, and small-island states, and demonstrate that the framework 
developed from this scholarship is useful for other case studies embodying similar 
concepts.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Forces of change  
 
The emergence of democracy in a nation can take different paths. In some instances, 
dramatic action may be necessary to trigger the forces that bring change. Although 
mass mobilisation is neither necessary nor sufficient for regime change, events from 
the recent past have shown that transitions to democracy from authoritarian regimes 
have often occurred when mass mobilisations of outraged citizens have demanded 
changes to their regimes (Huntington, 1991-2, pp. 604-5). Examples of such 
transition were evident in Eastern Europe during the fall of communism, with 
Tunisia and Egypt being more recent examples. In most such cases, democratic 
transition has been rapid rather than gradual. In the case of the Maldives, the last 
decade has been unprecedented in terms of political awareness developing among 
the general public. The effects of globalisation, as well as consistent economic 
growth and social development, have raised the expectations of citizens to the extent 
that they started demanding more political freedom and a greater say in the running 
of the country. Civil unrest during September 2003 and a public protest during 
August 2004 ignited the rapid progress made en route to democratisation. The 
changes that the nation has witnessed and is still witnessing have been extraordinary. 
First and foremost, after a 30-year rule by a sole ruler, democratic transition occurred 
peacefully in 2008, mainly due to a new constitution that provided citizens with 
rights they had never had before. These changes have transformed the political 
spectrum in the whole nation.  
 
Governance reform introduced in the Maldives included introducing multi-party 
politics, electoral reform, judicial reform, liberalisation of media, and strengthening 
key institutions (refer to section 4.3.3). Reform of the civil service (CS) was also part 
of this agenda. The main focus of CS reform was on significantly reducing the power 
of the political executive to control public sector employment by defining a CS and 
establishing a statutory civil service commission (CSC) provided for in the 
constitution and empowered by a CS Act, to be responsible for employment of civil 
servants. This redefinition of the political executive from the CS has so far not been 
without hiccups and bumps. Nonetheless, the processes involved in the formulation 
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of a CS model that is aligned with Maldivian administrative history and the 
country‟s on-going political reforms are of significant importance, especially in the 
context of a small-island state where such drastic changes had been few and far 
between.   
 
1.2 Research purposes, propositions, and questions 
 
The primary purpose of this study is to analyse a case of the development of a civil 
service model as part of a process of democratisation in the Maldives. The 
approach used to achieve this purpose is to examine two general propositions for 
their application in the Maldivian case.   
 
Proposition 1: A period of accelerated democratisation, such as that occurred in the 
Maldives in the period from 2003 onwards, would be associated with a deliberate 
programme of institutional change. Civil service reform would be part of this 
programme and a principal objective of CS reform would be to change the 
relationship between political and administrative power in the executive. 
 
Based on this proposition, the primary research question is: 
 
What effects has the current model of CS had on the democratisation 
process and vice versa?  
 
In order to answer this primary question, this thesis intends to: 
 
1. Describe the CS model of the Maldives in relation to the options available for 
its development; 
2. Analyse the process by which the political actors in the Maldives arrived at 
the current model of CS during the transition to a multi-party democracy and 
the reasons for the choices they made; and 
3. Analyse the interaction between the political executive and the CS in the 
context of developing new democratic institutions in the Maldives. 
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Proposition 2: Certain features of small-island states like the Maldives, such as the 
relative social closeness of its citizens and their geographical insularity, would affect 
both democratisation and the development of a CS.  
 
Based on this proposition, the secondary research question is: 
 
How was the process of democratisation and choice of the CS model 
different because the Maldives was a small-island state? 
 
In order to answer this secondary question, this thesis intends to: 
1. Describe features of the Maldivian economy and society that seems specific 
to relatively small and isolated countries; 
2. Consider how these features may have specifically influenced the 
democratisation process and decisions on the choice of the CS model in the 
Maldives.   
 
1.3 Significance of the study 
 
The Maldives is an island nation which, due to its insularity and strategic 
insignificance, has been sheltered for much of its existence from major outside 
influences. Although recent and relatively rapid exposure to the effects of 
globalisation has brought modernising influences, there has also been considerable 
local pressure to rapidly modernise the Maldives‟ political institutions to put them on 
a par with those found in advanced democracies. This pressure is having an impact 
on a society that has been homogeneous in terms of race, religion, and language. The 
CS has traditionally been the single biggest employer in the country and the 
democratisation process is continually altering the functioning of government 
machinery.  
 
“Civil service”, “democratisation”, and “small-island states” are terms discussed 
widely in the contemporary literature, though not in an integrated manner. That is the 
gap that this thesis attempts to fill by providing a synthesis of these terms from 
relevant literature. By forming a case around these concepts, this thesis attempts to 
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demonstrate that other studies can benefit as knowledge is communicated through 
concepts that scholars are familiar with and find useful in the study of the formation 
of public institutions such as the CS, and consequently the relationships between that 
institution and other institutions in an emerging democracy of a small-island state in 
particular. In developing a case, this study is testing that proposition in references to 
previous scholarship. Although there are plenty of general studies of the role of CS 
in democratic institutions, there are a much smaller number of studies on exactly 
how CS reform fits in the modern process of democratisation. The Maldives case is 
an opportunity to study the process where the motivation of elites and the ideas they 
draw upon in negotiation lead to the formal development of a governance institution.     
 
1.4 Personal journey 
 
The reason I undertook this study has primarily been my close involvement in the 
modernisation and reform of the Maldivian public sector. In my short professional 
career, I have worked primarily at the President‟s Office (PO) which I joined after 
completing high school. Over the years, the experiences that I have accumulated and 
the opportunities that I have received to pursue tertiary education in public 
administration, have furthered my interest in the area of administrative reform and 
modernisation. In this regard, I have been fortunate to be involved in numerous 
projects aimed at the modernisation of the public sector, including being a 
participant in some of the events described in this thesis. I cannot escape the 
possibility of bias in the choice of evidence, but I have managed the risk as best as I 
can (refer to section 3.5). The desire to contribute in a scholarly manner to the 
institutionalisation of a professional CS has always been the driving force for me 
during this doctoral journey.  
 
1.5 Definitions of important terms 
 
Before proceeding, it is imperative to provide at least a partial definition of some of 
the important terms used in the study. The task is undertaken with the recognition 
that universally accepted definitions for these terms probably do not exist. 
Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate their meaning in the context of this 
research. The following provides the meanings given to the terms in this study.   
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1.5.1 Civil service. 
 
Civil service can mean different things in different situations. Finlay (1966, p. 7) 
suggests that devising a precise definition for the term informatively and in a legally 
acceptable manner is not possible. Some authors have nonetheless attempted to do 
so. Parris (1969, p. 22) refers to the civil service as “a body of full-time, salaried 
officers, systematically recruited, with clear lines of authority, and uniform rules on 
such questions as superannuation”. The Tomlin Commission Report (1931) defines 
“civil servants” as “those servants of the Crown, other than holders of political or 
judicial offices, who are employed in a civil capacity and whose remuneration is paid 
wholly and directly out of monies voted by Parliament” (cited in Jordan, 1994, p. 
29). There are numerous other definitions of the civil service (see Dimock & 
Dimock, 1969, p. 179; Henry, 2010, p. 210; Starling, 1993, p. 450). However, for the 
purpose of this research, a civil service will be considered as an organised body of 
employees of the state subject to a uniform code of employment, directly 
subordinated to the political executive and governed by the rule of law. Such a 
synthesised definition aligns with the contemporary forms of government and the 
functions bestowed upon the CS in such environments. 
      
1.5.2 Civil service model. 
 
The CS has been part of the daily vocabulary of public affairs for over a century 
now, perhaps even longer.
1
 Since the nineteenth century, most nations that have 
endeavoured to develop a CS have chosen the path of relevant legislation that 
outlines the scope, parameters, values, and responsibilities of the CS. The role and 
shape of civil services have been changing over several decades (see Butler, 1993). 
Furthermore, as a comparative study by Choi and Whitford (2011) shows, 
differences are evident in how countries shape their CS laws, arguably because how 
each nation shapes its CS depends on its history as well as lessons obtained from 
other countries.  
 
                                               
1
 See section 2.3.1 for a historical overview of the CS.   
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“Civil service model” and “civil service system” will be used interchangeably in this 
research. According to Morgan and Perry (1988, pp. 85-6), a CS system refers to 
“the mediating institution authorized by constitutional rules which mobilizes human 
resources in the service of the civil affairs of the state in a given territory”. Here the 
CS is seen in functional terms linking the policy formulation and implementation 
processes by providing the human resources to implement public policy (Burns, 
1994, p. 8). Any nation with “institutions that turns [sic] inputs from the 
environment into outputs such as policy, goods and services for and on behalf of the 
State may be said to have a „civil service system‟” (Burns & Bowornwathana, 2001, 
p. 3).  
 
For the purpose of this research, civil service model means the framework used to 
define and shape a CS. The term “model”, whether or not it is universally accepted, 
is always a simplified representation of reality in which the major relationships are 
identified between the stylised component elements. The terms model and system 
define elements and relationships that are important for this research which will be 
conducted in large measure through these abstractions. The justification for the use 
of this approach is that it fits the evidence collected for the research, in the sense that 
most of the evidence collected assumes similar definitions and relationships. 
 
1.5.3 Democratisation. 
 
There is a lack of consensus on the exact meaning of “democracy” (see Beetham, 
1994). For the purpose of this research, the term democracy, or what Robert Dahl 
(1971) terms “polyarchy”, will be defined as a political system that meets three 
minimum conditions:  
 
1. Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized 
groups (especially political parties) for the major positions of government 
power; 
2. A “highly inclusive” level of political participation in the selection of 
leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that 
no major (adult) social group is excluded; and 
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3.  A level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom 
of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure 
the integrity of political competition and participation. (cited in Diamond, 
Lipset, & Linz, 1987, p. 5) 
 
With the above minimum pre-conditions required for a nation to be considered 
democratic, “democratisation” is the process by which a nation transits from a 
political system that does not encompass those conditions towards a political system 
that does. In other words, the term democratisation “refers to political changes 
moving in a democratic direction” (Potter, 1997, p. 3). A movement towards 
democracy is also most commonly seen as a movement away from autocracy, so that 
the most significant dimension of democratisation is a limiting of the scope and 
arbitrary use of executive power. With time being the key factor, the changes during 
the process occur: 
 
from less accountable to more accountable government, from less competitive 
(or non-existent) elections to freer and fairer competitive elections, from 
severely restricted to better protected civil and political rights, from weak (or 
non-existent) autonomous associations in civil society to more autonomous 
and more numerous associations. (Potter, 1997, p. 6)  
 
1.5.4 Emerging democracy. 
 
There is plenty of evidence from historical accounts of the democratisation process 
that it does not follow a single path of linked phases. Transition from authoritarian 
rule to a democratic form of government through fair and free elections marks the 
beginning of the democratic process. Any state that has embraced the principles of 
democracy and is moving towards the consolidation of democratic values could be 
regarded as an emerging democracy. Sørensen (1998, p. 39) points out however, that 
several phases of “democratic deepening” may be necessary before a democracy 
becomes mature. Consolidation is reached when democracy is embraced as the “only 
game in town” (Di Palma, 1990, p. 113) by the major political actors, interest 
groups, and organisations, and democracy subsequently becomes ingrained in the 
political culture. Considering the different phases of democratisation evident in 
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individual nations, consolidation often takes several decades. This does not imply 
that reverting back to autocratic rule is not a possibility. Episodic breaches of 
democratic procedures that challenge the foundation of democracy may be evident. 
There have also been many reversals and interruptions in the historical record of 
different countries.  
               
1.5.5 Small-island state. 
 
The case chosen for this study is based on a small-island state. Thus a definition of 
small-island states is needed as it foreshadows later discussion of the effects of 
smallness and islandness on the nature of society and politics. The aim is to find a 
group of countries that are broadly in the same range of population size and degree 
of geographical isolation as the Maldives, for which there are observations that 
might be relevant to the Maldives. Furthermore, a definition will have more value for 
reflections from this case study to states that share similar attributes.    
  
In analytical writing one of the major difficulties frequently encountered is when one 
tries to define terms which are part of everyday language. This is certainly evident 
when one attempts to define small-island states. For a start, there is no consensus on 
what is “small” (Eckaus, 1997) or “state” (J. Richards, 1990) or even an “island” 
(Dommen, 1980). Defining the word small as a measure of country size is 
problematic as Ott (2000, p. 14) points out, “the question of what constitutes 
smallness remains unanswered” even after decades of discussion regarding the topic. 
For those who have used one dimensional measures, state size has been measured, 
for instance, by using population (Clarke & Payne, 1987, p. xvii; Harden, 1985); 
gross national product (GNP) per capita (Robinson, 1960); a combination of 
population, land area, and gross domestic product (GDP) (Shand, 1980; Crowards, 
2002); or power in terms of a country‟s influence in the international system (Fox, 
1959). Others have used multiple measures combined in proportions which can only 
be considered arbitrary (Vital, 1967). Alternatively, others have used multi-
dimensional measures of viability (Benedict, 1967), capacity for autonomous state 
action (Emmanuel, 1976), and degree of vulnerability (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
1985). As a result definitional efforts with respect to small-size states provide no 
universal agreement (Khan, 1982, p. 57).  
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The attempts at definition are further complicated by the use of terms “small states” 
(Baker, 1992; Gayle, 1986), “very small states” (United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research [UNITAR], 1969), or “micro states” (Anckar, 2002; 
Caldwell, Harrison, & Quiggin, 1980; Dommen, 1985; Murray, 1981; J. Richards, 
1990). Even with differing measures of smallness, defining it without the use of 
specific indicators presents clear problems. Thus, most researchers have used 
specific indicators, with “small population” being the most common (J. B. 
Raadschelders, 1992, p. 27).  
 
As pointed previously, defining island also appears problematic. Glassner (1990, p. 
47) states that in simple terms island is “a piece of land surrounded by water”. 
However, Baldacchino (2007, p. 4) cautioned that “the mere rendition of an island as 
a piece of land surrounded by water is academically imprecise” because, as 70 per 
cent of the earth‟s surface is surrounded by water, even a great land mass such as 
Australia could be termed as an island at the largest scale (Cosgrove, 2007). 
Furthermore, concerning the concept of “island state”, Anckar (1996, p. 702) defines 
it as “states that are islands or parts of an island or consist of islands and parts of 
islands”.  
 
According to Newitt (1992, p. 16): 
 
not all small states are islands and not all island states are small but the 
problem of „smallness‟ is given an added dimension in the case of an island, 
and insular isolation can be considerably intensified if you are also small.  
 
Given the lack of unanimity, a specific definition is still needed in order to proceed 
with this research. As a result, for the purposes of this research, a small-island state 
is defined as an independent country that has a population equal to or less than one 
and a half million and is surrounded by sea. This one-dimensional categorisation of 
the countries is adopted purely for the purpose of simplicity. Based on this 
definition, as of June 2011, there were 30 small-island states (see table 4.7).   
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1.6 Thesis outline  
 
Chapter One presents the research purposes, propositions, and questions. It outlines 
the significance of the research and why the topic was chosen. Brief definitions of 
the main terms used in the study are also presented. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the thesis structure.   
 
Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework by providing a synthesis of the 
terms of the thesis. It is divided into five main sections: (1) the democratisation 
process; (2) the theory of contemporary civil service; (3) linkages between civil 
service and democracy; (4) overview of possible features of public administration in 
small-island states; and (5) processes of policy formulation, decision-making, and 
political interactions. The chapter concludes by presenting the implications of the 
literature for the Maldivian case.   
 
Chapter Three presents the research design and methodological approach for the 
thesis. Firstly the chapter examines epistemology and ontology aspects. It is 
followed by discussion and justification for choosing a qualitative research design 
and a case study strategy. The rest of the chapter discusses generalisation, limitations 
of the study, data sources, methods of data collection, and data analysis.   
    
Chapter Four begins with a brief overview of the Maldives, after which the chapter is 
divided into three main parts. The first part describes the democratisation process in 
the Maldives. The next part shows the main causes behind the democratic reforms. 
The final part argues that Maldives is an emerging democracy and presents the main 
challenges evident in the effort to sustain and consolidate the democratic transition.  
 
Chapter Five provides a brief history of public administration in the Maldives prior 
to the establishment of a statutory CS. It argues that the nation went through three 
major phases that eventually led to a law governing the CS. The first period extended 
from early historical times to the 1930s when the first written constitution was 
proclaimed. The second period from the 1930s to the mid-1970s was a period of 
relative stability in administration due to the greater focus on recovery from the 
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effects of World War II. The final stage, from the 1970s to 2008, was a period of 
relatively rapid economic growth and expanding contacts through travel and 
communications with the outside world.  
  
Chapter Six focuses on the formulation of a civil service model for the Maldives. It 
presents the different stages in the formulation of the CS Act as well as the CS model 
chosen in the Maldives. It examines the actors involved, the germane changes made 
to the bill, and the rationale behind the support for the bill. The bulk of the chapter 
examines the attributes of the CS model chosen for the Maldives. A brief glance at 
the possible influences from overseas CS systems on the Maldives is also 
undertaken.  
 
Chapter Seven presents the linkages between civil service and democratisation. The 
prime argument in this chapter is that the CS model chosen for the Maldives has a 
significant bearing on the democratic process and that, in turn, the democratic 
process, due to its nascent stage, hinders efforts to institutionalise a professional CS. 
After examining the impact that these processes have had on one another, the chapter 
presents a number of features of the CS in the Maldives in the context of an 
emerging democracy.    
 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by presenting the main research findings, 
contribution to the literature, lessons for the Maldivian CS, and implications for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The CS is a significant institution in any democratic society. Countries that have had 
a long history of an independent CS will bear witness to the validity of this 
statement. However, establishing and institutionalising an autonomous CS in an 
emerging democracy can pose a number of challenges. It can be further complicated 
when both these processes go ahead simultaneously in the context of a small-island 
state.   
 
There are a number of theoretical frameworks that contribute towards understanding 
the research questions of this study (see section 1.2). “Civil service”, and 
“democratisation”, along with “small-island states” are terms with many 
connotations attached to them (see section 1.5). Though these concepts are discussed 
widely in the contemporary literature, they have not been presented in an integrated 
manner. That is the gap that this thesis attempts to fill. This chapter provides a 
synthesis of these concepts from relevant literature. The review of literature 
presented in this chapter aims to show three main arguments that are examined in the 
context of the Maldives in the remaining chapters of the thesis. Those arguments are:  
1. The historical development of the nation is an important factor in democratic 
transition and consolidation; 
2. Civil service reform will be based both on a country‟s existing institutions 
and on models from other jurisdictions; and 
3. The dynamics between the political executive and the CS are significant 
factors for institutionalisation
2
 of a professional
3
 CS.   
                                               
2 According to Selznick (1957, p. 16) “Institutionalization is a process. It is something that happens to 
an organization over time, reflecting the organization‟s own distinctive history, the people who have 
been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests they have created, and the way it has 
adapted to its environment”. Selznick (1957, p. 17) goes on to state that “to institutionalize is to infuse 
with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand”. In this research, institutionalisation 
implies being deeply embedded into thought and behaviour.     
3 Cheetham and Chivers (2005, p. xii) define profession as “an occupation based upon specialised 
study, training or experience, the purpose of which is to apply skilled service or advice to others, or to 
provide technical, managerial or administrative services to, or within, organisations in return for a fee 
or salary”. There are numerous other definitions of profession (see Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 
1933/1964, p. 287; Freidson, 1994, p. 10; Larson, 1990, p. 30). The professional is the individual who 
occupies the profession. For the purpose of this research, a professional CS implies “competent, 
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This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section focuses on the 
democratisation of nation states. The second section focuses on the theory of 
contemporary CS. The third section links the CS and democracy. That is followed by 
a section discussing attributes of public administration that are common in small-
island states. The fifth section examines the processes of policy formulation, 
decision-making, and political interaction. The chapter concludes with implications 
that this theoretical framework has for the case of the Maldives.   
 
2.2 Democratisation 
 
In the last fifty years or so, most writers agree, that there have been several waves of 
democratisation of states, defined as a process where states move to greater degrees 
of electoral contestability, constraints on the power of the executive, and respect for 
individual freedoms. International measures of these changes (such as Freedom 
House or POLITY IV) suggest that they are neither universal nor irreversible. Thus 
much recent writing on democratisation as a process has focused on what factors are 
likely to be associated with a democratic transition and what factors are likely to be 
associated with its consolidation. This section outlines some of the underlying social 
and economic factors commonly cited as significant in democratic change as well as 
the importance of a country's past history and politically significant incidents. It also 
argues that some specific factors may be relatively more important in small-island 
states such as the Maldives. To present this argument, the section is divided into four 
main parts: democratisation as a process; causes of democratisation; results of 
democratisation; and democratisation and small-island states.  
 
Before proceeding with the discussion of the above mentioned categories, a brief 
look into the nature of Islam in the Maldives is given here. The Maldives is an 
Islamic state: all written constitutions of the Maldives have established Islam as the 
state religion. There is also evidence that Islam is playing a larger part in party
4
 
political activity since 2005, after being largely kept out of politics in the preceding 
                                                                                                                                     
motivated and impartial civil servants working in a system dedicated to serving the public interest” 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 1997a, p. 5). 
4 The Adhaalath party was registered as a political party on August 18, 2005. It is a party based on 
Islamic ideology and is headed mostly by Islamic scholars (see “AP” in table 4.9 for the party 
membership).  
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administration. The research for this thesis however uncovered no evidence that 
Islamic thought had any direct or significant influence on the development of the CS 
or its relationship to the democratisation process in the period under study and it 
therefore does not figure in the discussion of these processes which is the subject of 
the thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Democratisation as a process. 
 
Democratisation occurs when a nation moves from a less democratic form of rule 
towards a system that comprises basic democratic principles such as open 
competition, political participation, and civil and political liberties (see section 
1.5.3). During this process, two simultaneous but somewhat autonomous processes 
occur – “a process of disintegration of the authoritarian regime, which often assumes 
the form of „liberalization‟, and a process of emergence of democratic institutions” 
(Przeworski, 1986, p. 56). The transition from a less democratic form of governance 
to one that encompasses modern democratic principles is normally a lengthy process. 
Numerous categorisations of less democratic regimes exist in the contemporary 
literature. Rather than focusing on such regime types, attention here is focused on 
democracy and the features that characterise democratic systems.  
 
A nation pursuing democratisation needs “open contestation over the right to win 
control of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the 
results of which determine who governs” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 3). This transition 
process can happen in a number of ways, and be gradual or sudden, violent or 
peaceful, moderate or absolute. Furthermore, as this is a process of change, “most 
writers conceive of it as a journey without end” (Burnell, 2008, p. 269) because full 
transition or consolidation is probably an elusive target.  
 
A history of democratic culture is not necessary for a nation to pursue democracy 
(Diamond, 1993, p. 423). As discussed in the following section, democratisation can 
be the result of the combination of many factors. Democratic transition does not 
follow a linear path and is not a rational process by any means (O‟Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1986, p. 72). Often democratisation follows “an iterative process of 
constantly resonating reciprocal influences between actions, new institutions, new 
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social forces or configurations, new environmental constraints and opportunities, and 
new perceptions, beliefs, and values” (Diamond, 1993, p. 423). As a result, the 
transition can take a number of different routes.  
 
Typologies of democratisation processes have been presented by a number of 
authors including Linz
5
 (1978), and Share and Mainwaring
6
 (1986). Furthermore, 
Stepan (1986) listed at least ten alternative paths
7
 from nondemocratic regimes to 
political democracy. However, because of their clarity and relevance to the 
Maldives, the typologies of Huntington (1991-2) and Welzel (2009) are presented 
here.  
 
Huntington (1991-2, p. 583) names three broad processes; transformation, 
replacement, and transplacement. According to him, in simple terms, transformation 
occurs when the elites in power take the lead in bringing democracy, replacement 
occurs when opposition groups take the lead in bringing democracy resulting in the 
collapse or overthrow of the authoritarian regime, and transplacement occurs when 
transition is the result of joint action of government and opposition groups. As 
evident, the focus in this typology is on government and opposition groups and the 
influence and power of those actors.  
 
Welzel‟s (2009) typology of the democratisation process focuses on the participation 
or the absence of the general public during the democratic transition. Welzel (2009, 
p. 87) identifies responsive democratisation, enlightened democratisation, 
opportunistic democratisation, and imposed democratisation. Welzel (2009, p. 87) 
calls transitions driven by the masses, “responsive democratisation”, the dominant 
type of democratisation witnessed in the emergence of nascent democracies in recent 
                                               
5  Linz (1978, p. 35) used the terms “reforma” and “ruptura”.  These terms could be considered 
equivalent to “transformation” and “replacement” respectively in Huntington‟s (1991-2) 
classification.  
6 Share and Mainwaring (1986) used the terms “transaction”, “breakdown/collapse” and “extrication”. 
Once again these terms can be considered equivalent to “transformation”, “replacement”, and 
“transplacement” respectively in Huntington‟s (1991-2) classification.  
7 Those ten paths are: internal restoration after external occupation; internal democratic reformulation 
after external liberation; externally monitored installation; transformation led by authoritarian regime; 
transition initiated by military-as-government; extrication led by military-as-institution; transition led 
by society; transition led by opposition parties; violent revolt; and revolutionary war (Stepan, 1986).  
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times. However, other forms of democratisation where mass action plays little or no 
part may also be evident in emerging democracies. For instance, Bhutan‟s 
democratisation process has been driven predominantly by the King, an 
unconventional transition (Turner, Chuki, & Tshering, 2011) that Welzel (2009, pp. 
87-8) would call “enlightened democratisation”, which occurs “when negative 
historical experiences have discredited alternative forms of government” and the 
“elites effectively respect democratic standards even in absence of mass pressures to 
do so”. Opportunistic democratisation (when the elites believe “they can easily 
corrupt democratic standards in practice and when the pretence of democracy is 
perceived as a useful means to open the doors to the international community” and 
donor agencies (Welzel, 2009, p. 88)), and imposed democratisation (when the 
“elites depend on the will of external powers and when these powers are pushing for 
democracy”), are two forms that are not driven by the pressure from the masses 
(Welzel, 2009, p. 88).  
 
2.2.2 Causes of democratisation. 
 
It is rare for a nation to pursue democratic transition for a single reason. Rather, 
often a combination of factors is required for democratisation to proceed effectively 
(Rossi & della Porta, 2009, p. 182). As Pagnucco (1995, p. 151) has stated, the main 
reason for the need to combine perspectives from above and from below is that “the 
„mode of transition‟, the context of the democratization process, the types of actors 
involved in the process, and their strategic interactions, all influence the kind of 
democracy that is established”. Therefore, this section presents a number of probable 
factors that may drive a nation towards democratic transition. The factors presented 
here are: political elites, mass movements, societal groups, significant incidents, 
economic and social development, globalisation and media, and international 
community.  
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Political elites. 
 
Often a number of organisations or actors within a society are responsible for 
moving the democratisation process forward. Among them, political elites
8
, both 
existing and those that emerge during the democratisation process, arguably play a 
central role. Their contribution can be important in determining the success or failure 
of the process (Kotze & Du Toit, 1995, p. 34). For elites to support democratic 
reforms, either there should be a widespread belief among them that democracy is 
the best form of government for the society (Diamond, et al., 1987, p. 7), or they 
believe that their interests will be better served when they back the democratic 
movement to dismantle the authoritarian regime (Przeworski, 1986; Stepan, 1986, p. 
72). Such support from the elites may be the result of modernisation because, as 
Welzel and Inglehart (2008) state, with modernisation, ordinary people‟s capabilities 
and willingness to struggle for democratic reforms increase which puts effective 
pressure on elites.  
 
Effective pressure by the general public can also result in splitting the existing elites 
who either support or resist democratic reforms. When such a split occurs a liberal 
reform camp will emerge that assists the transition towards democracy (Higley & 
Burton, 2006; O‟Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986, cited in Welzel, 2009, p. 
83). This might be due to a number of reasons, some of which are addressed in the 
following sections. Such a liberal camp will then try to regain legitimacy for the elite 
by initiating a liberalisation process which may lead to a negotiated transition to 
democracy (Welzel, 2009, p. 83). However, such a negotiated and peaceful transition 
is possible only when the majority of the political actors within the regime, as well as 
                                               
8 Defining the term “Political Elite” is a theoretical morass with a long history. A recent definition 
provided by Burton and Higley (2001, p. 182) defines political elites as “the several thousand persons 
who hold top positions in large or otherwise powerful organizations and movements and who 
participate in or directly influence national political decision-making”. They are from all facets of the 
society “who have the organized capacity to make real political trouble” (Burton & Higley, 2001, p. 
182). In addition, Blondel and Müller-Rommel (2007, p. 821) state that, “all persons with specific 
individual resources such as income, prestige, education, and occupation may in principle belong to 
the political elites. Thus, the political elite in modern democracies consist of distinct groups of 
individuals with varying socio-demographic backgrounds and occupational positions”. Although 
different labels are used to refer to the same concept and different concepts are covered by the same 
label, many authors including Bottomore (1964), Dahl (1970), Guttsman (1960), Lasswell (1961), 
Meisel (1962), Mills (1956), Mosca (1939), Pareto (1935), and Zuckerman (1977) have contributed to 
the literature.   
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the opposition, are willing to negotiate during the transition process. Failure to 
negotiate, or unsuccessful negotiation, may lead to civil unrest.    
 
Mass movements. 
 
As important as the political elites are in the democratisation process, the power of 
ordinary people, the mass public, has also been a significant force in many 
democratic transitions. The Arab Spring is a recent example where popular uprising 
was significant in the initial stages of a transition. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) 
argue that the public may prefer democracy for superficial or instrumental reasons 
(cited in Welzel & Inglehart, 2009, p. 129). Superficial reasons include pursuing of 
democracy because it has become socially desirable with positive connotations 
(Inglehart, 2003, cited in Welzel & Inglehart, 2009, p. 129), whereas instrumental 
reasons involve pursuing democracy in the belief that it will bring economic 
prosperity rather than for reasons such as political freedom (Bratton & Mattes, 2001, 
cited in Welzel & Inglehart, 2009, p. 129).  
 
On the contrary, Welzel and Inglehart (2006, 2009) argue that only when preferences 
are intrinsically driven – that is when the masses place a high value on freedom and 
self-expression
9
 – is it likely that the people will actively pursue democratisation. In 
the absence of intrinsic preferences, and in cases where people‟s expectations are not 
fulfilled through democratic governance, reversion to autocratic rule is also a 
possibility.         
 
In addition to intrinsic preferences towards democratisation, the conduciveness of a 
nation‟s political culture to democratic reforms is also an important element, though 
not a necessity. While Diamond (1993, pp. 7-8) defines political culture as “a 
people‟s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations 
about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system”, 
                                               
9  Components of self-expression values include tolerance, trust, political activism, and greater 
emphasis on freedom of speech; more specifically it includes values such as tolerance towards 
homosexuals, willingness to trust others, willingness to sign petitions, describing oneself as very 
happy, and giving priority towards self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical 
security (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
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Verba (1965, p. 513) defines it as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive 
symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes 
place”. Simply, political culture concerns the sentiments of the people in relation to 
political action. In transitions led by mass movements, it is important that the masses 
are in favour of drastic changes and do not believe that the status quo fulfils their 
ambitions and demands. In other words, during mass-led transitions, a majority of 
the public is likely to favour democratic change and embrace democracy as better 
than any other form of political system. In addition, when a “set of values, beliefs, 
and attitudes that fosters toleration, bargaining, and compromise” (Payne & Nassar, 
2010, p. 180) is present, or when there is a willingness to tolerate diversity and 
conflict among various groups as well as when the legitimacy of compromise is 
recognised by all parties (Huntington, 1984, p. 209), the probability that the 
transition will succeed is likely to be greater.  
 
Societal groups. 
 
Interest groups such as political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs) are 
also important players in emerging democracies. In countries where political, 
economic, and societal liberalisation takes place prior to democratic reforms such 
groups can be leading forces in the drive towards democratisation. Morlino (2009) 
states that political parties are an essential component of democracy and they are 
dominant in the transition process as well although they are not always hegemonic. 
A lively civil society has also been considered essential for democratic consolidation 
(Letki, 2009) and some even list civil society as one of the key spheres necessary for 
the modern democratic system to emerge and function (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 7).  
 
Significant incidents. 
 
Politically significant incidents sometimes trigger attitudinal changes within political 
elites and the mass population that, in turn, support a process of democratisation. An 
event in Tunisia that triggered the Arab Spring is one recent example. One also 
needs to note that, although a single, particularly dramatic event may be a turning 
point in mass action, such a dramatic event often is a manifestation of a culmination 
of a series of events (Linz, 1990, p. 157).  
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Mass demonstration or political violence can mark the start of this process. Welzel 
(2009, p. 89) states: 
  
If people have acquired both the capability and the willingness to join forces in 
struggling for democratic freedoms, and if there is reason for grievance 
because these freedoms are denied, deficient or challenged, at some point a 
critical event will prompt people to actually act together for these freedoms, be 
it to establish, to deepen or to defend them. Provided these actions grow strong 
enough, power elites will be forced to give in to their demands. When this 
happens we witness mass responsive democratization. 
 
Though the start of the transition may be due to such incidents, the process may not 
be smooth. Huntington (1991-2, p. 610) observes, the road towards transplacements 
is “often marked by a seesawing back and forth of strikes, protests, and 
demonstrations, on the one hand, and repression, jailing, police violence, states of 
siege, and martial law, on the other”. In such cases, there is no single mass uprising 
that sweeps the established order from power. Both the government and opposition 
are incapable of changing the status quo, and after testing each other‟s strengths and 
weaknesses, a political dialectic is initiated which leads to further democratisation 
(Huntington, 1991-2, p. 609). In most cases such transitions are lengthy and often 
involve several setbacks before eventual agreement is reached among the political 
elites. 
 
Economic and social development. 
 
Although economic development arguably leads to the rise of a middle class which 
is considered a crucial social requisite to foster a democracy (Pei, 2002, p. 4), 
“economic development compels the modification or abandonment of traditional 
political institutions; it does not determine what political system will replace them” 
(Huntington, 1984, p. 201). In particular, capitalism and democracy can exist 
independently from one another and one does not necessarily lead to the other 
(Grugel, 2002, p. 240). There are capitalist nations that are not considered 
democratic (China, for example) and though it has been rare, history shows there 
were non-capitalist democracies (for example, Chile under the rule of Salvador 
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Allende). Such examples show that the point made by Lindblom (1977, pp. 161-9) 
appears almost precise – that though all political democracies have market-oriented 
economies, not all market-oriented economies are paired with democratic political 
systems. Nonetheless, though capitalism and material development are not essential 
preconditions for democratic transition, growth in personal wealth may increase its 
likelihood. In this regard, Lipset (1959, p. 75) has stated that the “more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”.      
 
Globalisation and media. 
 
Globalisation is defined as the “processes whereby many social relations become 
relatively delinked from territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly 
played out in the world as a single place” (Scholte, 2001, pp. 14-15). There are 
numerous other definitions of “globalisation” (see Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & 
Perraton, 1999; Teichmann, 2002, p. 4; Zolo, 2007, p. 1). For smaller states the 
impact of globalisation has meant “that their control over the movements of money, 
commodities, people and information across their borders has entered a process of 
decline” (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 101), making them susceptible to daily global forces. 
 
The effect of globalisation can also be significant during the democratisation 
process, especially for smaller states due to their dependence on and openness to the 
outside world. The pressure on less-democratic nations to embrace the principles of 
democracy has increased exponentially, especially after the end of the Cold War.
10
 In 
the recent past, established democracies and multi-national bodies have promoted 
democracy under the banner of “good governance”. Though a number of influential 
nations are firm believers in “Westphalian sovereignty”, for most nations, the 
principle no longer applies when a nation represses its own citizens. In other words, 
“states no longer have the right to treat their citizens as they think fit” (Held, et al., 
1999). The principles of human rights are given a high degree of importance. Cases 
in point seen over the last two decades include the intervention in Bosnia and more 
recently in Libya. Some exceptions include Syria and North Korea, cases which are 
                                               
10 “Cold War had imposed restrictions on the ability of Americans to criticize American allies who 
violated their citizens‟ rights” (Payne & Nassar, 2010, p. 184). 
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not resolved due to a number of reasons including the reluctance of U.S. to get 
embroiled in yet another war, and the exercise of veto by Russia and China in the 
Security Council.   
   
In this global village, advancements in information technology and mass media have 
meant that the sovereignty of individual nations to determine their own affairs in the 
face of globalisation is eroding (Saward, 2003, p. 93). Mass media are a dominant 
actor in our day-to-day lives. In addition to conventional sources such as newspapers 
and television, internet and social networking sites also act as sources of information 
from which people learn about what unfolds domestically and globally. The reaches 
of an independent media can be fundamental during a democratisation process as the 
“media enable the citizens to make informed choices by seeking out information 
about the political alternatives at hand” (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009, p. 235). The 
media can therefore play a prominent role in focusing and organising resistance to 
the status quo of the polity. Media are also crucial in ensuring that democratic 
institutions work effectively thereby improving the quality of the democratic process 
(Cheema, 2005, p. 228). In what is often referred to as the “fourth estate”, the media 
have a powerful role in making governments and political actors accountable, in 
revealing acts of corruption and abuse of power by state officials. Therefore, 
independent and effective media contribute towards determining public opinion and 
thereby help to drive the process of democratisation. 
 
International community. 
 
The international community and donor agencies can also have an impact on the 
emergence of democracy, especially in recipient countries expecting significant 
gains from donors. For example, if a state wants to join the European Union (EU), it 
is required to have or develop the laws and institutions of democracy as a condition 
of accession. When development aid is tied to democratic reforms – mostly under the 
banner of “good governance” – required by international agencies such as the World 
Bank (WB) as well as individual governments, the extent to which the receiving 
nations are able to accept such preconditions can have an influence on the transition 
process. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
spends around US$650 million annually on programmes related to the promotion of 
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democracy (Carothers, 1999, p. 48). However, it is important to highlight here that 
although foreign influences can have a significant impact during the transition phase, 
the ultimate consolidation of democracy in a given case will be determined by 
domestic forces (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 73). Furthermore, L. Whitehead (1986, p. 
31) stresses that during peacetime, internal factors of the nation determine the 
success of democratic transitions and external support becomes of secondary 
importance. Knack (2004), in his multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on 
democratisation in a large sample of recipient countries over the period 1975-2000, 
found no evidence of aid promoting democracy in those nations. Therefore, the exact 
impact the international community has on the democratisation process may vary 
from country to country and thus requires a cautious examination. 
     
2.2.3 Results of democratisation. 
 
As mentioned previously (section 1.5.4), the breakdown of a nondemocratic regime 
and the beginning of the establishment of democratic order do not necessarily ensure 
a smooth consolidation of a democratic political culture. History shows reversal to 
autocratic rule is also a possibility. The state of each nation, inclusive of all factors 
that may have an impact on the political culture, determines the route each nation 
follows. This section presents four possible end results of transition towards 
democracy.  
 
Consolidated democracies. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 1.5.4), democratic consolidation is 
reached when democracy is seen by all actors as the “only game in town” (Di Palma, 
1990, p. 113). In other words, consolidation is reached when what Rustow (1970, p. 
358-61) refers as “habituation” is achieved: all aspects of democracy are ingrained 
among the actors so that they conform to written and unwritten rules even during 
conflict and competition (Diamond, 1999, p. 65). The elites, state institutions, and 
the public all believe that their political system is worth obeying and defending 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 66). When such a stage is reached, it can be safe to conclude that 
the transition to democracy is complete. In the political dealings among the actors 
“abnormality” will no longer be considered a central feature when the transition is 
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over (O‟Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 65). By then democratic maturity and 
consolidation is reached. Linz (1990, p. 158) states that consolidated democracy is:   
 
one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, 
forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic 
processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to 
veto the action of democratically elected decision makers. This does not mean 
that there are no minorities ready to challenge and question the legitimacy of 
the democratic process by nondemocratic means. It means, however, that the 
major actors do not turn to them and they remain politically isolated. 
   
It is also important to point out that sustainable democracy is achieved only through 
socially embedded democracy, which in turn is achieved mostly through mass 
responsive democratisation (Welzel, 2009, p. 89) mentioned earlier (see sections 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2).    
 
Restricted democracies. 
 
According to Sørensen (1998, p. 46), “restricted democracies are political systems 
with some democratic elements but also with limits on competition, participation, 
and liberties”. Also known as “guided democracy”, a classical example is Indonesia 
under the rule of Sukarno. In such nations, authoritarian rule may have been replaced 
by a form of democracy that has provided a degree of competitive elections and 
political liberties. However, due to the restrictions placed on democratic attributes, 
such nations are considered restricted democracies. In these countries one 
fundamental aspect of democracy is commonly missing, namely “an arena of 
contestation sufficiently fair that the ruling party can be turned out of power” 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 15). Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995, p. 8) refer to such 
regimes as pseudodemocracies, “because the existence of formally democratic 
political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often in part to 
legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination”. Though there are wide variations 
even among such nations, the basic feature appears to be limited competition due to 
application of autocratic modes to prevent open competition regardless of the 
tolerance towards multiple parties.    
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Frail, unconsolidated democracies. 
 
Most democracies that transit from authoritarian rule to democratic rule fall into the 
category of frail and unconsolidated democracies, at least initially. At times, they are 
also referred as emerging or nascent democracies. Due to a number of factors that 
include the lack of adequate time for democratic characteristics to institutionalise in 
the polity, such democracies lack some of the features evident in consolidated 
democracies. Some of the reasons behind the frailness and the characteristics of such 
democracies are presented below.   
 
Institutional weaknesses are arguably one of the biggest challenges facing an 
emerging democracy particularly in imposing effective constraints on arbitrary 
action by the executive. The professional capacity and institutional setup of state 
organisations, political parties, and CSOs can have a crucial impact on the 
development of democracy, especially during the early stages. However, 
“institutional weaknesses, including ineffectual political parties and an absence of 
effective checks and balances on the chief executive” (WB, 2005, cited in Kapstein 
& Converse, 2008, p. 4) are commonly found in emerging democracies. Checks and 
balances are particularly important in nations where new institutions are created as 
part of the democratic process. Additionally, in oppositional party-based political 
systems, the functioning of strong opposition parties is important in flourishing 
democracies because they can prevent abuses by the leadership (Kapstein & 
Converse, 2008, p. 26). Furthermore, tolerance and civility among the parties may 
also need to be developed over time. In this regard, some argue that at times there 
needs to be a more phased and gradual transition to democracy so that parties can 
learn to live with one another and establish a system of mutual security (Diamond, et 
al., 1987).  
 
Defining the boundaries of state institutions can also be problematic in nascent 
democracies. This complicates what O‟Donnell (1996) refers to as “horizontal 
accountability” – a system where control mechanisms are placed on state agencies by 
other state agencies to prevent the sanctioning of unlawful or inappropriate actions of 
state agents – and how that accountability is to be applied. The boundaries between 
the institutions of such democracies may be vaguely defined and “even when such 
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power may be defined clearly on paper, the actual mechanisms of enforcement do 
not exist, allowing opportunistic political leaders to trespass on the prerogatives of 
other institutions” (Pei, 2002, p. 14). In addition to the three arms of the state – 
executive, judiciary, and the legislature – a number of other organisations such as 
those responsible for auditing, and investigating corruption and human rights abuses 
acts to oversee the functions of the three arms in most nations. The proper 
functioning of the legal roles of such organisations and how they interact with other 
state organs can determine the time period for the nation to become a mature 
democracy. In a case study of seven East Asian and Pacific countries, Laking (2008) 
concluded that for such overseeing bodies to succeed a number of factors are 
important. They include a political climate that at least tolerates the activities of 
those institutions; operational independence from the executive; reasonably secure 
and adequate funding; powers of investigation; a public profile and some support 
from civil society and the media; and the ability of the institutions to get their 
findings and recommendations implemented. The presence of such factors will 
arguably be an important element in preventing abuse of power and cementing the 
democratic transition.         
 
In many emerging democracies, even those that entrench freedom of the press as a 
constitutional principle, political interference and control of the media can be the 
reality.
11
 Unwillingness to give up control of state media, politicisation of 
appointment of boards for public broadcasters, interference of democratically elected 
politicians towards independent media are all features evident in nascent 
democracies (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009). According to Voltmer and Rawnsley 
(2009, p. 241), “one of the main reasons why governments are reluctant to give up 
control over the media is the lack of alternative communicative links with the 
citizens, such as effective party organization”. Furthermore, media themselves might 
be politically inclined towards one or other political factions with opinionated and 
politicised reporting rather than neutral and balanced reporting (Voltmer & 
Rawnsley, 2009, pp. 243-4).    
 
                                               
11 Even in mature democracies, establishing a control mechanism for the media can be an issue. After 
the phone-hacking scandal, debate on control of the media has re-emerged in the UK - a nation with a 
centuries-old tradition of press freedom.  
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Due to such challenges in frail democracies, Polterovich and Popov (2007, p. 39) 
state that building a democracy “should be gradual, rather than shock therapy type, 
and should go hand in hand with the strengthening of law and order”. The 
consolidated democracies of the West themselves are prime examples of this because 
democracy was not installed overnight in those countries; rather it was a long-term 
process of gradual change (Sørensen, 1998, p. 52). Furthermore, Huntington (1984, 
p. 214) states that: 
 
the probability of stable democracy emerging will be enhanced to the extent 
that the transition can be a gradual one, that the introduction of contestation 
precedes the expansion of political participation, and that the role of violence 
in the transition is minimized.  
 
Depending on the readiness of the nation to embrace democratic ideals, a number of 
repercussions can be evident during the consolidation and sustaining of democracy. 
Misra (2004, p. 142) in his studies of Maldives, Bhutan, and Nepal, concluded that 
“hasty introduction of Western-style democracy may not be conducive to certain 
societies” and small states that have introduced democracy gradually have been more 
successful in maintaining law and order. Therefore, the speed at which democratic 
reforms are undertaken can have a bearing on the road towards maturity as the 
awareness of and readiness of the general public for democracy ultimately decides 
the final outcome.   
 
Failed democracies. 
 
Failed democracies are polities that at one time show promise as potential 
democracies but move toward authoritarianism and reversal of democratic principles. 
As Fish and Wittenberg (2009, p. 251) explain, such countries “have an experience 
of political opening but subsequently underwent a major reversal”. Observers have 
provided different reasons for such failures. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argue that 
ethnically “diverse societies are more prone to conflict and less able to generate the 
compromise that is integral to democratic practice” (cited in Fish & Wittenberg, 
2009, p. 253). Furthermore, high dependence on income received from oil and gas, a 
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large Muslim share of the population, and sex inequality has also been considered to 
be inversely related to successful democratisation (Fish & Wittenberg, 2009).      
 
Fish and Wittenberg (2009, p, 258) identify five agents with the potential to derail 
democracy: (1) a public that overthrows the government in an uprising; (2) 
insurgents that instigate civil war; (3) foreign powers that invade the country or 
provide support for anti-government elements; (4) armed forces that carry out a coup 
d'état; and (5) chief executives that engage in despotic actions. One or a combination 
of these elements may result in reversal to autocratic rule.    
 
2.2.4 Democratisation and small-island states. 
 
How does being a small-island state affect the process of democratisation? During 
the democratisation process there is: (1) negotiation of the institutional changes of 
democracy; and (2) subsequent resolution of conflicts in a way that protects those 
institutions. Small polities have relatively distinct features when compared to larger 
polities, and those features can be a factor during this process (also see section 2.5).   
 
According to March and Olsen (1984, p. 738), “political democracy depends not 
only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political 
institutions”. The constitutional arrangements of the nation also form part of this 
political institution. Stepan and Skach (1993, p. 2) argue that constitutions represent 
the “institutional frameworks” which provides “the basic decision rules and incentive 
systems concerning formation, the conditions under which governments can continue 
to rule, and the conditions by which they can be terminated democratically”. 
However, are successfully democratising small-island states more likely to have one 
form of constitutional architecture than another? 
 
There is some evidence supporting a correlation between the choice of formal 
institutions and smallness and islandness. Anckar (2006) argues that small-island 
states are more likely than other states to have a parliamentary system, support 
plurality-based electoral systems and employ “direct democracy” in the form of 
referenda and initiative ballots. Anckar (1996) also found that in small-island states 
that are archipelagos, specific consideration is given by constitution-makers to 
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representation in the national assembly of smaller island communities and often also 
to decentralisation of governance and administration.    
 
A number of studies have focused on state size and democracy. Ott (2000), used a 
cross-national multiple case study along with statistical data for all nations during the 
period 1973-1995. The study‟s central hypothesis was that state size does impact the 
formation and maintenance of democracy in small states. Ott hypothesised that those 
effects were the consequences of the social systems (such as informal patterns of 
interaction and overall cooperativeness among societal members) in small states. 
Such social interactions would in turn change the political and economic 
environment, and affect state behaviour at the system, group, and individual levels, 
affecting the democratisation process of those states (Ott, 2000, pp. 9, 195, 196). By 
using a variety of methods, including time series analysis, she concluded that small 
and island states are more likely to be and remain democratic. A study conducted by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat (1997) also concluded that small states are more 
likely to be and remain democratic irrespective of the level of economic 
development, and to show continuous political stability. Anckar (2008) also 
concludes that small country size is conducive to the growth of democratic 
principles. Therefore, small-island states can be seen as “a welcome antidote and 
contrast to the anarchy, autocracy, internal warfare, militarism, violence and state 
collapse which is a feature of all too many larger, mainland states” (Srebrnik, 2004, 
p. 339).    
 
Cultural attributes can play an important role in maintaining a civil political 
environment that is conducive to fostering a democracy. Grugel (2002, p. 246) 
insists that there is a common argument that it is easier for liberal democracy to 
institutionalise in Western cultures mainly because of their emphasis on 
individualism.
12
 Cheema (2005, p. 215) also argues that in cultures where people 
avoid extreme forms of individualism in their behaviour, this negatively affects the 
                                               
12  Among the four main cultural dimensions explained by Hofstede (1991), individualism and 
collectivism express how the individual affiliates himself or herself to the society. According to 
Hofstede (1991, p. 51) “individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are 
loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. 
Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated 
into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people‟s lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestionable loyalty.” 
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process of democratisation. It is perhaps paradoxical that while social closeness 
reinforces collective decision-making of democracies, it limits individual self-
expression that appears stronger in individualistic societies. Nonetheless, it can be 
argued that despite the cultural affinity for collectivism and other related attributes 
evident in small states, small-island states can, over time, still emerge as mature 
democracies, as small country size has been shown to be conducive to democracy 
(Frye, 2002, p. 86). 
 
Some social features of small-island societies may enable conflicts to be resolved 
within a democratic framework thereby aiding democratic consolidation along the 
way. Members of the governing elite in small states cannot ignore their social 
interconnectedness when exercising authority (J. Richards, 1982). For instance the 
importance and influence of political elites are likely to be greater in small states – 
thus allowing them to implement the “choice” to pursue the democratic bargain 
easily (Ott, 2000, p. 81). In other words, such elites are able to lead mass opinion and 
the outcome of their negotiations is more likely to be accepted by the wider public.  
 
This does not imply that political differences will not be visible in small states and 
small-island states. Political differences are unavoidable in a democratic polity, but 
how those differences are dealt with and resolved determine the maturity of a 
democracy. The societal closeness evident in small states means that when political 
differences arise they are “more personal, more intense and more emotionally 
charged” (Brown, 2008, p. 7; J. Richards, 1982, p. 159) than in larger societies. 
However, some argue that in small states it is not practicable to play politics as a 
zero-sum game and so the politicians learn to adopt a more consensual style and 
avoid the extreme hardline positions that are possible in larger countries (Lijphart, 
1977, p. 65). In this respect, Anckar and Anckar (2000) argue that extreme smallness 
of the nation, an extremely archipelagic geography, and an intense cultural resistance 
to divisions in the society can lead to flourishing democracies, interestingly even in 
the absence of political parties, which are often presumed to be divisive institutions.  
  
Geographical isolation coupled with smallness of island states can also be a factor in 
democratisation. Anckar and Anckar (1995) argue that a combination of smallness 
and remoteness hold quite specific democratic promises. They argue that people 
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living at a distance from the outside world are likely to develop a spirit of 
community and solidarity leading to the emergence of feelings of tolerance and 
communication, and that the distance between the governors and those who are 
governed is lessened as the two share the same challenges (Anckar & Anckar, 1995). 
Furthermore, it is also likely that the relative unimportance of some of the island 
states mean that colonising powers were less likely to intervene in the internal affairs 
or manipulate the institutional development of such states. Therefore, such countries 
may have been left to develop institutions on their own terms.  
 
2.3 Theory of contemporary civil service 
 
2.3.1 Historical overview. 
 
Substantial evidence from the work of anthropologists and archaeologists suggests 
the existence of organised government and public officials dates to around 6000 B.C. 
(Gladden, 1972a, p. 1). At that time organisations and functions would have been 
much simpler. Record keeping would have not existed until writing was invented 
much later, and probably emerged due to the need for counting. However, the 
comparatively well-documented Egyptian civilisation that existed from around 3400 
to 525 B.C. provides a starting point for the study of government (Gladden, 1972a, p. 
45). With time and the rise of different civilisations such as Greek, Roman, Indian, 
Chinese, and Ottoman, the operation of the state with its more advanced political and 
social institutions became increasingly complex.  
 
The Constitution of Melfi issued by Frederick II of Sicily in the year 1231 has been 
called the “birth certificate of modern bureaucracy” (Jacoby, 1973, p. 21, cited in J. 
C. N. Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, p. 73). With time and the dissolution of 
feudalism, new urban civilisations started to emerge. Such developments eventually 
led to the birth of the modern CS, from the nineteenth century into the 1930s (J. C. 
N. Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996). Some date the modern CS from the 
establishment of the British Civil Service in 1853 through the Macaulay reforms 
relating to recruitment of the Indian Service (Gladden, 1945). In this regard, some 
consider the term civil service as an Indian input to the field of public administration 
when it was used to differentiate government and military officials by the British 
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Government in Punjab in late eighteenth century (Mishra, 2001, p. 120). However, 
Van der Meer, Steen, and Wille (2007) date the birth of the modern CS from the 
drive for codified CS legislation in Prussia in 1794. 
 
Professional CS is by no means an exclusively Western concept. However, in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most international exchange of ideas of the CS 
has been based on European and U.S. exemplars, mainly but not exclusively as a 
result of colonisation, and therefore, the focus in the next section is on the evolution 
of the principles of the CS in those countries.  
 
2.3.2 Evolution of civil service models in Europe and the United States. 
 
This section examines the development of the CS model in the European-American 
context. J. C. N. Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996) identify five phases in the 
evolution of the CS systems with a focus on the European continent: civil servants as 
personal servants; civil servants as state servants; civil servants as public servants; 
the CS as protected service; and the CS as professional service. It is also possible 
that a similar division of roles may have developed much earlier in Egypt and China, 
for example. 
 
The first phase in Europe is considered to be during the thirteenth century when the 
monarch employed three types of servants – court staff, army, and civil servants (J. 
C. N. Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, p. 71). Such developments were the result of 
reshuffling of power between clergy, aristocrats, and kings that provided for an 
administrative apparatus (J. C. N. Raadschelders, 1998, pp. 149-50). During the 
second phase, when civil servants were considered state servants, a greater degree of 
formalisation in administration was in place. In the course of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, the focus started to shift from the betterment of the monarch to 
the provision of public welfare which was mainly the result of territorial expansion 
of states and the increasingly growing interaction with other states (J. C. N. 
Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, pp. 74-8). Civil service started to take shape during 
that stage, though not with features similar to those evident in the present day. In the 
next phase, from 1780 to 1880, the civil servant was no longer directly responsible to 
the monarch, but to a civil sovereign power (J. C. N. Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, 
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pp. 78). A civil servant was not seen as an officeholder but as an employee of the 
state during this stage (Church, 1981), though the service was still plagued with 
patronage (Gladden, 1972b). Developments during this third stage included 
introduction of ranking of staff, provision of regular salary with provision for 
pension, and written procedures to govern administrative tasks (J. C. N. 
Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, pp. 78-81). Politics and administration became 
differentiated during this third stage, providing a major platform for the development 
of the modern CS (Chester, 1981, p. 315; Nelson, 1982, pp. 119-133; Parris, 1969, p. 
33; J. C. N. Raadschelders, 2003, p. 310).  
 
In the fourth stage, during the period of industrialisation of the nineteenth century, 
the CS turned into a professional service (J. C. N. Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, p. 
83). With the expansion of public services provided by the government, the CS grew 
along with extensive regulations. Civil servants became more aware of their rights 
and consequently demanded legal protections and guarantees from the state. The 
Kingdom of Bavaria (currently a state of Germany) was one of the first in 1805 to 
pass a CS Act (Hattenhauer, 1979, p. 183; Heyen, 1989, cited in J. C. N. 
Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1996, pp. 83-4). The fifth phase was focused on the 
building and continuation of the processes of professionalisation and specialisation 
that were the hallmark of the previous stage. Legislation governing the CS had 
become the norm with increasing attention towards performance and elimination of 
red-tape in the bureaucracy. The CS also became the subject of extensive criticism 
for its growing size, lack of efficiency and representativeness (J. C. N. Raadschelders 
& Rutgers, 1996, pp. 86-9). J. C. N. Raadschelders (2003, p. 327) suggests that the 
fourth and the fifth stages elaborate the third stage because the civil servant 
continued to support the elected officials and in return civil servants received 
protection through law and political accountability.  
 
Butler (1993) identified four phases in the evolution of the CS in Britain: (1) from 
the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan report until the Warren Fisher reforms in the 1920s; 
(2) extensive growth in the size of the CS, which he termed the “cloistered 
profession” between 1930s and 1960s; (3) from the Fulton report until 1979, a period 
with emphasis on accountability, efficiency, and professionalism; (4) following 
Margaret Thatcher‟s electoral victory in 1979 into the 1990s – a period Butler (1993) 
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suggests, of direct initiatives specifically targeted at the CS that turned an 
evolutionary process into a “revolution”.  
 
Among the time periods mentioned by Butler (1993), arguably the most influential 
period followed the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. Some assert that the report 
sought to create a more efficient public service and a purer and more strenuous ethic 
in public life (Hart, 1972). Others have noted that the report was evolutionary, rather 
than revolutionary (Hennessy, 1989; D. Richards, 1997) due to the growth of the 
state which meant that the bureaucracy had to cope with the new pressures placed on 
it. D. Richards (2003) notes that as the responsibility of the state grew, politicians 
needed permanent advisers and staff to implement their policies thereby replacing 
the former patronage system.  
 
The CS evolved differently in the United States than it did in Europe, and Ingraham 
and Rosenbloom (1990) have identified four dominant models of the American 
Public Service: (1) an arm of the ruling elite; (2) an extension of political parties; (3) 
an apolitical, technical, and managerial public service; and (4) an extension of the 
chief executive.  
 
In the first model, from 1789 to 1828, the belief was that federal service should be an 
arm of the ruling political elites. Patronage was an accepted norm and politics and 
administration were considered the domain of the upper social class (Ingraham & 
Rosenbloom, 1990, pp. 212-3). The second model, from the late 1820s to the 1880s, 
was an extension of the first model. The party which captured both presidency and a 
majority of congress had the federal CS at their control, which meant a high turnover 
after a change of government at elections (Ingraham & Rosenbloom, 1990, p. 213). 
Calls to depoliticise the federal service led to major reforms and the advent of the 
third model. The Pendleton Act of 1883 was considered a turning point. In addition 
to depoliticisation of public service, providing efficient and effective regulation and 
service delivery through principles of scientific management were prime objectives 
(Ingraham & Rosenbloom, 1990, p. 213).  
 
There were numerous differences between the American and British models. For 
one, the American model did not include a base-grade entry and political 
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appointments were maintained for senior positions (Halligan, 2007, p. 54). It allowed 
open competition for promotions as well as entry examination and the emphasis was 
on practical skills and knowledge in the examination rather than on academic 
credentials and knowledge as is practiced in Britain (Ingraham, 1995, p. 27). The 
aim in U.S. was to deal with the patronage through political means with the use of 
executive orders rather than through legislative action (Ingraham, 1995). 
Furthermore, politics intruded into the CS and the CS was also at times involved in 
politics more openly in American federal bureaucracy compared to the European 
nations (Suleiman, 2003, p. 17). Such different evolutionary paths were mainly due 
to the difference in the system of government.  
 
The fourth model evolved during the New Deal that “viewed the public service as 
the domain of the elected executive for policy implementation and formulation” 
(Ingraham & Rosenbloom, 1990, p. 213). This was not a major departure from the 
previous model, but the main difference was a change of emphasis from scientific 
management to executive control, that contributed to the growth of several 
institutions outside the CS system (Ingraham & Rosenbloom, 1990, pp. 213-4). 
  
The evolution of CS models in the European-American context can thus be 
summarised into a number of main themes. They include: the development of a 
system of public employment that would fit the development of more complex and 
rule-driven systems of public administration; the constant and on-going tension 
between employment based on patronage and on qualifications for administrative 
tasks (merit); the efforts to define a distinct zone of administration that would be the 
domain of the civil servant; the associated demarcation of “policy” and 
“administration”; the growth of the ideas of hierarchy and career in the CS; and the 
evolution of the bargain between the professional civil servant and politician in 
which a guarantee of secure lifetime employment was given in return for 
unquestioning loyalty and obedience. Such features form part of what is referred as 
“Weberian” principles, discussed in the next section.       
 
 
 
36 
 
2.3.3 Civil service models in contemporary times. 
 
Bureaucracy
13
 is a central institution in any state. Max Weber was the first to 
identify bureaucracy as a system of administration that is carried out on a continuous 
basis by trained professionals guided by prescribed rules. He identified eleven 
features as pertinent to such organisations (see Weber, 2007), which Beetham (1996, 
p. 9) subsequently reduced to four: (1) a predefined hierarchy for each official with 
division of labour; (2) continuity of the job with an organisational structure that 
offers regular advancements; (3) impersonality of the tasks where rules act as guides 
and records are maintained; and (4) focus on expertise where officials are hired on 
merit and trained for the tasks.   
 
Weber‟s model of analysing administrative systems focused mainly on organisations 
as systems of power or domination in which the leader exercises control over and 
through a hierarchy of officials who both receive and give orders. To Weber, 
bureaucracy provides the basis for a more stable and predictable administrative 
structure for both superiors and subordinates. According to Weber (Parsons, 1947, p. 
328), there are three types of legitimate authority: (1) legal-rational authority – 
“resting on a belief in the „legality‟ of patterns of normative rules and the right of 
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands”; (2) traditional 
authority – “resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions 
and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them”; (3) 
charismatic authority – “resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, 
heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative 
patterns or order revealed or ordained by him”. Among these types of authority, 
legal-rational authority is associated with more impersonal specific and formal 
structures which when highly developed becomes more compatible with 
bureaucracy. Weber thus defines bureaucracy as a particular type of administrative 
structure, developed in association with the legal-rational mode of authority.        
                                               
13 It is believed that the term “bureaucracy” was first used in the middle of the eighteenth century by 
the French civil servant and physiocrat Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759) (J. C. N. Raadschelders, 
2003, p. 316). “Bureaucracy is not limited to government, since large organizations of men and 
women are not peculiar to government” (Hyneman, 1950, p. 4). However, normally “only civil 
servants and public organisations are identified as the bureaucrats and bureaucracy” (Demmke, 2005, 
p. 22). In this research the focus will be on governmental bureaucracy, specifically on central 
government. 
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Although the terms “civil service” and “bureaucracy” are often used 
interchangeably, there is a clear distinction between the two. In basic terms, the 
institution of CS comprises rules of employment governed by a uniform written code 
accompanying a judicial mechanism for resolving issues in the application of that 
code and is clearly and exclusively associated with the state, whereas bureaucracy is 
the mode of organisation within which the CS operates.  
 
In the present day, bureaucracy is often described in terms such as “centralized”, 
“hierarchical”, “specialised”, “slow”, “inefficient”, “cumbersome”, “inflexible”, 
“formalistic”, “red tape”, “hostile to discretion”, “non-transparent”, “too expensive”, 
“over-regulated”, “corrupt”, “egoistic” (Demmke, 2004, p. 55; Demmke, 2005, pp. 
2-3; K. M. Henderson & Dwivedi, 1999, p. xiii; J. C. N. Raadschelders, 2003, pp. 
313, 316), and many other similar terms with the connotation of rigidity. As is 
common with other traditional principles of the CS, rigidly enforced rules and 
regulations have also evolved considerably over the years, with variations evident in 
different countries‟ CS systems.  
 
Challenges facing the CS have meant that the evolution of the CS models over the 
centuries has been significant. Reforms directed at the CS have ensured that by the 
start of the twenty first century there remains no national CS model that can be 
entirely described as a classical career model (Demmke, 2004, p. 91), a feature that 
has remained a hallmark since the birth of the modern CS. It appears that the specific 
characteristics of classical career models
14
 “no longer fit modern requirements for 
flexibility, adaptation and more variety” (Demmke, 2004, p. 92). However, this does 
not imply that traditional elements no longer exist. According to Lægreid and Wise 
(2007, p. 178), “most governments still share the main elements of traditional system 
of public administration”.  
 
As mentioned previously (section 2.3.2), legislation governing functions of the CS is 
a common trait of the modern civil service. Principles and operational features of a 
CS can be defined by a written code, at times in constitutions with operational 
practices in regulations or ordinances. The CS is usually defined by emphasising its 
                                               
14
 Refer to section 2.3.4.  
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functions, methods of appointment, or legal status. With legislation (including 
secondary legislation that sets out normative legal rules that are enforceable as law) 
as the core for describing the CS model in this thesis, the focus is on the legal aspect. 
In general terms, such legislation is aimed:  
 
to provide a legal framework for the establishment and development of a state 
civil service which is politically neutral but designed to provide efficient and 
cost effective administrative support services to the elected government in the 
achievement of its economic and social objectives. (Collins, 1993, p. 331) 
 
Cardona (2002, p. 2) explains that laws governing the CS are public laws which 
define “responsibilities, liabilities, duties and rights of those who execute the powers 
of the state, manage public funds or provide the services of the state to the public.” A 
CS Act can be considered to be an instrument subservient to a range of policies 
which can be either positive or negative in effect. Negative objectives are intended to 
avert a number of undesired consequences such as politicisation of the CS, 
corruption, patronage, and nepotism. Although a wide range of models on which the 
CS Acts are based is evident in different countries (Choi & Whitford, 2011), 
generally, CS legislation is based on similar policy lines.  
 
Different countries enact the CS legislation for different purposes. Therefore, what is 
included in such legislation can vary considerably. The OECD (1996, p. 6) has 
identified four “best practice” objectives for CS legislation:  
 
a) raise the professional quality of staff so as to improve performance, grant a 
certain degree of independence for those staff executing public powers in 
order to prevent political abuse and other mismanagement, and foster 
appropriate ethical standards in public administration; 
b) enable the government to adapt the administration to changed needs, e.g. 
to restructure, to cut costs, or to reallocate human resources from one part 
of the civil service to another; 
c) give the public administration legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, and 
make citizens and other groups of state employees accept the features 
underlying a professional civil service (providing a balance between 
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qualitative requirements and duties on the one hand and rights and benefits 
on the other); and 
d) render a career in the civil service attractive, and to retain people in that 
career.  
 
Management of the CS by a statutory commission independent of the executive has 
been a common feature of much CS legislation, beginning in Europe (see section 
2.3.2). Nevertheless, the principle of regulating the CS by an independent body 
rather than through direct authority of the political arm of the executive power is the 
subject of a debate that has lasted for over a century. In reference to models of 
independent civil services, Argyriades (1996, p. 65) states that “governments have 
grown increasingly wary of such grands corps d’état that are removed from their 
control and able to exercise a measure of independent influence, often commensurate 
with the quality of their professional advice”. It is increasingly argued that 
“executive leaders, needing to consider their own re-election, their prestige, and their 
performance, feel a need to gain control of the instruments of governance” 
(Suleiman, 2003, p. 214). However, during the admission of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries into the EU, those countries had to pass legislation to 
establish neutral and professional civil services (Neshkova & Kostadinova, 2012, p. 
326). Regarding this, Dimitrova (2005, p. 81) states that the EU under its 
administrative conditionality required countries to pass:   
 
legislation establishing civil services in the CEE candidates as independent 
professional bodies and protecting civil servants from dismissals and extensive 
political interference. The model endorsed by the administrative conditionality 
requirements is thus closest to the classical Weberian bureaucracy model, 
although some subsequent advice related to the adoption of performance-
oriented criteria in personnel policy brings it closer to NPM [New Public 
Management] and therefore, according to some, it is a mixed model.
15
  
 
                                               
15 See Fournier (1998) who evaluates it as a classic Weberian model and Bossaert and Demmke 
(2003) who disagree, calling it a mixed model.  
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The diversity of the constitutional framework in different countries does not allow 
the creation of a single blueprint for the relationship between the political arm and 
the administrative arm of the executive. In reference to the Commonwealth 
countries, Sharpe (1993, p. 219) notes that “although each government has to fine-
tune the details to fit its own particular circumstances, the principle of maintaining 
the neutrality of the civil service seems to be common” (also see section 2.3.15). 
Additionally, the OECD (1999, p. 11) has emphasised that whichever model is 
chosen, it is “necessary to strike a balance between the value of independence and 
that of loyalty to the lawfully ruling government”. Such a balance is often achieved 
by striking a bargain between political arm and the administrative arm of the 
executive. For instance, politicians give up the right to interfere in personnel 
management functions or to direct civil servants on matters of administration, while 
civil servants give up the right to blame or express political opposition to the ruling 
regime (Hood & Lodge, 2006, p. 7). 
 
A relative separation between the political and administrative arms of the executive 
is a common feature in modern constitutional democracies (see section 2.4.1). 
Complying with the lawful orders of the elected government of the day continues to 
be the basic statutory responsibility of the administrative arm. As discussed later 
(sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3), however, an absolute demarcation between the two arms 
may not be possible and, particularly in emerging democracies, there may be 
continuing tension over where the boundary lies. There is further detailed discussion 
of the interface between politics and administration as it affects the CS in section 
2.4.1.    
    
2.3.4 Components of civil service model. 
 
Studying a CS system
16
 involves identifying its attributes or properties. In this 
regard, Morgan and Perry (1988) state that the study of a CS system should include 
at least four parameters: rules, structures, roles, and norms. According to Morgan 
and Perry (1988, p. 89), while “rules” mean the “assigned guides for conduct 
(Jackson, 1987) or constraints that social systems use to structure behavior (Ostrom, 
                                               
16
 See section 1.5.2.   
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1985)”, “structures represent the organizational arrangements of civil service 
systems”. Furthermore, as “roles reflect the set of activities expected of a person 
occupying a particular social position”, “norms involve values internal to the system 
which ground the rules and roles” (Morgan & Perry, 1988, p. 89).  
 
As mentioned earlier (section 2.3.2), with the evolution of a contemporary CS, the 
norms and principles of the CS have also been evolving. More importantly, there are 
no universally accepted principles regarded as being necessary for a CS. However, 
Bossaert, Demmke, Nomden, and Polet (2001) have listed typical elements of career 
models and typical elements of models with other structural characteristics. This is 
presented in table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Typical elements of a classical career model and model with other 
structural characteristics 
Career model Model with other structural characteristics 
Recruitment only to entry-level positions Recruitment to posts at all levels of the 
profession 
Specific legal requirements 
(diplomas/qualifications) for specific careers 
Specific skills set as requirements for 
specific posts 
Maximum age limits for recruitment No maximum age limits 
No recognition of professional experience 
outside the public sector 
Recognition for previous professional 
experience 
Statutory remuneration scheme Differentiated and/or individual rates of pay 
Automatic increases in salary based on 
seniority 
No automatic increases in pay 
Statutory promotion system No set promotion system 
Permanent tenure No permanent tenure guarantee 
Special statutory pension scheme Non-statutory pension scheme 
Special disciplinary legislation Different patterns of disciplinary legislation 
Source: Bossaert, et al. (2001, pp. 82-3) 
 
Although CS systems vary between nations, Butler (1993, p. 396) has identified the 
following core characteristics of the traditional British Civil Service as being the 
common features of a classical Weberian bureaucracy:  
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a) a permanent civil service recruited by competitive examination, and 
promotion by merit, rather than by patronage or political affiliation; 
b) a division between intellectual and mechanical work; 
c) clear separation of tenure, functions and responsibilities between civil 
servants and politicians (that is ministers); 
d) high standards of integrity based on a clear separation between public duty 
and private interest; 
e) an expectation that civil servants be employed within the civil service until 
retirement, subject to adequate performance; 
f) a substantial degree of horizontal coherence across the service, including 
common terms and conditions between departments, controlled as part of 
government expenditure by the Treasury. 
 
The above features, predominantly belonging to the “classical model”, can be 
present to varying degrees in modern day civil services. This thesis combines the 
above characteristics with a number of other aspects present in contemporary CS 
legislation (including Acts and regulations) to present the main components of the 
CS models. In Chapter Six, while presenting the Maldivian CS model, an assessment 
is made on what “classical” features are retained and which have shifted from the 
classical model.  
 
The CS models are commonly described and compared under the following 
headings:  
 
a) Legal basis of civil service 
b) Scope of civil service 
c) Management of civil service 
d) Code of conduct 
e) Categories of civil servants 
f) Merit system 
g) Recruitment system 
h) Classification system 
i) Salary and reward 
j) Promotion system 
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k) Political rights and neutrality  
l) Employment rights and protection 
m) Disciplinary procedures 
n) Grievance procedures 
o) Pension and retirement 
 
The following sections provide a brief overview of each of the above components. In 
the discussion, references to practices from different nations are given. How some of 
these components co-exist within a democratic environment and the particular 
question of the relationship between politics and administration is discussed in detail 
later in this chapter (see section 2.4). 
 
2.3.5 Legal basis of civil service. 
 
The legal framework for the CS or public service varies from country to country. 
However, The Committee of Minister of Council of Europe [CoE] (2000) has 
recommended that as a minimum requirement, “the legal framework and general 
principles concerning the status of public officials should be established by law or 
collective agreements and their implementation should be left to the government 
and/or other competent authorities or settled through collective agreements”. In this 
respect, provision for the CS can be codified in a number of documents. They 
include: 
a) Constitution; 
b) Acts (including public law and private law); and 
c) Secondary legislation (legislation made by government or an executive body 
that is vested with power to issue instruments such as decrees, directives, 
regulations, rules, orders, and so forth).    
 
2.3.6 Scope of civil service. 
 
Scope of the CS is concerned with identifying the parameters of the CS. Defining 
scope of the CS is important in order to determine the forms of public employment 
in the CS and other institutions of the state. In most countries a number of state 
institutions are often not included within scope of the CS. As a result, careful 
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consideration is needed in defining scope of the CS. Cardona (2001, p. 5) identifies 
three main types of scope:  
Vertical scope – where to draw the upper dividing line between politics and 
administration and the lower dividing line between civil servants and other public 
employees? 
Horizontal scope – what public organisations are to be included within the civil 
service law and what organisations have to have specific statutes or can simply be 
regulated by general labour law?  
Material scope – what other aspects of civil service employment such as pensions, 
working hours or holidays can be regulated by more general labour laws?   
 
2.3.7 Management of civil service. 
 
Management of the CS is linked to the responsibilities of the state as the employer of 
civil servants. Common standards of human resource management throughout the 
CS are required to maintain uniformity. However, the manner in which a nation 
structures these responsibilities can vary considerably. As Trendafilova (2008, p. 2) 
states, “there is a different mix of institutional players in different countries charged 
with the management of civil services”. Trendafilova (2008, pp. 2-4) clarifies that 
the management function involves the interaction among three institutional actors: 
(1) a central management capacity that is usually part of the executive charged with 
the responsibility of the overall management issues
17
 such as proposing legislation 
and personnel policies, monitoring of rules and policies, and management of 
training
18
; (2) an independent civil service commission that at times acts as a 
regulatory body or ensures that personnel management functions are implemented in 
a fair, open manner and on merit principles; and (3) individual ministries whose 
minimum responsibilities include initiation of recruitment and selection or initiation 
of salary increases in centralised civil service systems.    
 
                                               
17 CoE (2000) also recommends that, “the management policies relating to public officials should, in 
general be the responsibility of the government”. 
18 According to Euroconsult Mott MacDonald (2008, p. 21), the functions that such a central authority 
often carries out include, “position creation and classification; staff training and professional 
development; specification of terms and conditions of employment; drafting of disciplinary codes; 
and specification of salaries and benefits”.  
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The extent of the centralisation of personnel management function is also an 
important aspect. A centralised system of the CS management does not necessarily 
imply “a single, central monolithic organ controlling all system personnel 
movements, but rather some degree of shared personnel authority exercised by 
several entities at the central level” (Nunberg, 1992, p. 15). The powers in a central 
system could be divided among the different bodies mentioned above. Regardless of 
how the functions are divided the model promotes central supervision of functions. 
On the other hand, a decentralised system of the CS management “increases the 
decisional autonomy of line managers on most personnel matters, leaving only broad 
policy guidelines to be worked out at the center” (Nunberg, 1992, p. 16).  
Increasingly governments are moving away from “centrally-managed career-based 
civil service systems towards decentralised management of human resources” 
(Laking, 2007, p. 5) thereby fragmenting the uniform code of the CS.  
 
2.3.8 Code of conduct. 
 
A written code of conduct or a labour code is a feature of many CS and often 
outlines the main duties of the civil servants. As indicated earlier (section 2.3.3), 
principles and operational features of a CS can also be defined by such a code. While 
the constitution lays the general outline, operational practices are defined in 
regulations or ordinances. In the past, such secondary legislation covered detailed 
behaviours that were expected from civil servants. This is changing as countries 
increasingly find such an approach to be inconsistent with effective human resource 
management, focusing more on normative principles of behaviour and performance 
standards (OECD, 1997b). However, use of a code of conduct containing the basic 
professional values expected of an independent CS is still common practice. 
Furthermore, a code will “generally leave considerable room for individual solutions 
adapted to the individual circumstances and, where necessary, for departure from its 
provisions if other considerations demand” (OECD, 1997b, p. 5).  
 
2.3.9 Categories of civil servants. 
 
Categories of civil servants can vary depending on the CS model the nation adopts. 
The important point is that the categories and levels of civil servants should be 
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identified based on the functions performed to which a pre-defined responsibility is 
attached. In this regard, creation of a senior CS as a distinct category of the CS is 
seen in a number of nations. A senior CS often involves “an elite, professionalized, 
service-wide corps” (Nunberg, 1992, p. 26) that is offered more attractive incentives 
and conditions compared to the general civil servants. This elite corps is mostly 
created to combat such problems as:  
 
a) Wage erosion in comparison with the private sector and wage compression in 
relation to lower civil service echelons; 
b) Increasing marginalization of higher civil service cadres from policy and 
political decision makers because of the former‟s perceived lack of 
responsiveness to political agendas; 
c) The absence of a public-spirited, interagency, service-wide corps or elite 
cadre; and 
d) Difficulty in attracting highly qualified professionals away from the private 
market. (Nunberg, 1995, p. 27)  
 
The decline of permanent tenure for civil servants has also increased contractual 
employment within the CS. It is believed that contractual employment for a limited 
period potentially attracts a larger pool of candidates for a job.  
 
2.3.10 Merit system. 
 
Since the time of its consideration in the 1854 Northcote/Trevelyan Report, the 
meaning of “merit” has evolved through legislation, case law, and societal interests. 
During this time, the concept of merit has also been in contention with patronage 
appointments. Despite the fact that most governments continue to use principles 
other than merit to at least some extent, they still consider merit to be an important 
principle for the majority of positions in the CS. 
 
Disagreement continues about what constitutes merit, which is only vaguely defined 
in some systems. Nonetheless, with merit recruitment being one of the defining 
characteristics of Weber‟s model of bureaucracy (Page, 1992), and civil servants 
being selected on the “basis of achievement criteria and merit, rather than ascriptive 
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criteria such as case, race, class or language” (Peters, 2010, p. 83), this principle is 
retained even with modern changes in the CS.  
 
Stahl (1962, p. 28) defines merit broadly as “a personnel system in which 
comparative merit or achievement governs each individual‟s selection and progress 
in the service and in which the conditions and rewards of performance contribute to 
competency and continuity of service” (cited in Nigro, 2006, p. 4). Furthermore, in a 
careful attempt to define what merit connotes, the Australian Public Service Act 
(1999) provides a “test” in identifying a decision based on merit. It specifies that a 
decision relating to engagement or promotion is based on merit if: 
 
a) an assessment is made of the relative suitability of the candidates for the 
duties, using a competitive selection process; and 
b) the assessment is based on the relationship between the candidates‟ work-
related qualities and the work-related qualities genuinely required for the 
duties; and 
c) the assessment focuses on the relative capacity of the candidates to achieve 
outcomes related to the duties; and 
d) the assessment is the primary consideration in making the decision.    
 
2.3.11 Recruitment system. 
  
A common principle of civil services is that entry will be by fair and open 
competition for specific positions, with selection based on merit. Civil services are, 
however, distinguished by the levels at which entry can occur. Recruitment systems 
are often classified into two general types:  
 
a) Closed-entry, hierarchical systems with limited inter-class (and often inter-
departmental) mobility and highly selective entry requirements (Nunberg, 
1992, p. 21). Entry is generally restricted to a small range of lower level 
position.    
b) Open systems with lateral (and more flexible) entry, greater vertical and 
sometimes horizontal mobility, and more frequent use of short-term or 
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contractual employment (Euroconsult Mott MacDonald, 2008). Entry is 
generally possible at all levels.     
 
It might be difficult to place a nation exactly into one of the above ideal typologies 
because most countries operate in between these extremes. To ensure recruitment 
based on merit, a regulated and standardised entrance examination has also been 
commonly used in civil services to promote fair and equal treatment of the CS 
candidates (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, p. 27). With the changing face of civil services, 
however, use of standardised examination systems is on the decline (Meyer-Sahling, 
2009). Nonetheless, eight features commonly found in recruitment within Anglo-
American civil services are given below: 
 
a) Conduct a job analysis leading to a written statement of duties (the job 
description) and the knowledge and skills which the job holder will need (the 
person specification).  
b) Distribute and disseminate a job advertisement (i.e. vacancy announcement) 
to eligible groups and applicant. Include a summary of the job analysis with 
the vacancy announcement when possible.  
c) Draft (or use) a standard application form.  
d) Develop and use a scoring scheme based on the person specification (i.e. the 
pre-specified criteria against which candidates will be judged and hiring 
decisions made). 
e) Define and implement a short-listing procedure to reduce applications, if 
necessary, to a manageable number.  
f) Develop a final selection procedure based, again, on the person specification. 
Where possible and appropriate, finalists should be interviewed and 
evaluated by a panel.  
g) Identify and appoint the “best” candidate based on the scoring scheme.  
h) Notify both successful and unsuccessful candidate(s) of results. (Euroconsult 
Mott MacDonald, 2008) 
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2.3.12 Classification system. 
 
An individual‟s job that includes duties and responsibilities can be referred as a 
position, and “clusters of positions with similar characteristics are organized into 
what is called a job classification” (Berman, Bowman, West, & Van Wart, 2006, p. 
128). According to Shafritz (1973, p. 3), in such classification systems, formal job 
descriptions of all the jobs in the organisation are organised “into classes on the basis 
of duties and responsibilities for the purpose of delineating authority, establishing 
chains of command, and providing equitable salary scales”.  
 
In general, classification systems can be grouped into two main types: rank-in-job 
and rank-in-person. In the former, rank and salary are determined by the job that one 
holds, and promotion
19
 is generally achieved by applying for a higher-graded 
position in competition with others (Berman et al., 2006, pp. 123). In a rank-in-
person system, individuals are promoted to higher grades based on their potential 
and then become eligible for jobs matching their higher grading.  
 
Job classification is a necessary element in both rank-in-job and rank-in-person 
systems because it supports assessment of candidates‟ suitability for specific 
positions. As Lam and Chan (1995, p. 1320) state, job classifications “provide the 
bases to develop testing and other screening devices, such as the pre-established 
criteria to determine the employee‟s relative qualification and performance”. In this 
regard, Nunberg (1992, p. 30) identifies four main features of the traditional methods 
used to classify civil servants:  
 
a) Classify positions according to differences in job duties and corresponding 
responsibilities. The positions are ranked and arranged into occupational 
groups;  
b) Each occupational group has a unified salary schedule. This is determined by 
a central personnel authority. There is a flat salary for each grade. Each grade 
contains a number of incremental steps;  
                                               
19
 Also refer to section 2.3.14. 
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c) Civil servants advance to the next incremental step based solely on length of 
service. Civil servants have job tenure and progress through the incremental 
steps automatically; and  
d) Recommendations for service-wide salary adjustments to grades are normally 
carried out annually.  
 
It is important to note that such traditional features are seldom used in their strictest 
sense. In most countries, they are mixed with the alternative structural characteristics 
mentioned in table 2.1. For instance, promotions are often based on a performance 
assessment in addition to the length of service. 
 
2.3.13 Salary and reward. 
 
According to OECD (1997a), remuneration systems aim to reconcile two 
imperatives: to maintain overall budgetary equilibrium and to motivate officials. In 
traditional civil services, remuneration is based on centrally determined standards 
with little room for flexibility at organisational level (Nunberg, 1995, p. 31). Such 
systems rely “mainly on unified pay scales with automatic, fixed step increments 
based on seniority and determined on a service-wide basis” (Nunberg, 1995, p. 31). 
Relatively strict establishment control
20
 is a feature in traditional civil services.      
 
Compensation for civil servants is normally composed of several components. 
Generally they fall under immediate reward or deferred reward. Such rewards can 
also be classified as tangible rewards that can be monetarily valued or intangible 
rewards associated with intrinsic motivation. Mukherjee and Manning (2000) 
summarised the different types of incentives that can be allocated for civil servants 
(table 2.2).   
 
 
 
                                               
20 “Establishment control refers to the set of institutional arrangements used by governments to ensure 
that an appropriate number of staff with the right mix of skills are hired at the correct grades” 
(Euroconsult Mott MacDonald, 2008, p. 65). 
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Table 2.2: Incentives for civil servants 
  Contractually-provided Non-contractual/ 
intangible 
  monetary in-kind  
Current rewards base rewards 1. base wage/salary 2. health insurance 3. job security, 
prestige, social 
privileges 
 allowances 4. transportation, 
housing, meals, 
telephone, travel, 
cost-of-living 
5. transportation, 
housing, meals, 
travel 
6. trips abroad, 
training 
Future 
expectations 
 7. pension 8. housing, land, 
etc. 
9.reputation, 
re-employment 
after retirement 
Source: Mukherjee and Manning (2000) 
 
2.3.14 Promotion system. 
 
Promotion is also a fundamental component of any CS model. There are two broad 
approaches to promotion depending on the type of the CS model. They are: 
 
a) In career systems, candidates will be assessed on their general potential for 
higher management and policy positions and if successful move into a 
selection pool from where they can be assigned to specific posts requiring 
these skills; 
b) In position-based systems, applicants will be appointed to a specific post and 
have to demonstrate that they have the competencies required for the post – 
these requirements are likely to be based in part on generic management and 
policy experience and aptitude, but may also give weight to experience in the 
specific policy or operational requirements of the post. (Laking, 2007, p. 41) 
    
The assumption is that in career systems the “officials should not be promoted to a 
higher grade unless they are judged capable of filling the entire range of posts 
associated with that grade” (Ridley, 1983, p. 190). On the other hand, generally in 
position-based systems, apart from some positions that require specific professional 
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qualifications, “the higher the position, the more general management abilities are 
emphasised rather than specific experience in the organisation” (Laking, 2007, p. 
41). Once again, it is important to highlight that most countries fall in between these 
two extremes and therefore often use a combination of these features.  
 
2.3.15 Political rights and neutrality.  
 
With change of governments an accepted norm in a modern democracy, civil 
servants must be willing to serve the elected government of the day, whatever that 
government might be. As a result civil servants are required to be unbiased and 
politically neutral in undertaking their duties and responsibilities: they “should avoid 
activities likely to impair or to seem to impair, their political impartiality or the 
political impartiality of the public service” (Kernaghan & Langford, 1990, p. 56). In 
order to maintain a neutral CS therefore, a number of rights at the disposal of the 
general public may be constrained for civil servants.  
 
Generally, political rights refer to political activity
21
 and engagement in public 
comment.
22
 As far as political rights of the civil or public servant are concerned, one 
argument is that:   
 
public servants should enjoy as many political rights as other citizens; this 
right clashes, however, with another legitimate right – the right of public 
officials and members of the public to enjoy the reality and the perception of 
impartial public service. (Kernaghan & Langford, 1990, p. 61)  
 
                                               
21 “Political activity encompasses the rights to vote in any election; to seek election to public office; to 
be a member of a political party or organization; to hold an office in a political party or organization; 
to attend political meetings, rallies and conventions; to speak in support of or in opposition to a 
particular candidate at political meetings, rallies or conventions; to serve as a delegate or alternate to a 
political party convention; and to campaign for or against a political party or candidate by such means 
as making a financial contribution, soliciting financial or other contributions, canvassing door-to-
door, working at the polls in a partisan capacity, transporting voters to the polls on behalf of a 
political party or candidate, distributing campaign material, wearing political badges, and displaying 
lawn signs” (Kernaghan, 1986, pp. 639-40).  
22 “The right to engage in public comment is the right to speak in public on matters of political 
controversy or on issues of government policy or administration” (Kernaghan, 1986, p. 640). 
53 
 
Proponents of unlimited political rights to civil servants argue that limiting the rights 
excludes some of the most educated citizens in the labour force from political 
activity and such restrictions do not necessarily suppress the political views of those 
individuals. The counter argument is that restrictions placed on civil servants and 
public servants “are reasonable limits in a free and democratic society” (Kernaghan 
& Langford, 1990, p. 62) and political rights “should only be lawfully restricted in so 
far as it is necessary for the proper exercise of their public function” (CoE, 2000).  
 
As Vaughn (1976, p. 8-4) observes, the debate concerning the appropriateness of 
restrictions on political activities has been intense and the propriety of such 
restrictions is open to considerable debate. However, according to Mosher (1982, p. 
23), such deprivations of civil servants‟ rights are justified to assure the continuing 
viability of the democratic system. Basic rights such as freedom of association and 
expression, and rights to acquire wealth through enterprises related to the CS 
profession, can be restricted to ensure that civil servants maintain the integrity of the 
CS and also to eliminate abuse of power and conflict of interest issues. In order to 
maintain the professional ethos of the CS, restrictions on such rights are justified in a 
democratic society (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, p. 60). As far as political rights are 
concerned, a common belief is civil servants should be allowed to be members of 
political parties but should refrain from being politically active or manifesting their 
political views in public.  
 
Those who believe restrictions should be in place argue that individuals who join the 
CS or public service should do so with a realisation that to maintain the political 
neutrality of the service, some restrictions on individual political rights will be in 
place. Hood and Lodge (2006) argue that both the politician and the public servant 
need to give up some of their rights, which they refer to as “public service bargains”. 
Furthermore, some argue that expansion of political rights can lead to patronage 
appointments when ministers‟ confidence in the loyalty and impartiality of civil 
servants is absent (Kernaghan & Langford, 1990, p. 63). Therefore, the challenge for 
any CS is to find the optimum balance between political rights and political 
neutrality. However, as Kernaghan (1986, p. 652) has correctly stated, “the perfect 
balance between political rights and political neutrality for public servants is likely to 
remain an elusive goal.” Others argue that civil servants cannot be fully neutral and 
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so the focus should be to “have loyal civil servants who are aware of ethical 
problems, the dangers of corruption and the problems involved with political 
favouritism” (Demmke, 2005, p, 63).    
 
2.3.16 Employment rights and protection. 
 
As mentioned previously (section 2.3.4), one of the key characteristic of the classical 
CS is the expectation that civil servants be employed within the civil service until 
retirement, subject to adequate performance. Although in some countries a CS career 
probably no longer holds the appeal it once possessed, it was traditionally considered 
as the epitome of success in many countries. In the past, civil servants who met 
minimum standards of performance and conduct were assured of tenure in their jobs 
until retirement. In career systems in particular, civil servants were protected from 
outside competition as far as promotion to higher levels was concerned. 
Furthermore, there were significant legal barriers to their dismissal. However, such 
features have changed significantly in many countries. In most OECD countries, the 
possibility of a job for life in public employment has declined considerably (OECD, 
2004). Increasingly, performance is linked to the job. This departure from the 
classical career system has ensured that civil servants face growing competition from 
outside applicants during promotions. With such changing trends, governments 
increasingly use different mechanisms to make civil servants redundant.  
 
Although the idea of a career for life may have eroded in some civil services, 
sufficient job protection is still considered an important condition of the CS in a 
modern constitutional democracy (OECD, 1999). Importantly, protection of civil 
servants “against political and managerial discretion over dismissal reduces civil 
servants‟ dependence on outside interests and enhances the prospects of civil service 
impartiality” (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, p. 38).  
 
In the Weberian bureaucracy, a CS job was associated with holding a “vocation” and 
a “career” (Gerth & Mills, 1948, pp. 198-204). Civil servants were expected to 
devote their professional careers to the CS. Thus, restrictions on civil servants 
undertaking additional employment are also a key feature in the classical Weberian 
CS model. According to Meyer-Sahling (2009, p. 60), restrictions placed on 
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“economic activities of civil servants, notably alternative income opportunities in the 
private sector, are meant to increase the impartiality and fairness of civil servants 
towards society”. However, in developing countries, civil servants commonly 
undertake additional employment in the private sector, primarily due to the relatively 
low pay in the CS jobs.  
 
2.3.17 Disciplinary procedures. 
 
Disciplinary actions are often the result of failure to fulfill the duties of the civil 
servant, whether intentionally or through negligence. The objective of having the 
provision for disciplinary actions in legislation is to make civil servants accountable 
to their superiors in accordance with the law. Normally, disciplinary provisions 
include definitions of specific misconduct and wrong-doing as well as the 
administrative penalties for such actions.  
 
2.3.18 Grievance procedures. 
 
A legal remedy for the protection of the rights of civil servants is a common 
provision in civil services. It could be either before a court or an independent 
institution. In general, individual rights to a defence and to challenge sanctions 
before an independent body are considered primary features that guarantee the 
objectivity of a grievance mechanism. In most cases, a two-tier system of hearing the 
complaint is favoured. Initially the complaint is examined by a direct superior or the 
agency head, followed by referral to a neutral and specialised committee or board 
(Aeberhard, 2001, p. 28). This may apply to individual grievances as well as group 
grievances. In the case of group grievances, recourse to strike action is also used at 
times.  
 
2.3.19 Pension and retirement. 
 
Provision of a pension is a further feature of the Weberian bureaucracy (Gerth & 
Mills, 1948, p. 203). A pension right is part of a “bargain” between the state and the 
employee that usually includes some incentive – in the form of deferred benefits – 
for the employee to provide loyal service over the whole of a career. Pension is often 
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a continuous payment given at a defined rate, for life, typically upon retirement. 
Retirement age can vary across countries, often with a mandatory retirement age at 
which the person is entitled to the maximum possible pension, and early retirement 
options at which the person is entitled to a scaled back pension. The defined-rate 
retirement pension is often calculated based on the length of service and past salaries.  
 
In the past where traditional career models of the CS existed, many countries had 
specially designed occupational pension schemes for civil servants (Bossaert et al., 
2001, p. 163). However, with the changes in the economy and demography, many 
countries are reforming their pension schemes to make them more economically 
affordable for the entire community. Some countries have even scrapped specially 
designed schemes for civil servants and moved to general schemes. Other changes 
include moving from schemes that are paid out of the government budget to fully 
funded employer-employee contributing schemes, as well as changes in early and 
mandatory retirement ages. Such fiscally motivated changes have helped erode the 
idea of a job for life, particularly when pension rights are made portable.  
      
2.4 Linkages between civil service and democracy 
 
The previous sections (2.2 and 2.3) examined the democratisation process and the 
contemporary CS. This section links the two and outlines the role of the CS in a 
democratic setting.  
 
This thesis focuses on the changing relationship between the political executive, 
which is the elected representatives of the citizens, and its administrative arm, the CS 
as an important element in a process of democratisation. It is however important to 
underline that democratisation is a process involving change in a wider range of 
public governance institutions. Conventionally these institutions include the formal 
constitutional components of legislature, executive and judiciary together with 
specific overseeing bodies and other laws and quasi-autonomous public bodies 
intended to constraint the power of the political executive. According to Carothers 
(2007) these constraints are basically from the “rule of law” buttressed by the 
various accountability institutions. Other informal institutions also include non-
government watchdogs like civil society and the media. Although such watchdogs do 
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not have the legal apparatus, they “in conjunction with conscientious journalists, 
highlight wrongful doings that otherwise would go unnoticed, and provide potential 
allies for state agencies that might want to undertake appropriate action” (O‟Donnell, 
1998, p. 122).  
 
The formulation of a depoliticised and professional CS can however be a key 
generative mechanism in the new structure of relationships being created between 
the governors and the governed. This thesis shows that the Maldivian CS Act was 
not simply a shift of power relationships within the political executive and the CS, 
but it was a significant shift in the power structure of the state that intended to put 
constraints on the powers of the political executive as well as instil a neutral and 
competent CS that serves the people through their elected representatives. As such, 
the CS is held accountable beyond the political executive and thereby contributes to 
a broader shift in the governor-governed relationship (see section 2.4.1).  
 
Democratic constitutions feature a chain of delegation from the citizens to their 
elected representatives. Civil servants implement the policies of these elected 
representatives whether in a presidential or parliamentary form of government. The 
chain of accountability runs in the reverse order where the civil servants are 
accountable to those elected representatives who in turn are accountable to the 
citizens (see section 2.2.3 – frail, unconsolidated democracies – for the nature of 
checks and balances among state institutions). In other words, civil servants are 
bureaucratically accountable to the elected officials, and elected officials are 
politically accountable to the voters (Hughes, 2012). Additionally, the legislature can 
also hold ministers as well as public officials accountable through the parliamentary 
select committee structures (Scott, 2000).  
 
The CS as an ideal type is aimed not only at efficiency but also fairness in the sense 
of non-arbitrariness or more generally "the rule of law". Therefore, protecting the CS 
from the direct personalistic control of the political executive and making it 
accountable to the law is an important “generative" factor in democratisation because 
it is through administration that the political executive exercises its power. In 
summary: 1) democratisation involves moving a polity away from autocracy and 
towards democracy by institutional change aimed at having a framework of law 
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ensuring rights, constraints on political executive to act according to the law, and 
strengthening the accountability institutions that will enforce those constraints; 2) CS 
is based on neutral competence as well as rule of law; 3) the main generative role of 
CS reform in democratisation is to contribute to the executive constraints by bringing 
executive action within the rule of law.  
 
The rest of this section is divided into four parts. The first part examines the role of 
civil servants within a democratic environment. The second section demonstrates 
how politicians influence the CS settings. In the third section, possible challenges to 
the CS in the context of an emerging democracy are examined. The last section 
examines possible ways the CS contributes in the developmental aspect of the 
nation.   
 
2.4.1 What is the role of civil servants in a democracy?  
 
Unlike political office holders, civil servants are not elected officials. As a result 
questions have been asked about their legitimate role in the modern political system. 
As indicated previously (section 2.3.3), the traditional view is that the officials 
elected to political office control the executive function of the state which has “at its 
disposal a neutral civil service with a wealth of professional expertise, which 
prepares and implements public policy” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2004, p. 10) based 
on the agenda of the government in power; and that civil servants “accept the 
authority of the government, and work as best they can to carry out the government‟s 
programme in office, within the law” (Prebble, 2010, p. 54). It is also the general 
notion that the CS will be provided relative autonomy from the elected officials in 
matters of employment but will be accountable to the law and beyond the political 
executive to the institutions of accountability such as the courts and the legislature. 
This is a bargain between the factions competing for political power that enables 
them to have an efficient and loyal CS at their command if and when they win an 
election.  
 
In this model of CS, therefore, it is assumed that there will be a clear demarcation 
between political choice (the domain of the political executive) and administration 
(the domain of the CS). The OECD (1997a, p. 8) suggests there “is a separation 
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between political and administrative levels, and the absence of interference in the 
form of partisan concerns in the management of careers”. The assumption is that 
politics and administration “although closely interdependent, are different in nature, 
have a different underlying logic, and have different sources of legitimacy” (OECD, 
1999, p. 21). As with OECD documents cited here, principles for a relatively clear 
formal separation between politics and administration and a politically neutral CS 
are still frequently set out to be important elements in a modern CS.  
 
Outlining an ideal situation, Ridley (1995) states that the place of the CS in a 
democratic state can be explained using three simplified models. Firstly, civil 
servants are considered the servants of a democratically elected government that 
needs to answer to its democratically elected parliament in relation to the 
administration of its policies. Secondly, there is need for a separation of policy-
making and implementation, ensuring that policy-making is the function of the 
elected officials while the implementation rests with the civil servants. The third 
model sees the CS “as having an independent view of the national interest above 
party politics and above sectional interests”, where, in addition to the democratically 
elected government, civil servants have a responsibility to the state, the law, national 
interest or common welfare (Ridley, 1995, p. 15).  
 
Thus, the principles in play in the three models of Ridley (1995) are: (1) civil 
servants are loyal servants of the elected government with no separate political 
identity; (2) civil servants‟ roles are confined to the implementation of policy 
determined by the politicians; and (3) civil servants are answerable to national values 
that can be beyond the authority of the government. As changes of government are 
unavoidable in democratic societies, such interests beyond party politics can be 
essential for the progress and development of the nation.  
 
Kernaghan (1976, p. 433) identifies the following characteristics for a truly neutral 
public service in a Westminster-style government:         
 
a) Politics and policy are separated from administration. Thus, politicians make 
policy decisions; public servants execute these decisions;  
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b) Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than 
on the basis of party affiliation or contributions;  
c) Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities;  
d) Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on government 
policies or administration;  
e) Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political 
masters in private and in confidence. In return, political executives protect 
the anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for 
departmental decisions; [and] 
f) Public servants execute policy decisions loyally and zealously irrespective of 
the philosophy and programs of the party in power and regardless of their 
personal opinions. As a result, public servants enjoy security of tenure 
during good behaviour and satisfactory performance. 
 
The first of Kernaghan‟s principles, that politics and administration are separate 
domains, associated with the writing of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson over a 
century ago, have been widely challenged ever since. Politicians believe that their 
policy objectives are frustrated by civil servants imposing their own preferences over 
the wishes of the elected representatives of the people, and civil servants that 
politicians have unrealistic expectations for their policy objectives or are meddling in 
matters of administration (Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 1981, cited in C. 
Campbell & Peters, 1988). As a result, each will attempt to influence the other‟s 
“domain” and therefore politics and administration “may not be readily separable” 
(C. Campbell & Peters, 1988, p. 82). 
 
In arguing that the line between the two domains is blurred, the basic assumption is 
that political executives and the permanent CS each have distinct values and interests 
and will use the power and authority they have to achieve their different objectives. 
Civil servants for example “cannot be portrayed as apolitical eunuchs” (Kingdom, 
1990, p. 3) and may use their control of the administrative apparatus and information 
about operations to influence the policy process or to shape actual policy execution. 
Alternatively, when politicians want to have a greater input in matters of public 
employment or when they perceive apparent resistance from civil servants, they can 
use their authority to create alternative sources of policy advice and alternative 
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modes of service provision (C. Campbell & Peters, 1988; Aberbach & Rockman, 
1988). 
 
The result of this dynamic may be a more or less stable realignment of roles between 
political executive and administrators or it may be a continuing source of mistrust 
and tension. C. Campbell and Peters (1988, p. 81) suggest that the tension is likely to 
be highest when governments change and “politicians …. find the civil service to be 
a convenient scapegoat for all the problems they have encountered” or the 
bureaucracy may “dig in its heels at administering a program they consider to be 
fundamentally flawed”. These clashes and new accommodations do not mean that 
the zone between politics and administration is meaningless, however, only that it 
can remain contested territory subject to competing objectives and strategies. Some 
of the consequences of this dynamic are discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.4.2 How do politicians influence civil service? 
 
In a democracy winners of elections are able to place political appointees in 
positions in the country‟s bureaucracy. Such appointees are required to share the 
environment and to work with career civil servants. Nonetheless, the political 
masters have at their disposal mechanisms they can use to influence the 
administrative arm. One of them is politicisation of the CS. Aberbach and Rockman 
(1987) refer to politicisation as “the levels and types of political activity undertaken 
by civil servants, as well as to attempts by others to politically influence the 
behaviour of civil servants” (cited in Hojnacki, 1996, p. 137). 
 
Politicisation can be applied in various forms. According to Hojnacki (1996) 
politicisation can be internally-driven, society-driven, or politician-driven. In simple 
terms, internal-driven politicisation is related to “political activities engaged in by 
civil servants themselves” (Hojnacki, 1996, p. 139). Society-driven politicisation can 
be considered as influences from societal groups who “lobby” or influence the 
decision-making process within the CS (Riggs, 1988). Arguably the most common 
type of politicisation, politician-driven politicisation occurs when “elected and 
politically appointed public officials have their own political agendas and often look 
to civil servants to help achieve them” (Hojnacki, 1996, p. 142). In other words, the 
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political executive influences the administrative arm of the executive. Furthermore, 
such politicians attempt to control the behaviour of government organisations by 
introducing complex mechanisms for administrative procedures and oversights 
(Aberbach, 1990; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987; Meier, 1987; Miller & Moe, 
1983; Moon & Ingraham, 1998). As such acts are arguably present in most countries, 
it can be argued that politicisation of the CS is evident in both developed and 
developing countries, although in different forms.  
 
Recent research has supported this view (Meyer-Sahling, 2008; OECD, 1997a; Page 
& Wright, 1999; Peters & Pierre, 2004). According to Peters (2003) and Halligan 
(2007), political appointments are increasing even in Anglo-American countries, a 
concept that Light (1995) refers to as the “thickening” of government (also see 
Ingraham, Thompson, & Eisenberg, 1995). Executives often find means to appoint 
political representatives for various oversight functions, and also to functions that are 
already undertaken directly by civil servants, creating duplications. One such 
approach is the appointment of political advisers, which Eichbaum and Shaw (2010) 
argue have raised concerns in some countries. Such developments have put 
considerable pressure on the neutrality of the CS even in developed countries 
(Peters, 2003, p. 18). In an attempt to identify different modes of politicisation by the 
approach a new government chooses to exert its control on the bureaucracy, Meyer-
Sahling (2008) has proposed the following analytical tool in order to classify 
different approaches regarding politicisation of senior bureaucrats (table 2.3).  
 
As the table shows, the level of politicisation can vary from a complete revamp of 
the top CS to use of already existing top bureaucrats. In this regard, a new 
government may choose to either: (1) retain the existing senior bureaucrats, and 
when a vacancy arises, promote lower ranked officials based on professional 
competence (non-politicisation); (2) replace senior bureaucrats by promoting lower 
ranked officials based on political affiliation (bounded politicisation); (3) replace 
senior bureaucrats by appointing officials from outside organs such as the private 
sector, academia, nongovernmental organisations or interest groups, based on 
political affiliation (open politicisation); or (4) replace senior bureaucrats by 
appointing personnel associated with the political party in power (partisan 
politicisation) (Meyer-Sahling, 2008, pp. 4-9). 
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Table 2.3: Four ideal modes of politicisation 
 Non-
politicisation 
Bounded 
politicisation 
Open 
politicisation 
Partisan 
politicisation 
The approach of 
new government 
towards inherited 
senior bureaucrats 
Do not replace Replace Replace Replace 
The career path of 
new senior 
bureaucrats 
Promote lower 
ranks officials 
from existing 
bureaucracy, 
based on 
professional 
competence 
Promote lower 
ranks officials 
from existing 
bureaucracy, 
based on 
political 
affiliation 
Recruit 
outsiders from 
non-political 
settings, based 
on political 
affiliation 
Recruit 
outsiders from 
political 
settings 
Note: Modified based on Meyer-Sahling (2008, p. 8).  
 
No matter the level of politicisation present, relations between politicians and 
bureaucrats are very significant and, as stated previously (section 2.4.1), one of the 
intended objectives of a politically neutral CS is to maintain a separation between 
politics and administration. In this regard, as mentioned previously (section 2.3.15), 
an integral component of the traditional model of political neutrality is for public 
servants to refrain from publicly expressing their personal views on government 
policies of administration, mainly to preserve the confidence of the public and of 
political masters in the impartiality of public servants (Kernaghan, 1976). The 
delicate line between bureaucracy and politics means that, in its strictest sense, if 
public servants openly support and defend the politicians in power and the 
government‟s policies, then the opposition will see it as collusion, but if public 
servants openly support the opposition and criticise the government, then the 
government suspects treason (Caiden, 1996). Mistrust can also occur between the 
civil servants and the politicians simply because on the one hand, civil servants have 
to loyally implement government policies and may therefore be seen as willing tools 
of politicians; and on the other may give critical advice about the feasibility of 
policies which, even if privately given, leads to accusations from the politicians of 
disloyalty. Perhaps that is why Wood and Waterman (1994, p. 13) have highlighted 
that the role politics plays within administration is one of the long-standing and 
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continuing controversies evident in the field of political science and public 
administration. A clear demarcation between politics and administration may never 
be possible. However, as Jenei and Zupko (2001, p. 80) argue, although tension 
inevitably exists between politicians and civil servants, “a high level of cooperation 
is needed for the government to be effective”.  
 
In one respect, cooperation between administrators and politicians can be considered 
to be healthy as well. This is because as Part (1990, p. 107) has stressed, in order to 
serve the government elected by the people, it may be necessary for the bureaucracy 
to assume the coloration of the party in power, at least to some degree (cited in 
Barberis, 1997, p. 153). In some countries with a history of the CS, when a change in 
government occurs, senior civil servants are also expected to demonstrate to their 
new political leaders that they understand the new government‟s policy priorities and 
are prepared to provide professional advice on how to implement those policies. 
However, as Meyer-Sahling (2004, p. 77) notes, whenever there is a change of 
government, there will be at least some level of distrust between the incoming 
government and the bureaucrats it “inherits”. A study conducted by the OECD 
(2007) also found that relations between political advisers and civil servants tend to 
be problematic in most EU and OECD member countries; particularly evident during 
the transition of governments (also see Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010).
23
 The fears held 
by both sides will be visible, but these need to be put aside in order to maintain the 
integrity and professionalism of the permanent CS. How the transition of power 
takes place and whether it occurs in an organised fashion will be an indicator in 
determining whether the CS is operating as intended.  
 
Unlike civil servants who are appointed based on merit, political appointees are 
appointed on the basis of their political affiliation. For political executives without 
prior experience in the public sector, there can be a “lack of management experience; 
lack of understanding of, and experience in, the public sector; and/or inadequate 
understanding of the programs and policies for which the political executive is 
                                               
23
 Some countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium have to manage for extended periods of 
transition where an election does not produce a clear majority party or coalition. Thus they have to 
have elaborate codes for civil servants to carry on with the necessary business of government during 
these periods. There are rules in New Zealand for such transitions, put in place following the 
introduction of mixed-member proportional (MMP) voting system. 
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responsible” (Ingraham, 1987, p. 426). Some even argue that such appointees are on 
the whole more likely to be less competent and less experienced than career public 
servants (Kernaghan, 1976). Albeit that it is not the case with all political appointees, 
any lack of competence, experience and preparedness, combined with the possible 
short tenure and high mobility of political executives, may result in the lack of long 
term vision and understanding of the strategies of government agencies. On the 
positive side, political appointments without prior experience in the public sector can 
be an asset as such appointees may come with a better understanding of the policies 
and political objectives of the new government – views that the existing civil 
servants possibly do not understand if they have been accustomed to a different 
ideology held by the previous regime.  
 
2.4.3 Are there specific challenges to civil services in emerging 
democracies? 
 
Institutionalisation of a professional CS in an emerging democracy can pose a 
number of challenges. During the process of institutionalisation, a number of 
characteristics and features that are mostly though not exclusively confined to 
emerging democracies can also be evident, depending on the socio-political 
environment.   
 
The functions of a CS are often outlined in a CS Act. As mentioned previously 
(section 2.3.3), the EU has advocated as a condition of accession, establishing the 
independence of the CS in a statute. As Ridley (1995, p. 14) points out, however, it 
could be argued that on the one hand new democracies should rely on such a law-
oriented approach to prevent abuse of power, but on the other hand if the democracy 
is at its infant stages, that “the rule of law approach will simply encourage elitist 
attitudes in the civil service”. The latter argument is also supported by a number of 
authors. Research has found that “civil service laws have seldom been the expected 
catalysts for the stabilisation, depoliticisation and professionalisation of the central 
administration” (Verheijen, 2000, p. 29). Some have even concluded that laws are 
inherently incapable of producing major social change because they encourage 
alternative courses of action that disrupt social equilibrium (Roots, 2004). Meyer-
Sahling (2004, p. 72) states that in the countries of Eastern Europe which returned to 
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democracy recently, “even when civil service legislation has been adopted, political 
interference at the top of the civil service continues to contradict attempts to 
establish professional civil services insulated from politics”. Even when political 
leaders do not have the capacity to appoint their loyalists to government 
organisations, a variety of strategies can be employed by politicians to achieve the 
objectives that they desire (Peters & Pierre, 2004). As a result, “in these nations, 
democratisation involves not only establishing traditional political institutions, but 
also improving the legitimacy of the civil service” (Andrews, 2008, p. 171).  
 
Laws are amended according to the needs of a society and the CS Acts are no 
exception. However, stable and effective legislation can be important in the attempts 
to inculcate professional ethics amongst the civil servants. Such stability may be a 
rarity in nascent democracies. An evaluation undertaken by Meyer-Sahling (2009) of 
the CEE countries that were part of the EU enlargement in 2004 revealed that all 
eight countries
24
 scored poorly in terms of “legal predictability”. Having amended 
their CS laws in numerous instances, such continuous changes had meant that the 
formal rules governing the CS had been very unstable in those countries, and the 
stability of the CS administration had been seriously undermined with the possibility 
of the development of an arbitrary management.  
 
As mentioned previously (section 2.4.2), the thickening of government is evident 
even in established democracies. Such practices can have adverse effects in 
emerging democracies too. For example, one strategy often used in thickening is to 
exclude top civil servants from the scope of the CS legislation, a practice referred to 
by Thompson (2006) as the deinstitutionalisation
25
 of civil service. Thompson 
(2006) asserts that such practices are evident in environments overtly hostile to merit 
ideals. Exclusion from the parameters of the CS laws probably “weakens the 
accountability of the civil service and undermines the principles of professionalism 
                                               
24  The eight countries covered in this study were Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.   
25 According to Olsen (2009, p. 10) de-institutionalisation “implies that existing institutional borders, 
identities, rules, and practices; descriptions, explanations, and justifications, and resources and powers 
are becoming more contested and possibly discontinued. New actors are mobilized. Outcomes are 
more uncertain, and it is necessary to use more incentives or coercion to make people follow 
prescribed rules and to sanction deviance”.  
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and political neutrality” (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, p. 21). Undoubtedly the morale of 
career managers is adversely affected as political executives are able to bypass them, 
and instead rely on lower level political appointees, thereby making career managers 
redundant (Ingraham, 1987). Furthermore, though such appointments are legal in 
many countries, political interference can result in high personnel turnover, 
organisational instability, and demotivation of staff at all levels, as it becomes 
evident that top jobs in the ministries can be obtained only by means of personal and 
political connections rather than on the basis of merit (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, p. 76). 
In this respect, Suleiman (2003) has emphasised that the ongoing practices of de-
professionalisation and politicisation of public administration in several states, and 
with more emphasis placed on political affiliation, loyalty, and commitment to the 
current government, have costs in terms of an administration‟s ability to serve future 
governments and society at large (cited in Olsen, 2005, p. 9). Regardless of the 
means used, the aim of political leaders is to control the powers of a bureaucracy by 
appointing political staff who will be used as instruments of authority over the CS.     
 
2.4.4 What is the role of civil service in national development? 
 
The classical CS model does not directly address the range of tasks that state 
bureaucracies are required to undertake in national development. As these tasks 
proliferated from the original ones of tax gathering and local magistracies, into a 
wide range of technical, professional, and entrepreneurial roles, the classical model 
focused on generalist administrators overseeing a range of these specialists, technical 
functions and occupations. Along with modernisation and expansion of the societies, 
determining the appropriate role of the government in national development became 
important. In other words, the extent to which the state should be involved in the 
societal development was questioned.  
 
From the early twentieth century, state bureaucracy played a major developmental 
role, especially in the areas of social services and public utility provisions. The 
growth in public services came with significant rises in the cost of delivering such 
services and questions were once again asked regarding the role that should be 
discharged by the CS. One strategy used was to fragment the single CS into a 
number of different modes of organisations that included semi-autonomous agencies 
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and public commercial enterprises, each with their own employment rules. Thus, in 
some countries, the developmental role played by the central CS shifted to a more 
regulatory role.  
 
Despite such changes in the role of the CS, some countries have retained its 
entrepreneurial role. Some argue that the CS or the bureaucracy can play a crucial 
role in the development of a society. In this respect, Ejifor (2003, p. 5) has argued 
“one of the most important catalysts of the development of nations is an efficient 
bureaucracy. On the other hand, one of the heaviest millstones round the neck of 
developing nations is an inefficient bureaucracy”. Bureaucracy is ubiquitous in most 
developing countries and “they serve important functions in a democratic society” 
(Blau & Meyer, 1971, p. 164). In addition, a bureaucracy is responsible for enforcing 
the law equally for all citizens and regulating the market through its institutions in 
order to provide a platform for anyone to acquire wealth (Blau & Meyer, pp. 165-6).  
 
Determining the most efficient model of public employment can be debatable. 
Regardless of the model adopted, the underlying assumption is that “public 
institutions operate on the principle that politicians, bureaucrats and trained officials 
are elected to act in the interests of the people as their employers” (Aadel, 2001, p. 
8). For a developing country, a high degree of involvement of state bureaucracy can 
arguably be beneficial for state development, as evident from the experiences of the 
developed democracies.  
 
2.5 Public administration in small-island states 
 
Civil services of small-island states can share some common features. Before going 
into the details of such features, however, two cautionary notes need to be raised. 
Firstly, these features may also be visible in developed nations with large civil 
services. Second, although smallness or islandness may not have a direct correlation 
with public administration and institutional choices, at least an indirect linkage is 
evident. In this regard Baldacchino (2004, p. 278) points out, “islandness is an 
intervening variable that does not determine, but contours and conditions physical 
and social events in distinct, and distinctly relevant ways”. However, in a more 
assertive manner, Anckar (2006, p. 43) concludes “that islandness links in many 
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instances to the choice of institutional settings”. These “settings” may include public 
administration as argued below.  
 
The administrative features presented below can on one hand enhance the field of 
public administration, and on the other, be detrimental to the development of a 
professional CS. Identifying those features and aspects can be relevant to analysing 
the extent to which a professional CS institutionalises in island states. The theoretical 
perspective outlined below is by no means exhaustive, but is focused only on the 
issues that are deemed relevant to this research.   
 
The small size of a population can at times be detrimental in establishing a politically 
neutral CS. Politics and public administration are closely tied to each other, which 
has been described as a characteristic particularly found in small societies (Murray, 
1981; Randma, 2001; Sutton, 1987). As a result “there is a greater amount of mixing 
between politicians and civil servants and stronger personal networks beyond 
political ties so that it can be difficult to maintain totally separate discrete roles” 
(Randma, 2001, p. 48). At times, the absence of discrete roles may even lead civil 
servants to be politically active thereby placing the concept of neutrality in question. 
Pirotta (1997, p. 199) has argued that, in Malta, public service neutrality is merely a 
legal fiction where “large numbers of public servants openly take part in political 
activities.” In such cases, the separation of politics from administration becomes 
contentious. Furthermore, anonymity of civil servants – one of the privileges enjoyed 
by a nation‟s civil servants – can also become an issue due to the small population. 
In this regard, according to Sutton (1987, p. 19), in small states public servants are 
“frequently unprepared to take risks or make decisions out of the routine without 
reference to superiors. Administration is therefore politicized, often centralized, and 
subject frequently to the narrow political vision of the small state politician”.  
 
There have been those who have opposed a politics-administration dichotomy where 
small states are concerned. Those who argue in favour of this separation assert that 
the inability of the public service or the CS to become rationally bureaucratic is the 
cause of limited development (Schahczenski, 1990, p. 75). On the other hand, Jones 
(1976, p. 94), discussing experience in the small-island states of the Caribbean, 
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argues that “the „politicization‟ of the state bureaucracy and corruption and so on, 
need not be rejected on a priori grounds as being inconsistent with development”.  
 
Personal relationships also play a significant role in small states, much greater than 
in large societies. According to Baker (1992, p. 17) in small countries it is simply 
“impractical to separate personality from function”. A small population means that 
even civil servants regularly interact with citizens who receive their services, either 
as neighbours, relatives or friends, to a greater degree when compared with larger 
countries. This view is supported by Misra (2004, p. 134) who states that “the 
prevalent interconnectedness among individual and families, society in small and 
micro states is far more cohesive than in their larger counterparts”.  
 
Such relations can also be a factor within organisational settings. Weber argues that 
the historical process of rationalisation embodies the shift from traditional authority 
towards legal-rational authority (Parsons, 1947). However, in some small-island 
states with traditional chiefly systems, there exists a mix of the two, often with 
tensions between them. In such countries, when personal relationships come to the 
fore, the concept of professionalism being maintained is questionable, because “the 
very fact of smallness means a tendency to greater particularism in society, because 
people grow up within an interdependent network and every social relationship 
serves many interests” (Randma, 2001, p. 48). Such relations can be considered 
either in a positive or a negative sense. On the positive side close personal contacts 
in small civil services means that relations and informal networks can enhance 
collaboration within the organisation and among different organisations of the CS, 
whereas on the negative side the objectivity of personnel decisions may be 
questionable (Randma, 2001).  
 
It is also common that small states or small-island states have large civil services in 
comparison with their populations and a common feature of such polities is the 
ubiquity of government (J. Richards, 1982, p. 158). According to Feeny and Rogers 
(2008, p. 527), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) tend to have relatively higher 
ratios of government expenditure to GDP compared with other developing nations. 
Inability to achieve economies of scale and a lack of critical mass also tend to be 
common characteristics of public administration, and the resulting economic and 
71 
 
social overheads lead to a high per capita cost of both public administration and 
economic and social infrastructure (Wettenhall, 1992). Although a number of 
possible reasons can be found for this phenomenon, arguably the fact that the state 
employs a large chunk of the working population can contribute to a relatively high 
wage bill of the government in relation to its total expenditure. Furthermore, it is 
common for governments of small states to be involved in the development of the 
economy to a greater extent than in larger states. Pirotta (1997, p. 202), reporting this 
phenomenon in the case of small but relatively developed Malta, argues that this may 
be the general rule in the case of micro-states.  
 
In the past, smallness was not a requisite for being colonised. However, colonial 
heritage is regarded as an important linking factor between geography and politics 
(Anckar, 2006, p. 51; Ott, 2000, pp. 69-70; Srebrnik, 2004, pp. 333-4). Furthermore, 
most small-island states have had a history of colonisation. Regardless of a country‟s 
size, in most cases foreign rulers imposed their way of handling administration and, 
even after the colonisers left, in most cases the previously planted structure of 
administration remained intact. This is the case even in Caribbean nations with a 
long history of democratic institutions (Hope, 1983) and a professional CS (Rowat, 
1996). One reason for the continuity of such institutions even after independence 
may be that amidst the political changes “somehow the civil service scrapes through 
unchanged, perhaps because the myth has really been accepted that it is neutral and 
objective and, therefore, „one size fits all‟” (Baker, 1992, p. 14). Although this 
notion can be debated, the presence of such institutions in a country for an extended 
period of time will in most cases lead to institutionalisation of the functions that in 
turn strengthen the democratic state.   
 
Small-island states also have a limited pool of qualified personnel (Jacobs, 1975, p. 
136). Consequently a few individuals in such societies come into repeated contact 
with each other, but in a variety of roles and capacities (J. Richards, 1982, p. 157). 
Furthermore, due to the lack of supply of trained professionals, it may simply not be 
possible to locate anyone with adequate training in some technical fields, and even 
when such professionals are available, the government may not have the capacity to 
offer competitive salaries (Wettenhall, 1992). As Brown (2008, p. 11) points out, “it 
will never be possible for a small country of 1.5 million people or fewer to have all 
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the specialists it could require in every technical or managerial area essential for its 
development in a modern world”. This means specialists often act as generalists, and 
perform a broad range of functions. Even when training is provided and specialists 
are hired, a “brain drain” has been evident in a number of such states. As a result, the 
hiring of expatriate consultants is a common phenomenon. The small size of the 
working population combined with low pay also means that career civil servants may 
be forced to work in secondary employment outside the CS.  
 
Small does not necessarily portray a negative image. Although a number of features 
mentioned above can potentially inhibit the development of a CS that is professional 
and aligned with democratic values, such attributes can be transformed to be made 
beneficial for the CS. As Rajbansee (1972, p. 216) has stated “one of the blessings of 
small size is the opportunity it gives to avoid bureaucratic rigidities.”  
 
In summary, although some of the tendencies reported here may be present in larger 
states as well, in small societies, it is arguable that civil servants may find it harder to 
separate their official duties from their private lives and personal responsibilities; 
may be subject to greater personal exposure or the decisions they take on delegated 
authority; and may find that they are more subject to micro-management by 
politicians than in larger governments and organisations. 
 
2.6 Policy formulation, decision-making, and political interactions 
 
The decision on the form of a CS legislation in the Maldives was one of public 
policy being “whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 1975, p. 1). 
Key to the definition of public policy is the idea of a process to reach a decision 
(Birkland, 2005, p. 213). Policy formulation and decision-making are integral parts 
of the policy process. Policy formulation involves “exploring the various options or 
alternative courses of action available for addressing a problem” (Howlett, Ramesh, 
& Perl, 2009, p. 110). Such options are identified after the actors begin to tackle a 
policy problem. During the decision-making process, an option is chosen as the 
course of action. Actors or organisations involved in the policy process debate 
options presented to them before arriving at a decision. The decisions on which 
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public policies are based can come in different forms, such as legislation, executive 
orders, or other official acts (May, 2003, p. 223). 
 
Review of these stages of the policy process is the focus of this thesis because of the 
analysis of the CS Act that emerged during the democratisation process. This 
segment of the chapter focuses on the interaction of actors in the policy formulation 
and decision-making stages during the enactment of the relevant legislation. Though 
the primary focus is on how the legislative process shaped the CS Act in the 
Maldives, a broader perspective is required on the wider policy process and the 
interaction of the main actors in the process.     
 
Governments normally initiate policy formulation. However, it is also possible in the 
case of a government‟s inability or reluctance, that the legislature takes the initiative 
to push through certain reforms. In this regard, Carey (2009, p. 1) states that apart 
from making laws, legislatures can be an important policy-making institution as they 
approve budgets and make other fundamental policy decisions. However, exactly 
what role a legislature and its members will have in policy-making is subject to a 
great deal of variation in different nations.  
 
Olson and Mezey (1991, p. 6) suggest two paths for policy-making by the 
legislature. The first depends on the relationship of the legislature to other political 
institutions and actors, such as executive elites, political parties, constituencies, and 
interest groups. The second is concerned with the internal structure of the legislature, 
such as the strength of committee systems, access to professional staff and the degree 
of control exercised by the political party machinery. However, the focus of this 
research is on the first category and on how these actors influence and contribute to 
policy formulation. The reason for choosing this category is the availability and 
accessibility of relevant information. On the other hand the reason for excluding the 
second category is simply because it involves the study of parliament and its internal 
structures, including mechanisms such as access to professional staff, development 
of an established committee system, and direct control by the political parties. These 
latter aspects are still in their infant stages in the Maldivian case study examined in 
this thesis, thereby making it difficult to collect comprehensive data. 
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The legislature can play a significant role regardless of whether the form of 
government is presidential or parliamentary. As Howlett et al., (2009, p. 60) note, 
even in a nation with a presidential form of government, its members of parliament 
and its committees play an active role in designing policies. Irrespective of the form 
of government, how such actors interact in decision-making determines the outcome 
of the legislative process.   
 
Why does administrative reform come onto the legislative agenda? Geddes (1994, 
pp. 83-99) argues that when political parties have relatively equal strength in the 
legislature, politicians will be more likely to adopt bureaucratic reform. This may be 
because if one party dominates the legislature it will probably have little political 
incentive to push for such reforms as the dominant party can use the CS for political 
gains. On the other hand, if two dominant groups have equal strength in the 
legislature, one or the other has little to lose but possible electoral gains on offer if 
they are seen advocating for administrative reform. Nonetheless, even in the case of 
a single party domination, they may opt for reform in cases where “public outrage 
over bureaucratic incompetence and graft had become so vehement that politicians 
might fear that they would lose more votes by opposing reform than by reducing 
their ability to distribute patronage” (Geddes, 1994, p. 95). Furthermore, legislators 
who do not necessarily have strong convictions about a specific policy might be 
among the most fervent advocates of that policy simply because they believe it will 
appeal to their constituents (Shils, 1959, p. 348). 
 
Decisions are made through voting in the legislature, and, prior to casting of the 
votes, any bill is bound to have to navigate its way through a number of channels. 
Most of the policymaking and bargaining among legislators takes place before it 
reaches the voting stage, possibly at the committee stage, or even before the bill is 
submitted to the legislature. As mentioned above, the propensity for legislators to 
bargain can result from the strength of parties in the parliament as well as the 
possible gains and losses on offer by choosing or rejecting a specific policy. Such 
discussions can be held “in public pronouncements and debate, in legislative 
committees and party caucuses, or during negotiations between executive and 
legislative actors or between party leaders and rank-and-file legislators” (Carey, 
2009, p. 46). However, eventually the decisions made by law-makers will be 
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dependent on both instrumental and non-instrumental motives for being involved in 
the interests of the constituencies (Esaiasson & Holmberg, 1996, p. 279). On a 
personal level, the law-makers will assess their probability of re-election. 
Furthermore, they will assess the prevailing norms thereby attempting to pursue 
“normatively appropriate behaviour” (March & Olsen, 1984, p. 744). Although 
analysing motives is a daunting task, discussions in parliament and the symbols
26
 
evident during the process provide clues about assumptions underlying decisions 
made by political actors.  
 
Upon the initiation of a public policy by the legislature, why does a government 
choose to back such reform alternatives? According to Sahlin-Andersson (2002, p. 
47), the motives for a government to launch reform, the opportunities available to a 
government, and the changes such reforms lead to, depends on the constitutional 
arrangements (Olsen & Peters, 1996), administrative systems (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 1999; Hood, 1995), reform traditions (Pallot, 1998) and the cultures 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 1999) of that particular nation. For instance, past practices 
revealing how an administration operated, especially where there have been cases of 
mismanagement and unethical acts, can determine the need to push for such reforms. 
Perception of dissatisfaction regarding past policies within segments of a 
government can also provide reasons for pushing through reforms.    
 
As indicated above, not all policies originate from parliament. So where do policy 
options originate from during the formulation stage? In most cases they are borrowed 
from the practices of other countries. This is referred to in the contemporary 
literature as policy transfer. According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1998, p. 56) policy 
transfer “refers to the process by which actors borrow programmes and policies from 
one setting to develop programmes and policies within another”. Though related 
notions such as policy convergence, policy diffusion, emulation and lesson-drawing 
are used, they are all partially overlapping concepts. As this research examines the 
processes of formulation of the CS, the term policy transfer is suitable as it is 
concerned more with processes rather than with results.   
                                               
26 The term “symbol” is used here to denote the actions and reactions of the MPs through different 
means such as delaying tactics, nature of their speech, verbal gestures, and so forth.   
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Dolowitz and Marsh have developed a framework for analysis of policy transfer 
which asks questions as: Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the key 
actors involved in the policy transfer process? What is transferred? From where are 
lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or 
facilitates the policy transfer process? How is the process of policy transfer related to 
policy “success” or policy “failure”? (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Answers to these 
questions help explain the processes involved. This thesis attempts to identify the 
origins of the policy formulation of the CS Act, and some aspects of this process 
seem to be explained by a process of policy transfer.  
 
The above questions also include further examination of the role of the political 
actors which is an important aspect of this thesis. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p. 10) 
identify nine main categories of political actors involved in the policy transfer: 
elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy 
entrepreneurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-national 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions, and consultants. Depending on the 
type of policy transfer, the degree of involvement of such actors will vary. Which of 
these actors influenced the policy transfer process, and the extent to which those 
actors influenced the process in the Maldives, is examined later (see sections 6.2 to 
6.7).    
 
The size of a country can also affect the nature of decision-making by political 
actors. In the case of small-island states, members of the political inner circle will 
know each other quite well. In such countries the effects of decisions are pervasive 
due to the interlocking of role relationships among the political actors and the 
availability of monitoring mechanisms to oversee the implementation of such 
decisions through economic, legal, political, and social pressures (J. Richards, 1982). 
As a result it is more likely that they will cooperate with each other and it is more 
likely that they will choose compromise over confrontation (Ott, 2000, p. 195). 
Research also often suggests that in some countries, despite apparent divisions, the 
political actors are socially and ideologically united (Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 
2007, p. 820). However, where disagreement exists, differences of opinion will be 
taken on a more personal level (J. Richards, 1982). In either case, the timing of any 
policy transfer is crucial, as decisions taken by political actors will encompass either 
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voluntary or coercive elements depending on the periods of social, political, and 
economic stability, or on some form of political crisis (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 
17). In other words, during times of political instability political actors might have to 
approve certain reforms due to environmental pressures, reforms that might be not 
pursued in times of harmony. 
 
2.7 Conclusion: Implications for the case of the Maldives 
 
The aim of this chapter was to develop the basic propositions of the two research 
questions that will be the basis of the analysis of the Maldives case. The propositions 
developed in this chapter on democratisation and CS, taking into account the specific 
context of a small-island state, will form the basis for analysis of the evidence from 
the Maldives case. The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that the 
democratisation process results from a combination of factors with a number of 
outcomes possible. It also suggests that particular characteristics of small-island 
states can also be a factor in democratisation and institution building. Redefining the 
boundaries between the political and administrative arm of the executive in such a 
setting has numerous challenges, which current studies do not adequately explain. 
However, application of the theories and processes reviewed in the chapter to the 
Maldivian case can make an important contribution to understanding the processes 
of democratisation and the CS development in the context of small-island states.  
 
Democratisation can follow different paths and at times steady economic and social 
progress can contribute to democratic reform. In the event of long history of 
authoritarian rule, politically significant triggering events leading to mass uprisings 
can also be pivotal in accelerating the reform process. At some stage this process 
will include negotiation of the institutional settings.   
 
Reform of the CS can be one component of this negotiation. The shape of the future 
statutory CS is determined normally by the political strength of actors and their 
commitment to the CS reform. However, when democratic reform and CS reform are 
pursued in a nation where the CS has historically been controlled by an autocratic 
political executive, there may be a move to entrench a statutory CS relatively 
independent of the political powers and intended to be distanced from future political 
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control. The possible effects of such a policy can be the creation of a CS that may 
not be completely responsive to the elected government. 
 
Often the CS reform is one component of the political and governance reform 
agenda. Reform of the CS may thus not be at the top of the agenda: especially when 
democratic reforms proceed in an accelerated pace, the CS reform may not get the 
full attention it requires. Thus policy makers may adopt the previously maintained 
centralised model of administration, simply transferring the powers from the political 
executive to a statutory body. 
 
There are common features of political and public administration among small-island 
states, which may play a part in reform policies and processes. The geographical 
dispersion of islands in most small-island states often leads to the adoption of a 
decentralised system of government, while the CS reform remains under central 
control. When the CS reform and political governance reform diverge in such a 
manner, compatibility issues tend to appear. 
 
Implementation of democratic reforms does not necessarily eliminate or reduce 
politicisation of the CS. Although a statutory CS may be designed to draw a stronger 
line between policy and administration, there will still be a tension between political 
priorities and CS autonomy. As politicisation is evident in large and small countries, 
it may have a particularly strong effect in small-island states. The interlocking 
relationships observed in small-island states means that when politicisation takes 
place in the public domain, questions may arise regarding the integrity of the state 
institutions and their constitutional powers. Questions on the chosen model of the CS 
as well as the legality of the challenges that are faced during the consolidation of the 
reform may surface.  
 
Emerging democracy implies consolidation is yet to be reached. When fierce 
political differences remain among the political actors of small-island states, using 
the CS to forward one‟s own political agenda has a higher probability. This is 
especially relevant when, following a long history of authoritarian rule, a newly 
elected government goes on a crusade to remedy what it considers failed past 
practices. Along with the volatility of such an environment and the administrative 
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history of the nation, the statutory CS may be inclined to defend itself by adopting a 
law-oriented approach in the management of the CS. Additionally, 
institutionalisation of a professional CS is hindered when politicians use a number of 
mechanisms to de-institutionalise the CS along with attempts to reshape the scope of 
the CS.    
      
To date, the topics reviewed in this chapter have only been addressed separately in 
contemporary academic literature. The intricacies of the dynamics between these 
processes are expected to become clearer, at least in the case of the Maldives, when 
the democratisation process, the formulation of the CS, and the interplay between the 
two processes are examined from Chapters Four to Seven. Those chapters use 
germane documents, statistics, and data along with observations on ideas of 
interviewees to draw conclusions from the scholarship presented in this chapter. The 
next chapter discusses the research design and methodology used to gather and 
analyse the empirical data.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter discuss the research design and methodology adopted for this research. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the epistemological and ontological stance 
taken. Next section examines the research design, followed by a discussion of the 
case study strategy of inquiry, and why it was preferred in undertaking this research. 
The next two sections discuss issues surrounding generalisation and possible 
limitations of the thesis. The last three sections present the data sources used for the 
study, methods of data collection, and data analysis process.    
 
3.1 Epistemology and ontology 
 
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge and ontology is concerned with the nature 
of reality. In other words, “epistemology deals with problems of knowing” while 
ontology gives “referents of knowledge, if indeed there are any” (D. T. Campbell, 
1988, p. 440). Crotty (1998, p. 10) clarifies that ontology relates to understanding 
what is, while epistemology relates to understanding what it means to know. It is 
common that such philosophical ideas remain mostly hidden in research (Slife & 
Williams, 1995). Nonetheless, as Creswell (2009, p. 5) states “they still influence the 
practice of research and need to be identified”.  
 
This thesis is based on a mild form of social constructivism. Crotty (1998, p. 42) 
defines constructivism as a view in which “all knowledge, and therefore all 
meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in 
and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and 
transmitted within an essentially social context”. I am not denying that there is a 
reality of events that exists separately from the way we perceive them but I am 
arguing that there is a “social reality” which is made up of commonly held beliefs 
and understandings about these events.  
 
Institutionalism can be understood as a way of understanding the persistence of 
forms of social organisation. Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 936), distinguish three 
schools of institutionalism: historical institutionalism; rational choice 
institutionalism; and sociological institutionalism. According to Hall and Taylor 
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(1996, p. 938), historical institutionalists define institutions as “formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy”. Rational choice institutionalists use 
“„new economics of organization‟ which emphasizes the importance of property 
rights, rent-seeking, and transactions costs to the operation and development of 
institutions” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 943). Sociological institutionalists argue that 
institutional forms and procedures used in modern organisations should be seen as 
culturally-specific practices (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 946).   
 
Premfors (1998) discusses the differences on issues of ontology and rationality 
among these types of institutionalism. He argues that historical institutionalism 
relates to: formal and informal structures (institutions), not classes or norms; weak 
constructivism (ontology); appropriateness (rationality); public policies and power 
constellations (key study objects) (Premfors, 1998, 147). 
    
This thesis is a study of institutional change that occurred over a relatively short 
period of time but emerged from the existing institutions of public life in the 
Maldives. Therefore, the appropriate approach for this thesis is historical 
institutionalism. Institutional change can be deliberately negotiated, but it is always 
subject to the particular institutions and history of the country, so that it never starts 
with a “blank canvas”. Adopting others‟ words, it is therefore “closer to a mildly 
constructivist historical institutionalism [rather] than to either rational choice or the 
more strongly constructivist sociological institutionalism” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2004, p. 23). I am interested in people‟s ideas about the CS and democracy and how 
they influenced the development and implementation of the CS Act. Rather than 
observing what people did or asking them what they did, this study quite often asked 
them for their observations on ideas which are not their own and events in which 
they may not have directly taken part. The responses are historical in the sense that I 
am constructing a narrative after the event. The influences on the people are the 
ideas of others but also “the rules of the game” that are inherited from the pre-
existing institutions of the Maldivian society. As the study brings economics and 
political power into the discussions, it is not just about exchange of ideas but also 
about some underlying historical forces.  
 
82 
 
3.2 Research design 
 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007, p. 5), research involves a 
multistage process which one follows systematically in order to undertake and 
complete a study. Consequently, every study should have a specified research 
design. Creswell (2009, p. 5) refers to research design as the “plan or proposal to 
conduct research, [which] involves the intersection of philosophy, strategies of 
inquiry, and specific methods”. This research uses a qualitative research design in 
operationalising the research questions and the theoretical framework presented in 
the previous two chapters.  
 
The study examines the processes and the interactions between different actors and 
institutions in the establishment of a statutory CS. An in-depth analysis of these 
aspects is examined by choosing a qualitative design and using the meanings people 
attach to such involvements. That is because “qualitative researchers are interested in 
understanding how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their 
worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences” (Merriam, 2009, p. 5). 
Taylor and Bogdan (1998, pp. 7-8) assert that qualitative approaches allow the 
researcher to understand the meanings people attach to things in their lives and adopt 
strategies to examine the way people act in the course of daily life. Therefore, by 
choosing a qualitative approach, a “deeper” understanding of such social phenomena 
can be studied (Silverman, 2005, p. 10). The approach paves the way to identifying 
possible implications for the establishment and institutionalisation of a statutory CS 
by identifying the patterns involved as derived from the rich information gathered. 
 
In collecting data for this study, I had some ideas about which documents might be 
relevant and who to approach for interviews, but I was open to interpretations that 
arose from the evidence itself, rather than my preconceived ideas and potential 
biases (refer to sections 1.4 and 3.5).  
 
3.3 Case study research strategy 
 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534) explains, “case study is a research strategy which focuses 
on understanding the dynamics present within single settings”. Firstly though, what 
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is a case study? Thomas (2011a, p. 513) defines case study as “analyses of persons, 
events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are 
studied holistically by one or more methods”. There are numerous other definitions 
of “case studies” (see Bennett, 2004, p. 21; Creswell, 1998, p. 61; George & Bennett, 
2004, pp. 17-18; Gerring, 2004, p. 342; Seawright & Collier, 2010, p. 315-6; 
Simons, 2009, p. 21). According to Morris and Wood (1991, cited in Saunders et al., 
2007, p. 139), case study strategy is the preferred option when the researcher seeks 
to obtain a rich understanding of a particular context and process. 
 
In a case study, it is important to distinguish what it is a case study of, and what it is 
a case study about. In other words, what is the subject of the case and what is the 
object of the case. Thomas (2011a, p. 511) argues that: “(1) the subject of the study, 
which is the case itself, and (2) the object, which is the analytical frame or theory 
through which the subject is viewed and which the subject explicates”. The Korean 
War, for example, can be considered the subject of a case, while U.S. resistance to 
putative communist expansion can be considered the object of that case (Thomas, 
2011a). In line with such a distinction, the subject of this thesis is the development of 
the current CS model of the Maldives during the reforms that followed mainly after 
2003. The object is the interaction between the process of democratisation and the 
institutional development of the CS.   
 
3.4 Generalisation 
 
In case studies, “generalizability refers to the capacity of the case to be informative 
about a general phenomenon, to be broadly applicable beyond the specific site, 
population, time, and circumstances studied” (Mabry, 2008, p. 222). Thomas 
(2011b) states that it can be difficult to use generalisation criteria in case studies, 
while Stake (2000, p. 19) notes that case studies are widely seen as non-useful 
because “they are not a suitable basis for generalization”. Such views do not 
necessarily diminish the importance of case studies.  
 
Ruddin (2006) argues that: 1) generalisation is essential to understanding the world; 
2) there is no point doing a case study unless you expect to generalise from it; and 3) 
publishing a case study is a statement of generalisability in its own sense. Ruddin 
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(2006, p. 800) further states that generalisation in the single case study is not a 
matter of statistical inference, but of “imposing meaning” on the subject of the case 
study – the meaning being the statement of the object of the study. In this thesis, that 
will be the development of the current CS model in the Maldives through the mutual 
determination of a process of democratisation and the formation of a statutory CS.       
 
Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 302) observes, “case study as a methodology is generally held in 
low regard, or is simply ignored, within the academy”. According to him, this is a 
result of a misunderstanding that one cannot generalise on the basis of a single case 
study (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The scope of this study has been limited to the Maldives by 
the limited resources and time constraints available to undertake the research. A 
comparative case study or a multiple case study approach would probably lead to 
better generalisations and applications to other small-island states. Then again, 
comparative cases will also differ in important matters; for example no other small-
island state has gone through similar changes in such a relatively short period in the 
recent past, where a statutory CS was established along with a transformation to a 
multi-party democratic system simultaneously. 
 
According to Stake (1995, p. xi), “case study is the study of particularity and 
complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances”. Thus, this study aims only to discuss the role of a CS in a small-
island state through the Maldivian experience and to add to a body of knowledge on 
the objects of the case study. It is possible that other countries share characteristics 
with the Maldives in relation to political processes and institution building and, 
therefore, the Maldivian experience may be beneficial to such countries on the path 
towards democratic consolidation and strengthening of state administration. 
Additionally, for the Maldivians to make sense of their own experience, possible 
lessons for the Maldivian CS are also outlined in the conclusion chapter (see section 
8.4).    
 
3.5 Limitations 
 
Limitations of this study regarding generalisation based on a single case study are 
presented above. This section presents other possible limitations of this thesis. 
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1. As mentioned in Chapter One (section 1.4), I was a participant in some of the 
events described in this thesis. In addition to semi-structured interviews and 
secondary documents, I also used my previous work knowledge to a lesser 
extent to complement and increase the validity of the research. On the one hand, 
such past involvement provides an opportunity to investigate beyond the 
interviews and documents. In other words, it opens up “an opportunity to get 
beyond people‟s opinions and self-interpretations of their attitudes and 
behaviours, towards an evaluation of their actions in practice” (D. E. Gray, 
2009, p. 397). However, on the other hand, such close involvement can be 
perceived to facilitate personal biases towards the case. I acknowledge that I 
have my own standpoints and perceptions on social, cultural and political issues 
of the Maldives. To conduct the research in a professional manner and to 
maintain a “value-neutral position” (Berg, 2009, p. 200), such potential biases 
are counteracted by not using my own experience as “data” in this research, but 
only to verify the data collected through interviews and documents. I have 
intentionally provided a personal observation in this thesis in only one instance 
(see section 4.4.2). 
2. Bias on the part of the interviewees is also a possibility. The majority of the 
interviewees for this research are public figures who are politically aligned to 
one side or another. At the time of the interviews, there were major political 
tensions in the Maldives: concern for maintaining reputations and consideration 
of the future may have influenced their responses to my questions. Certainly, the 
political views of some interviewees were very visible during the interviews. To 
counter this, political statements have not been used in the thesis. Furthermore, 
as mentioned later (see section 3.8), wherever possible, documents were used to 
substantiate some of the statements made by the interviewees.  
3. Another potential issue could be the problem of “shared meaning” in critical 
terms such as “democracy” and “civil service” used in the interview questions. 
As stated (see section 3.8), the majority of the interviews were conducted in 
English. Interviewees who preferred to conduct the interview in the local 
language were not necessarily unfamiliar with English; they simply were more 
comfortable expressing themselves in the local language. Additionally, the 
crucial terminologies of the interviews were presented in English, even in the 
interviews conducted in the local language, as such words were well-known in 
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daily vocabulary. However, there is a possibility that when translating from the 
local language to English, some concepts and terms might not mean exactly the 
same in the English translation. This is the case for both interviews and 
secondary documents that were translated. Furthermore, even when the 
interviews were in English and the critical terminologies well-known, some 
interviewees may have attached varying meanings to terms such as “democracy” 
which do not have a universal definition (see section 1.5.3).  
4. May 2008 marked the birth of the statutory CS in the Maldives. The first multi-
party election in the country was held in October 2008. The democratisation 
process is still unfolding and the consolidation of democracy will require several 
more years. In other words, the story “isn‟t over”. Consequently, references to 
the events and processes until March 2012 are mentioned in this thesis. A 
reminder about the unfolding political changes was evident in February 2012. 
Recurring political turmoil led to a police-initiated mutiny that resulted in the 
highly disputed resignation of the first democratically elected president (see 
section 4.5.1). Therefore, analysing a process that is unfolding in an emerging 
democracy might be considered premature, considering the short span of time 
that has elapsed. On the other hand, conducting a study at such early stages 
while witnessing the process unfolding could provide valuable lessons for the 
future which may help to strengthen the Maldivian CS as well as assist in the 
consolidation of democracy. In other words, what is being witnessed presently is 
what Lægreid (2002, p. 163) called the “adjustment effects of the reform”, and 
analysing the reforms at this early stage can make it possible to isolate the 
impact of democratisation from other possible factors such as socio-economic 
changes that may affect the polity.  
5. Questions can still arise regarding the impact of President Nasheed‟s resignation 
on this thesis. The main response to such concerns is that this thesis is not about 
predicting the sustainability of democracy in the Maldives – a fact evident by 
the use of the word “emerging” in the title of the thesis. Rather, it examines the 
formulation of the current CS model and how it interacts with the democratic 
changes. In other words, his resignation does not have a significant impact on 
the presentation of this case study. 
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3.6 Data sources 
  
A case study is often conducted in great detail and thereby mostly depends on the 
use of several data sources (Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg, 1991, p. 2). By using multiple 
sources, researchers “strive to thoroughly explore day-to-day interactions, how 
things transpire, and the individual meanings of these events for the people 
involved” (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2012, p. 8). While use of multiple data 
sources paves the way for triangulation (refer to section 3.8), multiple sources 
provide a richer picture of the phenomenon under study by viewing the same 
attributes of the subject of the case from different perspectives.  
 
Two main data sources were used for this research; semi-structured interviews and 
secondary documents. As L. Richards and Morse (2007, p. 114) indicate, semi-
structured questions are used when the researcher is to some extent familiar with the 
concepts that are being studied but does not know enough to be able to anticipate the 
answers from the interviewees. Furthermore, the authors have argued that in such 
cases open-ended questions are arranged logically and the same questions are asked 
of all participants, although not necessarily in the same order, and supplementary 
questions are asked as the interview progresses.   
 
The sampling used to determine the interviewees was not probability sampling or 
convenience sampling, but what Patton (1990) refers to as purposeful sampling. 
According to Maxwell (2009, p. 235), “this is a strategy in which particular settings, 
persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can 
provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices”. As the establishment of a 
CS was not a decision made by the general public but by selected political actors, 
using a purposeful sampling strategy allowed me to delve into the reasoning and the 
thoughts of individuals who were important to the processes that were being 
researched.  
 
Secondary documents collected for the research were from government organisations 
and multinational bodies. Newspaper articles were also used as a guide in 
determining the chronology of events during the democratisation process and the 
formulation of the CS. 
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3.7 Methods of data collection 
 
The field research for this project was carried out from May 8, 2010 to October 11, 
2010 in Male‟, the capital of the Maldives. This section describes the methods used 
for the two main data collection activities of interviewing and secondary documents.  
 
Three main groups were targeted for interviewing: (1) senior politicians; (2) senior 
government officials; and (3) senior officials of the former government involved 
during the establishment of the CS. For the purpose of obtaining an outside 
perspective, a civil society and a media organisation were also approached. The 
social contacts that I had developed over the years were used to contact potential 
interviewees. To some extent, some of my former colleagues and friends assisted in 
approaching potential interviewees.  
 
For most potential interviewees three documents were sent prior to the interview 
(although some requested that I bring the documents to the interview): 
 
a) A letter requesting an interview.  
b) A letter explaining the nature of the research, how interviews would be 
conducted, how the information gathered would be handled and stored, and 
how confidentiality aspects of the research would be managed. (Annex 1)  
c) A consent form to be filled by the interviewee (Annex 2).  
 
Prior to each interview, respondents were given an overview of the research, and 
thus they were well informed about their participation. Subsequently, all respondents 
signed the consent form.  
 
The majority of the interviewees were senior officials who were in the public sector 
when the CS was being established, but who no longer work in the government 
(because of the change of government) although some of them are politically active 
in different capacities. Interviewing such prominent figures meant that I was able to 
“learn more about the inner workings of the political process, the machinations 
between influential actors and how a sequence of events was viewed and responded 
to within the political machine” (Lilleker, 2003, p. 208).  
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It was a challenge to obtain interviews from some of the officials. Although most of 
those approached for interviews responded positively, there were some who were 
reluctant to be interviewed. Despite numerous reminders throughout my stay in 
Male‟, they did not respond to my requests. One potential interviewee also 
postponed the interview several times, and it ultimately did not materialise. The 
elusiveness of some of the potential interviewees suggests that they did not want to 
participate in research of such high political salience. From about 30 individuals 
approached, a total of 22 interviews were obtained (The list of the general groups to 
which interviewees belong is given in Annex 3).   
  
Secondary documents were also a vital source of information for this project. As a 
result, a number of government organisations were approached under the “Right to 
Information Regulation” of the Maldives. A government form was filled and sent to 
each organisation along with a letter outlining the objective of the research. The 
majority of the documents were obtained from the parliament and the CSC. 
Parliamentary documents include Acts, bills, minutes, and reports. The CSC 
documents include annual reports, official statistics, and a number of other published 
documents relevant to this research. Reports and documents from a number of other 
government organisations were also obtained. Documents were also obtained from a 
number of international organisations‟ websites. Local newspaper websites were 
continually monitored for any relevant information for the research. Throughout the 
field research, I maintained a diary that recorded my daily work, to ensure 
consistency and justification for the whole process.    
 
Most of the information that was requested from government organisations was 
provided in due time. However, several documents were unobtainable for a number 
of reasons. One organisation said that some of the information requested was 
historical which meant that they needed to access their archive. Interestingly those 
documents belong to the period of 2005 to 2007. Unfortunately those documents 
were never received. In another instance, a piece of information was requested from 
two different government ministries, neither of which could locate it. After I sent an 
additional letter to one of those ministries regarding the matter, I received a phone 
call from the permanent secretary of the ministry – which also did not result in a 
positive outcome. More importantly another government organisation refused to 
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provide some of the information requested, claiming that it was classified as internal 
documents that were not for public viewing. Such a response could have been legally 
challenged under the “Right to Information Regulation” of the Maldives. It is 
worthwhile to mention here that such discretion and secrecy resembles the pre-1960s 
European democracies (OECD, 1999). During that period:  
 
the only application of the principle of openness in the majority of Western 
democracies was, on the one hand, the principle that legal regulations could 
only enter into force once published in an official bulletin or journal, and on 
the other, that administrative decisions could only be applicable once they had 
been officially and duly forwarded to and received by those concerned. 
(OECD, 1999, p. 12)  
 
The Maldives as an emerging democracy has a long way to go to match the same 
standards of access to official information as those found in mature democracies 
today.    
 
3.8 Data analysis process 
 
Data analysis entails reflecting on the collected data and taking steps to understand 
what the data represents and interpreting the larger meaning of the data (Creswell, 
2009, p. 183). Firstly, I transcribed all the interviews. Of the 22 interviews, six were 
conducted in the local language, the rest in English. An external translator was hired 
to translate the interviews conducted in the local language. Secondly, all the 
interviews were coded using NVivo. Themes were developed through coding.   
 
I also read all the secondary documents collected. Notes were made on the 
documents about how they related to the themes developed through the coding of 
interviews. Analysing documents such as parliamentary minutes was undertaken 
with caution. Given that there was a political debate going on regarding the CS 
reform, it made particular sense to ensure that any statement of “fact” by 
parliamentarians could be cross checked against other sources. Whenever possible, 
documents were also used to substantiate some of the statements made by the 
interviewees. 
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By using both interview data and secondary documents, common patterns and 
themes were identified. Through triangulation and explanation, connections were 
established in relation to the research questions of the thesis. As this research 
involves the interviewing of some of the most prominent political leaders as well as 
senior officials from government organisations, it was of prime importance that it be 
carried out with extra diligence in order to protect the confidentiality of those 
involved. In instances where direct or indirect quotes are used in the study, the 
identity of the person is not revealed. Instead, I used a general reference to an 
individual based on their political, institutional, or group affiliation (see Annex 3).    
 
The next chapter examines the democratisation process in the Maldives.  
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CHAPTER 4: A NEW DAWN – DEMOCRATISATION IN THE MALDIVES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the democratic transition in the Maldives. As formulation of a 
statutory CS was one component of the democratisation process, this chapter sets the 
scene for analysing the interaction between the CS model and the democratisation 
process, a discussion presented in Chapter Seven. This chapter argues that, for all the 
recorded history of the Maldives, a strong centralised and autocratic system of 
government has been in place, though with some qualifications. It also argues that 
the effects of modernisation, most particularly the emergence of an educated 
population, have contributed to the rise of self-expression values that contributed to 
the rise of new elites as well as demand for greater political participation. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief profile of the Maldives. The rest of the chapter is 
divided into three main parts that follow the general outline presented in section 2.2 
of Chapter Two, which focuses on democratisation. Those three parts are: 
democratisation process; causes of democratisation; and results of democratisation – 
in which this thesis argues the Maldives is an emerging democracy that is presently 
frail and unconsolidated. Each of these parts is further subdivided into a number of 
sections, the detail of which is presented at the beginning of each part. 
 
A cut-off point of March 2012 is used in presenting the events in this chapter, at 
which point the democratic reforms were still at an early stage. Categorising the 
Maldives as a frail and unconsolidated emerging democracy does not imply that 
democratic transition has failed in the Maldives; rather it shows the challenges that 
are being faced at this early stage of the process and the considerable work ahead to 
move into democratic consolidation (refer to Annex 4 for a timeline of important 
events mentioned in this thesis). 
  
4.2 Country profile 
 
The Republic of Maldives is located in the Indian Ocean, with Sri Lanka and India 
being the closest neighbours (see figure 4.1, p. 94). It is an archipelago of 1190 
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islands grouped into 26 atolls,
27
 in which the highest islands are barely three metres 
above sea level. The island nation spans 822kms from north to south and 130kms 
from east to west. The Maldives is 100% Sunni Muslim. The population is 
approximately 330,000
28
 (Department of National Planning [DNP], 2011), all of 
whom speak the same language, Dhivehi. The capital island, Male‟, is the hub of all 
government and economic activities that sustain approximately a third of the entire 
population.  
 
Of the country‟s 191 inhabited island communities (DNP, 2010), with the exception 
of the national capital, only four have a population of more than 5000. There are 95 
inhabited islands with less than 1000 people and 28 islands have a population of less 
than 500 (DNP, 2010) (see table 4.1). The dispersion of the population to such small 
communities poses complex challenges for the governance, public administration, 
and delivery of state services that are further explained in this and the following 
chapters. 
 
Table 4.1: Registered population in inhabited islands as of December 2009 
 
Source: DNP (2010) 
                                               
27 An atoll is defined by Webster‟s Dictionary as a ring-shaped coral island and its associated reef, 
nearly or quite enclosing a lagoon. 
28
 Projected mid-year population for 2012. 
Population 
Number of 
Islands 
Less than 199 1 
200 – 299 7 
300 – 399 8 
400 – 499 12 
500 – 599 14 
600 – 699 14 
700 – 799 14 
800 – 899 13 
900 – 999 12 
1000 – 1999 62 
2000 – 4999 29 
5000 – 9999 2 
10,000 + 3 
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Figure 4.1: Map of the Maldives 
 
Source: Ministry of Planning and National Development [MPND] (2007a, p. vii) 
 
4.3 Democratisation process in the Maldives 
 
As defined earlier (sections 1.5.3 and 2.2.1), democratisation is a process whereby a 
nation moves from a less democratic and usually more autocratic form of rule 
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towards one that incorporates basic democratic principles of open political 
competition, political participation, and civil and political liberties. The change 
process in the Maldives reveals what Huntington (1991-2) refers to as 
transplacement, which occurs when transition is the result of joint action of 
government and opposition groups. The Maldivian transition can also be categorised 
as what Welzel (2009, p. 87) refers to as responsive democratisation, which is a 
transition driven by the general public. Why the Maldives democratic transition 
process can be categorised this way is discussed below.  
 
In order to analyse the democratisation process in the Maldives, this part of the 
chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section presents an overview of 
the political history of the nation to show the context in which democratic transition 
unfolded. The second section presents the political system from 1978 to 2003. This 
time frame is chosen because 1978 is considered as the beginning of a new chapter 
in the Maldives, and 2003 marks the beginning of the transition towards a multi-
party democracy. The final section shows the democratic process from 2003 until the 
end of 2008 when the first multi-party election was held. 
 
4.3.1 Political history. 
 
The early history of the Maldives is shrouded “in obscurity – the natural result of 
their complete isolation and comparative insignificance” (Bell, 1883/2004, p. 21). 
The written history of the island nation began in 1153 A.D. when it converted to 
Islam (Reynolds, 1975), although ruins of Buddhist temples bear testimony to an 
even longer history (Maumoon, 2002). In this regard, while some believe that the 
Maldives have been inhabited for over two thousand years (N. Mohamed, 2002), 
others date it even earlier (Heyerdahl, 1986).  
 
Traditionally the Maldives has been a “monarchy ruled by dynasties of kings and 
queens over a long unbroken period of time” (N. Mohamed, 2005, p. 4). Kings and 
queens were referred to as sultans and sultanas respectively after the nation 
converted to Islam. A sultan is the ruler of a Muslim country. The first sultan of the 
Maldives, Sultan Mohammed Ibn Abdulla, converted from Buddhism in 1153 A.D 
(Department of Information and Broadcasting [DIB], 1985, pp. 7-8). A total of 89 
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sultans and three sultanas (Phadnis & Luithui, 1985, p. 10) spanning over six 
dynasties ruled Maldives until the country became a Republic in 1968.  
 
Interestingly, the post of sultan was not hereditary with the son succeeding the 
father, and it was quite rare for such a succession to take place. Determining the 
succession to the throne was often marked by coups and squabbles which are 
common in many monarchical systems (Phadnis & Luithui, 1985). Even from the 
early years, although the sultan had absolute powers, his actions were checked by 
councils of advisers and chiefs that even used their powers to depose the sultan on 
several occasions (DIB, 1990). Furthermore, the sultan was not considered “above 
the laws [sic]” (Bell, 1883/2004, p. 64). Such practices show that the Maldives had 
hints of democratic principles in its polity even during earlier times.  
 
Although the Maldives remained an independent country throughout most of its 
history, there were two brief periods of foreign domination, firstly by the Portuguese 
(1558-1573)
29
, a period of terror and violence during which the occupiers forcefully 
tried to convert the locals to Christianity (Maumoon, 2002). Portuguese rule was 
brought to an end
30
 by the revered national hero Mohammad Thakurufaanu and his 
two brothers who prevailed after eight years of guerrilla warfare (Maumoon, 2002). 
Mohammad Thakurufaanu‟s reign marked the start of the Utheemu dynasty, a 
turning point towards a more structured system of governance and a period of reform 
and organisation, more specifically in defence and education (DIB, 1990, p. 2). 
During this period, the sultanate became an institution instead of a person, where 
“tenets of democracy in the form of the consent of the ruled became more evident in 
the decisions of the sultan” (DIB, 1990, p. 2).   
 
                                               
29 According to Hecker (1986), the first contact with the Portuguese was made in 1505 when the 
islands were visited by Portuguese ships. De Silva (2009) reports that Vicente Sodré‟s ships had 
sailed to the Maldives as early as 1502-1503. As the Portuguese interest in the Maldives grew, they 
made several attempts to dominate the Maldives and were eventually successful in 1558 when they 
defeated Sultan Ali VI, the Martyr.   
30 After the defeat in 1573, the Portuguese sent more forces to regain the Maldives and the struggle 
went on for three more years after which the Maldives agreed to pay tribute in return for freedom 
from interference in internal affairs (de Silva, 2009). The Portuguese once again attempted to overtake 
the capital Male‟ in 1631 and 1649, but their futile attacks were driven off (de Silva, 2009).  
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The second instance of direct occupation of the Maldives was by the Malabars
31
 for 
roughly four months during 1752. As repression and torture by the Malabars 
increased, a group of Maldivians led by Dhon Bandarain removed the occupiers 
(Reynolds, 1975). This event is significant in the Maldivian history because it was 
the last instance of direct foreign occupation.
32
 
 
Changes in regional powers have also had an effect on the Maldives. The Dutch 
arrived in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1638 and defeated the Portuguese there in the 1640s 
(de Silva, 2009). To counter the Portuguese threat the Maldivian sultan secured a 
tributary relationship with the Dutch in Ceylon (de Silva, 2009), as the Dutch were 
unwilling to intervene in the Maldives. By 1798 the British had assumed control of 
Ceylon (Coelho, 1997, p. 51). As domestic disturbances continued in the Maldives, 
the British feared that the Maldives might seek protection from another foreign 
power, affecting the British dominance in the region. The Maldives was crippled by 
bankruptcy, and the “gunboat” diplomacy of the British forced the sultan in 1887 to 
enter into a protectorate agreement under which the full control of foreign and 
defence affairs were handed over. The agreement was based on non-interference by 
the British in the internal affairs of the nation, which is perhaps why the Maldives 
lacks the same colonial imprint as the rest of South Asia (Maloney, 1976, p. 656). 
British impact on Maldivian economy, politics and society was therefore minimal 
compared with the experiences of neighbouring countries (Maumoon, 2002). The 
lack of foreign influences in the internal matters of the country meant that the 
political, economic, and social development of the Maldives was virtually immune to 
foreign influences until the twentieth century, except for some limited contact with 
Sri Lanka (Phadnis & Luithui, 1981).   
 
The Maldives‟ first written constitution was proclaimed on December 22, 1932 and 
was largely based on customs, conventions, and traditional administrative practices 
that the country had followed until then (DIB, 1990). With it, the country effectively 
                                               
31 Malabars came from the south west coast of India and were based in Cochin.  
32 The terrorist attack on Male‟ on November 3, 1988 by Tamil Tigers did not result in occupation of 
the country. The attackers fled the country the same day after facing fierce resistance from the 
Maldivian army. 
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converted to a constitutional monarchy with a majlis
33
 (legislature) and a cabinet of 
ministers (Maloney, 1976). This was seen as the renouncing of royal prerogatives 
which had been held for more than 800 years and a touch of democracy from the 
European countries (Hockly, 1935, p. 139). The constitution came into effect mainly 
due to a weakened sultan and an unstable political environment in the Maldives 
(Phadnis & Luithui, 1985). However, that constitution did not significantly change 
the authoritarian nature of the political regime that had lasted for centuries 
(Reynolds, 1975).
34
 Despite the lack of meaningful reform, some argue that, 
although the system of government was autocratic, most often it was benevolent in 
nature (Coelho, 1997, p. 51).     
 
In an attempt to bring the Maldives into the modern world, a public referendum was 
held to decide whether the people wanted a monarchy or a republic. With the consent 
of the people, the Maldives converted to a republic on January 1, 1953 with Amin 
Didi elected as its first President (Maumoon, 2002). The new republican constitution 
gave voting rights to women and provided modern schools with equal opportunities 
for women, and health facilities and technology such as telephone and power plants 
were introduced for the first time (Maumoon, 2002). However, continuing political 
turmoil meant that the situation deteriorated to such an extent that Amin Didi
35
 was 
deposed in September of that same year (Reynolds, 1975). The short lived first 
republic ended and the sultanate was re-instated in March 1954 with a new 
constitution
36
 (Maumoon, 2002). Interestingly the majlis, which mostly consisted of 
elected members, was retained with powers to override the sultan‟s veto (Maloney, 
1976).   
 
Throughout the internal political turmoil, the British refused to get involved 
(Maloney, 1976). However, the importance of the Maldives to Britain was magnified 
                                               
33 Parliamentary elections have been held in the Maldives almost every five years since 1932.  
34 After further political turmoil, the first constitution was abolished in 1933 and a new constitution 
was drawn in 1934 (Maumoon, 2002). It was further amended in 1936, 1937, 1942 and 1951.   
35 While Amin Didi was abroad for medical treatment, an uprising against the government took place 
and the constitution was suspended. Upon his return he was arrested and sentenced to be banished for 
an attempted coup d‟etat, and he died in January 1954 while in banishment (Maumoon, 2002).  It is 
believed he died from the injuries that he sustained when he was mobbed and stoned when he 
disembarked at the capital Male‟ (Maloney, 1976).  
36
 This constitution was again amended in 1965 and 1967 (Maloney, 1980, p. 202).  
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during the Second World War when the British used the southern island of Gan as an 
air and naval base. It also marked the beginning of the end of the on-going smooth 
relationships between Britain and the Maldives. With the strategic importance of the 
military base in Gan, the British had negotiated with the Maldivian government to 
lease Gan Island for 100 years from 1956
37
, an agreement that was not popular 
among some political elites. The rebellion and secession of the three most southern 
atolls in 1959 marked one of the most difficult episodes that the country had to face 
during the century and it is believed that there was encouragement by the British for 
the rebellion (N. Mohamed, n.d.). During the negotiations that followed between the 
Maldivian government and British representatives, an agreement was reached in 
September 1963 to end the rebellion and re-establish the authority of the Maldivian 
Government in the southern most atoll of Addu
38
 (N. Mohamed, n.d.). The head of 
the rebellion Abdulla Afeef and his family were given political asylum by the British 
and taken to Seychelles.  
 
Animosity towards the British among the Maldivian public had grown to 
unprecedented heights as a result of the rebellion. During the negotiations between 
the British and the Maldivian government held at that time, the Maldivian 
government formally requested full independence from the British and this was 
attained on July 26, 1965. The British military base in Gan remained under the 
previous agreement but the British closed the base and fully withdrew from the 
Maldives on March 31, 1976
39
(Hecker, 1986).  
  
Soon after gaining political independence, the Maldives converted to a Republic 
once again. In a national referendum held on March 15, 1968, 81% of the public 
voted in favour of abolishing the sultanate (Ahmad, 2001). After yet another public 
referendum, Ibrahim Nasir was elected as President of the Second Republic and 
                                               
37
 This agreement was re-negotiated in 1960 in which Britain‟s rights over the base were reduced to a 
period of 30 years (Phadnis & Luithui, 1981).  
38 The southern rebellion atoll of Fuvahmulah surrendered to the Maldivian government on November 
1, 1963. Previously the southern atoll of Huvadhoo surrendered after military intervention on January 
29, 1962 (N. Mohamed, n.d.).  
39 The British abandoned Gan Island before the expiry of their contract as part of their defence cut and 
withdrawal from the East (Phadnis & Luithui, 1981). 
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sworn into office on November 11, 1968 under a revised constitution
40
 that came 
into force on the same day. Socio-economic changes by Nasir included the 
introduction of tourism in the early 1970s, which resulted in the opening of the 
country to the outside world thereby bringing many changes to the traditional way of 
life (Maumoon, 2002). Nonetheless, political reform was almost negligible, resulting 
in a continuation of political turmoil. One such example was the removal and 
banishment
41
 of Prime Minister Ahmed Zaki in 1974 on the grounds of 
mismanagement and favouritism towards relatives, though the actual reasons may 
have been the disputes over the control of state industries (Phadnis & Luithui, 1981).  
 
Consolidation of political power also continued during this period. Under the 1968 
constitution, the majlis was elected for five years and the majlis nominated a 
candidate for the presidency that went to a public referendum for acceptance or 
rejection (Maloney, 1976). The constitution gave the president far reaching powers, 
including the ability to appoint eight members
42
 to the majlis
43
, as well as the 
speaker of the majlis (Maloney, 1976) and the chief justice. Further centralisation of 
authority included appointment of Atoll Chiefs by the central government
44
, 
abolition of the Office of Prime Minister through a constitutional amendment, and 
abolition of several ministries to bring them under the PO (Maloney, 1976, p. 668). It 
was “felt that the political unity of the country can only be assured by a well-ordered 
chain of command with which is mingled a generous dose of fear” (Maloney, 1976, 
p. 659). Dissent towards President Nasir grew and he was accused of 
mismanagement of government funds as well as abuse of power which eventually 
                                               
40 This constitution was further amended in 1970, 1972 and 1975 (Maloney, 1976).  
41 Banishment is an ancient practice where one is sent to a remote inhabited island without his/her 
family where he/she has to find a place to live and earn a living. In traditional times those who were 
banished resorted to fishing but it was almost impossible to escape from the island. The length of the 
banishment can vary, with lengthy terms being imposed in the case of political dissidents. In the past, 
most politically influential people experienced banishment at one time or another during their lifetime 
(Maloney, 1976). That includes President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom (see section 4.3.2) as well. 
Although, the penal code of 1968 which contains banishment as a sentence is still valid, banishment is 
rarely handed now.  
42
 Prior to the constitutional amendments of 1975, these eight members were elected to the majlis 
from the capital Male‟ (Maloney, 1976). This constitutional change was a result of centralisation of 
powers of the president during 1975. The full majlis comprised 48 members.  
43 During this period, the majlis was not seen as a threat to the government as its members remained 
in fear and some had even been banished. It met about three times a year (Maloney, 1976).  
44 Until 1975 the Atoll Chief was elected from the atoll committee which was itself an elected body 
(Maloney, 1976). Elections of atoll committees started in 1964 (Maloney, 1980, p. 186).   
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resulted in his departure from office in 1978 and self-imposed exile in Singapore 
shortly afterwards.  
         
4.3.2 Political system: 1978 to 2003. 
 
The taking of office by the second president of the Second Republic, Maumoon 
Abdul Gayoom, in 1978 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the Maldives. 
Although social and economic sectors were changing and growing rapidly, 
democratic reforms were slow and insignificant. Even though the president convened 
a constitutional assembly (People‟s special majlis) on November 29, 1980 to amend 
the 1968 constitution, it took a further 17 years to complete the new constitution. 
Moreover, the constitution that came into effect from January 1, 1998 lacked the 
fundamental aspects required in a modern democracy such as the provision for multi-
party politics and was arguably a continuation of the 1968 constitution. Table 4.2 
shows a comparison of the main components of 1968 (including the amendments of 
1970, 1972, and 1975) and 1998 constitutions.   
 
Table 4.2: Comparison of main components of 1968 and 1998 constitutions 
 1968 constitution 1998 constitution 
Presidential powers Head of state and 
government; supreme 
authority in propagating the 
tenets of Islam. 
Appoint/dismiss speaker of 
people‟s majlis.  
Powers of the 1968 
constitution retained. 
Additional powers included: 
highest authority in 
administering justice; 
appoint/dismiss chief justice, 
deputy of the people‟s 
majlis, atoll chiefs, judges, 
auditor general and the 
commissioner of elections. 
Presidential election People‟s majlis decides on a 
presidential candidate by a 
secret ballot. The chosen 
name goes for a public 
referendum. President chosen 
for a five year term. 
Almost same as 1968. Only 
difference was that any 
person who fulfils the 
criteria can apply after which 
the people‟s majlis decide on 
one candidate by a secret 
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ballot.   
People‟s majlis Main mandate was to pass 
legislations. Comprised 48 
MPs; eight appointed by the 
president, 40 elected
45
. Five 
year term limit. Provision for 
questioning ministers and 
passing motion of no 
confidence on them. 
Impeachment of the president 
also possible. 
Same as 1968. Only 
difference was an additional 
two elected MPs that was 
due to a change in the 
administrative structure of 
the archipelago.  
People‟s special majlis Mandated to amend the 
constitution. Convening and 
dissolution vested with the 
president. Composition 
included: members of the 
cabinet of ministers; all 
members of the people‟s 
majlis; members 
elected/appointed separately 
to the same composition of 
the people‟s majlis. 
Furthermore, laws changing 
the value of the currency and 
laws that impair the rights of 
the administration or citizens 
passed by people‟s special 
majlis.  
Almost the same as 1968. 
Only difference was that the 
only mandate was to amend 
the constitution.  
Courts A single reference regarding 
the judiciary. Article 85 
states “The administration of 
justice and Shariath shall be 
conducted by a body 
appointed by the President of 
the Republic”.   
High court was the highest 
court. President determined 
the number of judges on the 
bench and 
appointed/dismissed all of 
them. Lower courts also 
operated in the same manner.  
                                               
45
 Two MPs from each of the 19 atolls and two MPs from Male‟. 
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A minister assigned by the 
president had the authority to 
issue directives and orders 
concerning the 
administration of courts and 
the conduct of judges. 
Civil liberties Freedom of expression and 
association granted, unless 
prohibited by law in the 
interest of protecting the 
sovereignty and maintaining 
public order and of protecting 
the basic tenets of Islam. 
Same as 1968. 
 
Both constitutions were silent on the crucial issue of the clear separation of powers 
between the different arms of the state, and the strong hierarchical nature of politics 
and administration remained unchanged. Secondly, there were no term limits on the 
office of the president. Opponents claimed that this was the reason why the former 
President Gayoom was re-elected for six consecutive terms
46
: he had been successful 
in retaining the majority of his supporters in the parliament. Misra (2004, p. 135) 
argues that although the Maldives managed to change from a sultanate to a republic, 
sultanism existed under a new guise. Presidential powers were similar to those of the 
sultanate before the founding of the republic. A third major issue was a lack of 
restrictions on ministers and public servants simultaneously becoming MPs. In the 
past several ministers and public servants had been appointed or elected to the 
majlis, raising conflict of interest issues for government accountability by further 
blurring the separation of powers between executive and legislature.  
 
This absence of the basic tenets of modern democratic reforms in the 1998 
constitution meant that the eagerness among the general public and expectant elites 
for greater political freedom and political rights continued rising and there was 
growing frustration with the slow pace of political evolution. In the early 1990s, 
                                               
46 Former President Gayoom was elected in 1978 with 92.96% of the popular votes, in 1983 with 
96.62%, in 1988 with 96.4%, in 1993 with 92.76%, in 1998 with 90.9% and in 2003 with 90.28% of 
the popular vote.  
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several popular political magazines were accused of inciting violence and were 
banned. In February 2001, a group of 42 intellectuals and prominent social figures 
submitted a request to register the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) as a political 
party, but this request was denied on the grounds that the constitution did not contain 
provisions regarding political party registration and formation. Despite the setback, 
prominent opposition figures operated the MDP in exile from Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
Frustration eventually boiled over in September 2003, triggered by a specific event 
(see section 4.4.4). One interviewee described this event as a “revolution” that had 
“no turning back”, forcing the government to pursue democratic reforms 
(Interviewee FO4).   
 
4.3.3 Democratic process: 2003 to 2008. 
 
Since 2003, the Maldives has undergone unprecedented political changes. A key 
trigger to “real” reform was 2003 civil unrest in the capital (see section 4.4.4) which 
placed pressure on government to reform the governance of the country. For the first 
time, the Maldives was on the path towards a multi-party democracy. In June 2004, 
President Gayoom announced his vision for constitutional reform that would lead to 
a multi-candidate election process. These reforms also included putting significant 
constraints on the powers of the political executive that had until then controlled 
unprecedented powers (see table 4.2). In a major policy speech delivered on June 9, 
2004, President Gayoom said “increasing the choice for the people in electing a 
president of the Republic and the further separation of powers are among the ideas 
for constitutional reform that I have proposed …. Likewise, our political system 
must further incorporate modern democratic practices” (cited in The National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2004, p. 10). The specific reform 
components included:   
 
a) Strengthening the system of governance; 
b) Promoting and strengthening the protection of human rights; 
c) Enhancing the independence of the judiciary; 
d) Developing the multiparty political system; 
e) Strengthening the civil service; 
f) Modernising the electoral system; 
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g) Enhancing the role of the media; and 
h) Strengthening key institutions. (Alam & Jasimuddin 2006, p. 11) 
 
The president convened the people‟s special majlis in July 2004 to formulate a new 
constitution based on multi-party democratic principles. This was a complicated task 
and several setbacks were encountered due to distrust between political rivals. 
Additionally, the public continued to demand immediate political reform. In August 
2004, thousands demonstrated in Male‟ (also discussed in section 4.4.4). To defuse 
the dissent, government made some concessions, including establishment of Police 
as a civilian organisation independent of the military (Yoosuf, 2004) and the 
appointment of finance and defence ministers (“Defence Minister Kamashaai,” 
2004) – portfolios held until then by the president. These changes came after 
continued pressure on the president to give up some of his powers.      
 
Parliament‟s unanimous vote on June 2, 2005 to permit the formation and operation 
of political parties (“Maldives MPs Back Democracy,” 2005) resulted in immediate 
formation of DRP (Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party) led by President Gayoom and the 
MDP led by the opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed, and provided a foundation for 
the freedom of association and freedom of expression that transformed the political 
spectrum entirely.
47
 Ironically, permission for the operation of political parties was 
given under the same 1998 constitution that was previously deemed incompatible 
with political parties. 
 
In addition to the formulation of a new constitution, other notable governance 
reforms during this period included the “Roadmap for the Reform Agenda” in March 
2006 which provided a timeframe for the reforms announced in June 2004. The 
MDP argued that the roadmap announced by President Gayoom was “a desperate 
attempt to buy time for his political survival” (Suryanarayan, 2009, p. 196). 
However, the provision for a statutory CSC in that roadmap outlined the importance 
of a CS for the progression of democratic reforms in the Maldives. Significant 
progress on the CS reform began in October 2005 when a parliamentarian aligned 
                                               
47 Several other parties have subsequently been formed but these two parties were largest in terms of 
membership as of March 2012.  
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with the government submitted a CS bill, which became law in May 2007 (detail 
discussion in sections 6.2 to 6.7).        
 
Constitutional reform was further delayed by deep divisions among members of the 
special majlis over whether a presidential or parliamentary system of government 
should be enshrined in the constitution. The government backed a presidential form 
of government while the opposition MDP backed a parliamentary form, and the 
impasse was surmounted when the matter was referred to a public referendum at 
which support for a presidential system of government gained 62% of the vote. 
These delays in formulating the constitution meant that the deadlines set under the 
Roadmap of Reform were not achieved and the new constitution was completed and 
ratified on August 7, 2008, after more than four years of political bickering, strikes, 
and unrest.  
 
The 2008 constitution is significantly different from all previous constitutions. The 
three arms of the state, executive, legislature, and the judiciary have been made 
independent of each other. Significant constraints were put on the powers of the 
political executive. Additionally, the CSC was made a constitutional body (see table 
4.3), that would manage a CS as the administrative arm of the executive – with 
relative separation from the political executive. Schneier (2006, p. 105) states that 
embedded in most contemporary constitutions are particular institutions empowered 
to perform roles that are isolated from the direct control of the legislature or the 
executive. Such overseeing bodies are also established in the Maldives. Furthermore, 
under the new constitution, city, atoll, and island councils are elected by the 
constituencies. Rights of citizens have been codified as never before. Table 4.3 
provides a comparison of the main components of the 1998 and 2008 constitutions.  
 
The negotiations over the constitutional reform in the Maldives took into account the 
protection of the interests of small scattered communities as well. The previous 
constitutions had the provision for two elected MPs from each atoll irrespective of 
the population size (see table 4.2). The 2008 constitution replaced this provision by 
dividing each atoll into a number of constituencies based on the population, but with 
a minimum number of MPs from each atoll. That meant that atolls with larger 
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population would have more MPs. In the meantime, it also meant that the entire 
population, irrespective of the size or insularity will also have representation.  
 
Decentralisation of powers to the elected city, atoll and island councils was also an 
important component of the reform agenda. Once again, islandness was a factor in 
the considerations on the architecture of these councils. For instance, each island 
would have a minimum number of councillors and all the islands in the atoll would 
be included in the composition of the atoll councils. These councils were given legal 
powers over municipal and development functions within their constituencies. 
However, these powers did not include making decisions on employment of civil 
servants working for those councils (see section 7.2.2).  
 
Table 4.3: Comparison of main components of 1998 and 2008 constitutions 
 1998 constitution 2008 constitution 
Powers of state A high degree of 
concentration of power in 
the hands of the president. 
Powers of the state divided 
among the president, 
parliament, judiciary, and 
several statutory bodies. 
Presidential election Five year term, no term 
limits. A public referendum 
after the majlis chooses a 
candidate.  
Five year term. Maximum of 
two terms, whether 
consecutive or otherwise. All 
applicants go directly to a 
public vote. 
People‟s majlis Comprising appointed and 
elected members. 
Speaker/deputy appointed by 
the president.  
All members elected. 
Speaker/deputy elected by the 
MPs. Additional functions 
include: amending the 
constitution, making the 
executive power accountable, 
and appointment/dismissal of 
senior officials of statutory 
bodies in accordance with the 
laws.  
Courts President appoints and 
dismisses all judges. 
Judicial power vested in the 
Supreme Court, the High 
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Court, and the Trial Courts. 
Chief justice and the judges of 
the Supreme Court are 
appointed by the president 
after consulting the judicial 
service commission (JSC) and 
confirmation of appointment 
by the people‟s majlis. All 
other judges appointed by 
JSC. Judges can be removed 
from the post if JSC finds a 
judge grossly incompetent or 
guilty of gross misconduct. In 
either case the matter must be 
referred to the people‟s majlis 
where two thirds of the MPs 
present must vote in favour of 
the judge‟s removal. 
Civil liberties Though granted in 
constitution, limitations in 
practice. 
Additional rights include: 
right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly without prior 
permission of the state; right 
to establish and participate in 
the activities of political 
parties; and right to strike in 
protest. 
Statutory bodies No provision for statutory 
bodies.  
Provisions of statutory bodies 
of JSC, elections commission, 
civil service commission, 
human rights commission, 
anti-corruption commission, 
auditor general, and 
prosecutor general mentioned. 
Also provision for elected 
councils with decentralised 
powers.   
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Ratification of the 2008 constitution paved the way for a new breed of politics in the 
Maldives. In the face of the upcoming election in October 2008, prominent ministers 
and political figures resigned from the Gayoom administration and several 
opposition political parties were established to challenge the 30-year rule of 
Gayoom. However, the main threat to his administration still came from the MDP 
which continued to be the most vocal of the opposition parties (Suryanarayan, 2009, 
p. 196). The presidential election held on October 8, 2008 did not reveal a clear 
winner. Among the main contenders, Gayoom received 40.63% of the votes, 
Mohamed Nasheed 25.09%, Hassan Saeed 16.78%, and Gasim Ibrahim 15.32% 
(Elections Commission, 2008a). A second round of voting took place on October 29, 
2008 between the two candidates who obtained the highest number of votes during 
the first round. During campaigning for the second round, Hassan Saeed and Gasim 
Ibrahim pledged their full support to Mohamed Nasheed. The second round of voting 
revealed Mohamed Nasheed as a clear winner with 54.21% of the votes (Elections 
Commission, 2008a). Mohamed Nasheed, commonly referred to as Anni, became the 
first president under a democratic constitution and was sworn into office on 
November 11, 2008.  
 
4.4 Causes of democratisation 
 
There is rarely a single reason for a nation to pursue the path towards democracy and 
the Maldives is no exception to this generalisation. It could be argued that a 
combination of socio-historic elements combined with developments, or even lack of 
developments, in various facets of the society led to the democratisation of the 
Maldivian polity. This section examines a number of such factors that were 
significant for democratic reforms in the Maldives. It follows a similar structure as 
Chapter Two, section 2.2.2 examining the influences on democratisation of political 
elites, mass movements, societal groups, significant incidents, economic and social 
development, globalisation and media, and the international community. 
 
4.4.1 Political elites. 
 
Traditionally, local elites in the Maldives were boat owners or lessees of uninhabited 
islands which placed them in a financially sound position (Maloney, 1980). It was 
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also common that such elites had political connections with elites in Male‟. In the 
past, those with such connections were able to land political jobs at island or atoll 
level (Maloney, 1980). With modernisation, the power base of the traditional elites 
has faded significantly. Nonetheless, some have been able to maintain their elite 
status due to the economic benefits flowing from their past privileges. For those 
elites who backed democratic reforms, their status was important in financing anti-
government protests.  
 
The power base of the elites was centred in the capital where the traditional class 
system comprised the four main divisions
48
 of royalty, hereditary aristocracy, titled 
aristocracy, and commoner. Since these classes were abolished in the early 1950s 
(Maloney, 1980), associated titles have become rare and simply symbolic when used 
as surnames. However, the abolition of sultanistic dynasties or class systems did not 
remove the influence that a few elite families had on the Maldives‟ political sphere. 
As Parmanand (1997, pp. 117-118) notes, “Maldivian politics is dominated by an 
elite drawn from a few influential families and they frequently command 
considerable support among the population”. Change to a republic in 1953 was 
considered simply a continuation of the old practices albeit in a different shell. The 
influence of the elite families continued from the First Republic of 1953 and was 
clearly visible in Gayoom‟s reign. In this regard, Faber (1992, p. 139) states that 
government and businesses remained “in the hands of a small côterie of privileged 
families in Male‟ which everyone can name”. Indeed Gayoom was often blamed for 
maintaining a highly centralised political system which had its roots in the oligarchic 
structure of the sultanate (Parmanand, 1997, p. 117). Nonetheless, these power bases 
too were shaken in the last couple of years of the Gayoom‟s presidency because 
several of his trusted ministers defected to the opposition.      
 
For such defectors as well as emerging elites that included political dissidents, the 
effects of modernisation, development, and globalisation generated an ideal 
opportunity to tap into power. As one interviewee said, the “democracy market” was 
the biggest market that could be exploited by those elites eager to gain a share of 
greater power for themselves (Interviewee FO5). The election of several vocal 
                                               
48
 For detail refer to Maloney (1980, p. 300).  
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opposition MPs to the majlis during 2005 and special majlis in 2004 contributed to 
continuous and growing pressure on the government to speed up the reform process. 
Although MPs supporting the government had a majority in both majlis, 
compromises were often made with the opposition to get the bills passed as well as 
in formulating the constitution. The introduction of political parties during 2005 also 
was crucial because freedom to associate turned out to be a driving force in 
politicising the general public, as never before. This new-found freedom brought 
masses to political rallies, the impact of which was always used by political elites in 
their attempts to gain the upper hand in political debates.  
 
The movements led by the MDP and the initiatives of President Gayoom were both 
pivotal in bringing about the multi-party election of 2008. The MDP played a major 
role in convincing the government and the public, at times through public 
demonstrations, that democratic change was necessary to ensure the ongoing 
development of the nation. President Gayoom and a group of his senior officials 
were also instrumental in designing a road towards democracy that included radical 
compromises. In the words of a former government official, “there was a willingness 
on the part of the former government
49
 to bring about certain changes to the way in 
which the country was governed” (Interviewee FO6). Therefore, the impact the elites 
had through institutions such as the government, majlis, special majlis and the 
political parties was crucial in maintaining momentum and guiding the general 
public through the democratisation process. 
 
4.4.2 Mass movements. 
 
Though the Maldives continues to remain an “elite-dominated democracy”50 despite 
the transition, demand by the general public to have a voice in the political arena has 
been increasing for some years now. Especially during the latter years of Gayoom‟s 
administration, government was continuously blamed for not spreading the 
development achieved in the capital island to remote corners of the archipelago. The 
                                               
49 Reference is made here to the Gayoom administration. 
50 Sørensen (1998, p. 81) defines elite-dominated democracies as systems in which traditional rulers 
remain in control, even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise 
or force – or some mix of the two – to retain at least part of their power.  
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economic divide was clearly visible: “the gap between the rich and the poor was 
becoming too obvious” (Interviewee GO7). When a 30-year rule had been unable to 
narrow the developmental gap, a simple change of regime appeared to be a popular 
solution, and this was openly welcomed by a majority of the electorate. A growing 
number of individuals were hopeful that they could get a share of the economic 
fortunes of the nation which were being controlled by a few elites.    
 
Allegations were also made of abuse of power and state resources by Gayoom‟s 
administration despite the nation‟s economic development under his rule. The 
inability to develop the outlying atolls combined with an inability to deal properly 
with cases of abuse of power also became building blocks for the arguments of the 
opposition that was advocating regime change. A heightened awareness and shift in 
public perception eventually led to agreement by the majority of the population that 
there was a need for a regime change: “any change” as some put it (personal 
observation). 
 
Limited room for political participation was also seen a shortcoming prior to the start 
of democratic reforms. The traditional oligarchic political structure combined with a 
constitution that allowed limited political participation had prevented a large number 
of individuals from aspiring to political office. With the advancements in socio-
economic spheres of public life, the desire to have a greater say in the functioning of 
the state was evident amongst an educated and young population that was prepared 
to pursue democratic changes. The incremental reforms of the past were not 
acceptable anymore. A radical change was demanded, for which the ruling elite had 
no effective response. A politician described it thus:   
 
What has [been] achieved in the past few years has been a more 
contemporary form of democratic process, which means a certain form of 
elections, certain independent institutions, and certain formalities of doing 
things. So it means there is this urge and need that was seen by the majority 
of Maldivians that a previous type of democracy or form of representation 
was not good enough or was not sufficient enough. So they wanted to replace 
it with a much more representative, much more elective mode of democracy. 
(Interviewee PL2) 
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The right to be politically active was increasingly viewed as a fundamental human 
right, a relatively new
51
 concept for the general public. As a result of the on-going 
changes, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression without fear of 
imprisonment were seen as fundamental rights by the public. The rise in such 
demands was driven by the rise in self-expression values in the Maldives.  
 
4.4.3 Societal groups. 
 
In the wider sense, societal groups can include CSOs as well as political parties. 
Though Maldives have traditionally seen active CSOs at island level focused on 
island development, only a few operated at national level. A lack of political 
plurality also meant that almost no CSO operated in promoting democracy. 
However, the introduction of political parties in June 2005 paved the way for 
political activism by such parties. A significant proportion of the population opted to 
join political parties (refer to table 4.9). Political forums and open public debate soon 
became a common occurrence. The political protests and strikes that followed were 
led directly by political parties, especially by MDP, often credited as a leader in the 
democratisation process (Interviewees FO2, FO4, FO6, FO10, GO3, GO6, GO7). As 
a result, the role of political parties in galvanising the general public was considered 
instrumental during the transition phase.  
 
4.4.4 Significant incidents. 
 
Although incremental reforms had been undertaken in the Maldives over many 
years, public frustration eventually boiled over in 2003. In September 2003, a 
prisoner at Maafushi Island Jail was tortured and beaten to death by the guards. The 
death was followed by a major uprising at the jail, which ended after three inmates 
were shot dead and several others injured. Once news of these incidents reached the 
shores of Male‟, huge numbers of disgruntled people took to the streets in protest. 
The government opted not to use force against the protesters, resulting in a number 
of government buildings and properties being torched. The government immediately 
established a Presidential Commission to investigate the incidents that had unfolded 
                                               
51
 The first Human Rights Commission of the Maldives was established on December 10, 2003.  
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in the jail. Soon after, in October 2003, a presidential election was held in which 
Gayoom was re-elected for a sixth consecutive term. In his speech delivered on 
November 11, 2003, President Gayoom announced an unprecedented and wide-
ranging reform programme designed to usher in a modern liberal democracy with 
strengthened human rights safeguards.  
 
Although the Constitutional Assembly was convened in July 2004, the public was 
demanding almost immediate political reform. A clear indication of this demand 
came in August 2004 when thousands demonstrated in the capital Male‟. As this 
protest was one of the biggest in the modern era, it sent a very strong message to the 
government. The protest ended with unrest after the security forces dispersed the 
crowd. The government declared emergency rule
52
 and arrested several opponents 
but protests and political rallies became a common phenomenon of the Maldivian 
polity.   
 
4.4.5 Economic developments. 
 
The Maldives has achieved significant economic prosperity in the last few decades. 
Tuna fish and tourism have made the Maldives prosperous (A. Whitehead, 1997). 
Traditionally, fishing was the main source of income for the majority of the citizens, 
with over 80% of the population engaged in fishing and related activities (Phadnis & 
Luithui, 1985, p. 15). However, the introduction of tourism in the 1970s transformed 
the nation – from 325 visitors in 1962 (Hecker, 1986), to 74,163 visitors in 1983 
(MPND, 2005a), to 683,012 by the end of 2008 (DNP, 2009). This came after the 
Maldives was included among the poorest of island developing countries and among 
the 20 poorest countries in the world in 1978 (Phadnis & Luithui, 1985, p. 53). The 
progressive achievements of the nation are evident as GDP increased from US$158 
million in 1985
53
 to US$1483 million in 2008
54
, and GDP per capita increased from 
US$879 in 1985
55
 to US$3799 in 2008
56
 (DNP, 2011; MPND, 2005a). Among the 
                                               
52 Emergency rule was declared for the capital and the vicinity. It lasted from August 13, 2004, 3:20 
p.m. to October 10, 2004, 6:00 p.m.  
53 Based on the 1995 Constant Basic Price 
54 Based on the 2003 Constant Basic Price 
55
 Based on the 1995 Constant Basic Price 
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countries in the South Asia region, GDP per capita of the Maldives is the highest (De 
Alwis, 2009). For the period 1985-2008, GDP growth rate has averaged 9.11% per 
annum
57
 (DNP, 2011; MPND, 2005a), with 2005 being the only year with a negative 
trend.
58
 Table 4.4 summarises the trends in economic development.  
 
Table 4.4: Trends in economic development 
 
Source: DNP (2011); MPND (2005a)   
 
Despite the economic achievements, the benefits were not felt significantly in the 
atolls and a considerable disparity of economic and social progress was visible 
between Male‟ and the rest of the country (Sathiendrakumar & Tisdell, 1989; also 
see Faber 1992, p. 139). Consequently the message of democracy was well-received 
by those islanders – perhaps for instrumental reasons – who felt that the fruit of 
economic developments should also be visible in the islands. 
 
Given the relative economic benefits at the national level, many did not have to 
worry about daily survival needs. As a result, people‟s aspirations started to focus on 
higher needs such as greater human rights and political rights. As Lipset (1959, p. 
                                                                                                                                     
56 Based on the 2003 Constant Basic Price 
57 GDP growth rate for the period 1985 to 2002 is based on the 1995 Constant Basic Price while 
growth rate for the period 2003 to 2008 is based on the 2003 Constant Basic Price.  
58 The main reason for the negative growth in 2005 was the devastating impact of the Boxing Day 
Tsunami of 2004. It was estimated that the total damage from the tsunami was US$304 million or 
35% of GDP, excluding the damage to tourist resorts. (MPND, 2005b).   
59 GDP and GDP per capita for year 1985 to 1990 are based on the 1995 Constant Basic Price while 
year 1995 to 2005 is based on the 2003 Constant Basic Price. Annual GDP growth rate for year 
1985, 1990 and 1995 is based on the 1995 Constant Basic Price, while 2000 and 2005 is based on 
the 2003 Constant Basic Price.   
Year
59 
GDP  
($US million) 
GDP per 
capita ($US) 
Annual GDP 
growth rates 
(%) 
1985 158.4 879 15.4 
1990 262.1 1229 16.9 
1995 601 2284 7.8 
2000 872 2915 4.8 
2005 973 2873 -7.1 
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83) points out, when there is increased income and greater economic security among 
the lower strata of the society, it allows them to develop more complex and 
gradualist views of politics. Therefore, economic development in the Maldives has 
arguably been one of the driving forces that contributed to the democratisation 
process.  
    
4.4.6 Social developments. 
 
There were also significant improvements in the social sector during the last few 
decades. For instance, the life expectancy at birth for both sexes increased from 46.5 
years in 1977 (Shaljan, 2004) to 74 years in 2008, with the average South Asian life 
expectancy being 65 years in 2008 (World Health Organization [WHO], 2010). 
Remarkable successes have also been achieved in the control of communicable 
diseases (WHO, 2008). Nonetheless, due to the high cost of providing advanced 
medical facilities to the geographically dispersed small population bases, these 
services were available only in Male‟ and bigger population centres, and patients 
from outer islands commonly had to travel to the capital Male‟ for treatment. With 
increasing revenue generated by the government, demand increased for better and 
more advanced services in the atolls. The government‟s inability to adequately 
address such grievances was a factor in the demands by the general population for a 
radical change in the governance of the nation.     
 
The education sector witnessed the most radical development. In the early twentieth 
century, formal education was confined to the capital and a few islands, while the 
rest had locally-run, informal schools called edhuruge. The elites who controlled 
both the state and the wealth of the nation mostly sent their children to Sri Lanka for 
schooling, in an attempt to groom them as future leaders (Reynolds, 1975). The 
introduction of English instruction in state schools in 1962 (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 23), 
provided the opportunity for children from non-elite families to also go abroad for 
study through scholarships.   
 
The achievements in the education sector are significant. Access to primary 
education increased from less than 30% during the 1970s (WB, 1996, p. 1) to 100% 
net enrolment in 1998 (WB, 2007, p. 1). The transition rate from primary to lower 
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secondary stood at 88% in 2005 (WB, 2007, p. 9). The adult literacy rate for 15 years 
and above reached 98.2% in 2006 (MPND, 2008a). 
 
The absence of a university in the Maldives until recently
60
 meant the only option for 
tertiary education was to venture overseas. This trend accelerated significantly, as 
various projects were launched by the government with the financial assistance of 
donor agencies to develop professionals by sending locals overseas for higher 
education. Along with donor scholarships, corporate funding and private funding, the 
number of graduates increased exponentially within a couple of decades. Figure 4.2 
shows the overseas scholarships awarded by the government for the period 1995 to 
2008. As these statistics do not include students studying through corporate funding 
or private funding, the actual figures are believed to be much higher. The 
scholarships awarded by the government include those funded by three WB 
Education and Training Projects aimed at financing overseas fellowships for post-
secondary education to improve the national skills shortages. According to the WB 
(1996), as a result of its first project, the number of post-secondary graduates in the 
country increased from less than 200 graduates in 1989 to almost 500 in 1996 (table 
4.5 outlines the number of scholarships awarded under all the WB projects, which 
includes undergraduates, graduates, and professional training).  
 
Table 4.5: Fellowships awarded by the World Bank training projects 
Project 1 (1989-1995) Project 2 (1995-2000) Project 3 (2000-2007) 
284 fellowships 277 fellowships 321 fellowships 
Source: WB (1996, 2001, 2007) 
 
                                               
60 The first university in the nation, the Maldives National University, was established on February 
20, 2011.  
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Figure 4.2: Government overseas scholarships awarded (1995-2008) 
 
Source: DNP (2010); MPND (2004) 
 
Most students who studied abroad (often in countries with developed democratic 
systems such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) returned 
to the Maldives after completing their studies (Interviewees CV1, FO5, FO7, FO10, 
GO3, MD1, PL1): “Their aspirations and visions for the nation are different from the 
existing scenario” (Zaki & Parakh, 2008, p. 72). A large number of graduates 
worked in government organisations and lobbied for governance reform. The 
pressure from inside the government sector was complemented by the demographic 
changes of the growing portion of youth who were educated and open to information 
and ideas from abroad made possible by developments in mass media and the spread 
of the internet.  
 
The demographic change in the population over the last few decades is also 
significant. The growth in the youth population has been considerable, and during 
democratisation process the opposition succeeded in playing a “change” card to that 
young population who had not seen a leader other than Gayoom for 30 years. Figures 
4.3 and 4.4 show the population pyramid for the years 1985 and 2006, revealing a 
significant jump in the age group of 15 to 40 years.    
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Figure 4.3: Population pyramid 1985 
 
Source: MPND (2005a) 
 
Figure 4.4: Population pyramid 2006 
 
Source: MPND (2008a) 
 
The propelling effect caused by an increasingly educated population combined with 
a youth population eager for change, was one of the major forces for democratic 
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reform in the Maldives, one which political elites and others who might seek to delay 
or stall the political changes were unable to resist. 
 
4.4.7 Globalisation. 
 
In addition to the socio-economic advances reported above, globalising forces, 
including mass media and travel, had their impact on domestic aspirations for 
democratisation. From the middle of twentieth century, Maldivians were 
increasingly being employed as crew in international shipping. As those seamen 
returned home, they started raising questions regarding the lack of political reforms 
in the Maldives (Interviewee FO9). The introduction of satellite TV and the internet 
in the 1990s, followed by affordable cable TV, was an important source of 
inspiration for the mass movements that were to follow in the drive towards 
democratic reforms. The “communicational revolution”, as termed by a respondent 
(Interviewee FO4), portrayed the image that the model of government that existed in 
the Maldives was not practicable anymore, especially after people witnessed the 
waves of democratic changes sweeping the globe. The once isolated locals who had 
limited opportunities to travel abroad started to get opportunities to venture to other 
parts of the world through the international travel routes supporting the tourism 
sector (refer to table 4.6 for the international aircraft movements in the Male‟ 
International Airport). Increases in travelling by Maldivians to all corners of the 
world were used as a learning experience to aspire to more. The Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine and the “Change” campaign of Obama gave increased confidence to the 
locals that they could replicate such changes in the Maldives (Interviewee FO6). The 
information revolution created a growing awareness among the masses as to how 
governments functioned in democratic societies. The Maldives became open to 
global trends, the effects of which are also considered significant in the country‟s 
march towards democratic reform.   
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Table 4.6: International aircraft movement at Male’ International Airport (1985-
2005) 
 1985 199061 1995 2000 2005 
Scheduled 2367 1102 5825 5973 7400 
Chartered 340 412 836 1200 742 
Non-Scheduled 320 136 394 517 983 
TOTAL 3027 1650 7055 7690 9125 
Source: MPND (2005a, 2006) 
 
4.4.8 Media. 
 
Freedom of the media has been a constitutional right for many decades in the 
Maldives. However, Maldivian governments always found ways to impede the 
media, at times even revoking licenses and jailing journalists. Over the years several 
newspapers and magazines that were critical of the government were banned and 
accused of destabilising the country. On the path to radical political change after the 
troubles of 2003 and 2004, the media started to open up as never before. After a 
group of young and educated cabinet ministers was appointed to the Gayoom 
administration in July 2005, there was significant liberalisation in the media arena. 
That month procedures for registering newspapers were relaxed and all pending 
applications were approved in just one day (Mendel, 2009). In June 2007, the state 
monopoly over broadcasting finally came to an end when licenses were handed to 
private broadcasters (Mendel, 2009). Soon a private TV channel and several radio 
channels started operation and since then such stations has multiplied.   
 
In the following years, a number of laws were enacted to regulate media and 
broadcasting, and to protect freedom of expression
62
 (Ministry of Information and 
Arts [MIA], 2007). By end of 2006, parliament received six media-related bills: 
Right to Freedom of Information, Freedom of Press, Maldives Media Council, 
                                               
61 The drop in 1990 was due to global recession and the Gulf War. 
62  Measures introduced by the government include instituting confidence building measures, 
introducing private media, creation of the legal framework, and imparting of necessary training (MIA, 
2007, p. 3).  
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Broadcasting, Registration of Publications, and Cable TV Services in the Maldives. 
After a number of amendments these bills became law and are in force.
63
 
 
The years from 2005 onward were a period of increasing media freedom. Generally 
freedom of expression, right to information, editorial independence, and journalists‟ 
right to protect their sources are respected
64
 in practice (Mendel, 2009). There is no 
attempt by the state to block or filter internet content (Mendel, 2009). As a result, 
websites have often been used as a source of information. Such a forum presented an 
almost unlimited opportunity for flexible, self-determined interaction, in the absence 
of traditional boundaries of social class and physical space (Meyer, 2002, p. 119). 
According to an interviewee, it was like the opening up of a shell in which the nation 
had been enclosed for many years (Interviewee FO6).  
 
It is evident the media has acted as a driving force in bringing about recent regime 
changes in a number of countries (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009). The media is having 
a strong impact on the changes in the political landscape of the Maldives as well. 
Political parties use all forms of media, including social media in order to get their 
message to the public. This was particularly evident in the run up to the presidential 
election of 2008. Consequently the Maldivian case also reveals what Meyer (2002) 
labelled as “media democracies”; democracies (including nascent ones) where 
political processes are mediated and shaped by the way media portray political 
incidents and how they are viewed by the general public (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 
2009). Despite the developments in terms of press freedom and a regulatory 
framework, however, a number of more recent challenges still remain in 
institutionalising an independent media in the Maldives. Some of these obstacles are 
discussed later in this chapter (section 4.5.2). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
63 They are: Maldives Media Council Law; Maldives Broadcasting Corporation Law; Broadcasting 
Law; Right to Information Regulation; Cable Television Service Regulation; and Regulation on 
Registration of Dailies and Magazines.  
64
 Some exceptions to this are listed in section 4.5.2 of this chapter. 
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4.4.9 International community. 
 
After gaining independence in 1965, the Maldives had approached the United 
Nations for development assistance (Coelho, 1997). The non-aligned status of the 
nation meant that foreign aid was also received from various countries as well as 
donor agencies, including neighbouring countries and Arab countries in particular. In 
fact, the major thrust of Maldivian foreign policy was based on the acquisition of aid 
for development purposes (Phadnis, 1980). Up until the 1990s, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) was a relatively important source of capital for development as 
the Maldives sought to strengthen its weak economic base. However, this reliance 
has declined in the last few decades (table 4.7 shows the net ODA received by small-
island states as percentage to their Gross National Income (GNI) for the period 1992-
2008).  
 
Table 4.7: Net official development assistance received by small-island states as 
percentage of GNI 
  1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Antigua and Barbuda 1.19 0.78 1.29 0.19 0.66 
Bahamas 0.09 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Bahrain 1.38 1.34 0.63 0.54 n/a 
Barbados 0 0.22 0.01 1.06 0.22 
Cape Verde 29.49 23.51 18.02 15.77 14.75 
Comoros 17.73 16.77 9.25 7.27 7.02 
Cyprus 0.37 0.25 n/a n/a n/a 
Dominica 6.89 19.81 5.25 8.67 4.98 
Federated States of Micronesia n/a 49.08 42.32 34.92 34.14 
Fiji 4.28 2.23 1.7 2.4 1.29 
Grenada 5.3 4.24 3.4 2.96 4.24 
Iceland - - - - - 
Kiribati 34.33 13.79 16.24 10.78 13.68 
Maldives 14.47 7.49 3.22 2.8 3.18 
Malta 0.15 1.96 0.56 n/a n/a 
Marshall Islands n/a 53.93 38.88 30.46 27.19 
Mauritius 1.39 0.44 0.44 0.52 1.12 
Nauru n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Palau 0.01 56.27 31.21 14.01 31.19 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.7 3.04 1.11 0.01 6.99 
Saint Lucia 6.06 7.27 1.62 -2.8 1.81 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
8.02 9.71 1.63 2.15 3.95 
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Samoa 29.79 14.44 11.05 8.41 7.47 
São Tomé and Príncipe n/a n/a n/a n/a 27.07 
Seychelles 4.5 3.87 3.1 1.56 1.5 
Solomon Islands 17.62 12.59 15.67 32.03 40.69 
Tonga 13.33 10.8 5.35 3.17 11.75 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.15 0.31 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 
Tuvalu n/a n/a n/a 21.61 32.37 
Vanuatu 22.82 14.06 17.68 11.23 15.71 
Source: WB (2012), World development indicators65 
 
Until January 1, 2011, the Maldives remained among the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) listed by the United Nations. Retaining this LDC status enabled 
developmental assistance from donor agencies and nations through grants and loans. 
Grants for development projects in the Maldives outlined in table 4.8 are considered 
a portion of the total aid received during the period 2002-2008, as several donor 
agencies provided assistance directly to the population. Despite graduating into the 
developing countries category, the Maldives continues to receive substantial amounts 
of ODA from developed countries (Bonofer, 2010, p. 442). 
 
Table 4.8: International grants for development projects for the Maldives (2002-
2008) 
Year Grant66  for development 
projects (In million MVR) 
% of total government revenue 
2002 72.4 2.16 
2003 72.4 1.86 
2004 14.1 0.33 
2005
67 766.4 14.65 
2006 793.2 11.18 
2007 935.9 10.72 
2008 461.4 5.24 
Source: DNP (2010); MPND (2004, 2005c, 2006, 2007b, 2008b) 
                                               
65 Net ODA consists of disbursement of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of 
principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and 
welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant 
element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). 
66 Includes grants in-kind but excludes direct expenditure by donors.  
67 The rise from 2005 onward was attributed to the Tsunami assistance. However, total grants were on 
the decline from 2008 as Tsunami-related projects started to wind down.    
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Some of the donor assistance had targeted governance reform for many years. They 
include projects funded by the WB and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Though 
conditionality of assistance had not been directly linked with political reform, such 
assistance had laid the groundwork for capacity building and institutional 
strengthening that eventually contributed to democratic reform. When democratic 
reform was initiated in 2004, the Commonwealth and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) also funded a number of projects directed 
towards democratic reform. From the early stages UNDP was the main international 
partner providing technical/policy advice and capacity building initiatives, which 
included assistance during the formulation of the constitution and assistance to 
several independent bodies including the CSC (UNDP, n.d.). In addition, the 
Commonwealth sent the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri Musa 
Bin Hitam, as a special envoy to provide support for constitutional and electoral 
reforms during the early stages (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006, p. 67).   
 
From the late 1990s, opposition activists based abroad had been lobbying for 
democratic reforms in the Maldives. Developments in mass media and the growing 
number of dissidents abroad led to a greater effectiveness in attracting the attention 
of foreign governments. With the diplomatic contact that the Maldives had with most 
countries of the world, it was impractical to ignore the “requests” of foreign 
diplomats to adopt a “rights-based approach” and transform the Maldives into a 
modern democracy (Interviewee FO5). Although foreign aid had been on the 
decline, it was still considered important for development, and the government was 
keen to maintain the aid flow. With the political developments of 2003 and 2004, the 
Maldives was eventually accepting aid that was directly linked to improvements in 
the political governance of the nation. Though foreign pressure or assistance did not 
directly lead to democratic reform, persistent pressure from foreign governments 
such as India (Bonofer, 2010, p. 446) and donor agencies edged the nation towards 
reform and helped guide the Maldives through the transition.  
 
4.5 Maldives – an emerging democracy 
 
Sustaining and consolidating the democratic reforms is vital for democracy to mature 
in the Maldives. While reversion to the autocratic rule of the past is unlikely and 
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there are significant constraints on the powers of the political executive, the road to 
maturity appears to be an uphill struggle. This section examines the main challenges 
that the Maldives are facing in relation to sustaining and consolidating democratic 
transition. The analysis so far reveals that presently the state of democracy in the 
Maldives is frail and unconsolidated (discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.2.3). This 
preliminary conclusion is reached by analysing institutional weaknesses, challenges 
to free media, speed of reform, and implications of island politics, discussed below.    
 
4.5.1 Institutional weaknesses. 
 
Lack of horizontal accountability. 
 
Establishment of numerous statutory bodies independent of the political executive is 
a new phenomenon in the Maldivian state sector. With democratic reforms, the 
powers of the political executive have been constrained through the creation of 
several overseeing bodies, indicated earlier (refer to table 4.3). The relations between 
the political executive and such bodies have at times been controversial during this 
initial period and reminiscent of times when the political executive applied its 
control to all sectors of the state, at times in violation of the constitution or laws. In 
other words, the “rule of law” was not enforced at times. The integrity of statutory 
bodies has, thus, arguably been compromised on occasions. A number of such 
instances where questions have been raised regarding the integrity and independence 
of such bodies are presented below.  
 
1. Government versus Anti-Corruption Commission: President Nasheed refused to 
appoint a member to the anti-corruption commission after approval by the 
parliament. The member was ultimately appointed after 15 months when the 
civil court ordered the president to do so.  
2. Government versus CSC: A number of disagreements between the government 
and the CSC regarding the interpretation of the CS Act have surfaced. As a 
result, the commission has taken the government to court several times, even 
though the government ignored such court rulings in the past (refer to sections 
7.2 and 7.3).  
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3. Government versus Parliament: During Nasheed‟s administration, the opposition 
controlled parliament passed motions and bills limiting or removing specific 
powers of the executive. A case in point is the changes brought to the CS Act 
where the appointment of the commissioners was changed from the president‟s 
initiation to become the parliament‟s prerogative.68 In retaliation the president 
challenged the constitutionally granted powers of the legislature by refusing to 
ratify some of the bills passed by the parliament, at times even when those bills 
were passed with an absolute majority that would overrule a presidential veto. 
Another crisis between the president and the parliament erupted when the entire 
cabinet of ministers resigned en masse accusing the parliament of blocking the 
government‟s proposals. According to the PO, the resignations were in protest at 
the performance of opposition MPs, whom the ministers accused of “hijacking 
the powers of the executive and making it impossible for the cabinet ministers to 
discharge their constitutional duties and deliver the government‟s election 
manifesto” (PO, 2010a). The move came just before a motion of “no 
confidence” in the Minister of Education was tabled. After international 
intervention from neighbouring countries, the entire cabinet was re-instated after 
a few days. A constitutional crisis once again followed as the government 
refused
69
 to get consent from the parliament on the ministers‟ reinstatement as 
required by the constitution. The deadlock continued until the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled on December 2010 that individual ministers should get the 
consent of parliament to complete the appointment process. Judicialisation of 
Maldivian politics was becoming common.    
4. Government versus Judiciary: The two year interim period of the constitution 
ended on August 7, 2010. As the parliament failed to appoint a permanent 
Supreme Court by the deadline, President Nasheed declared the interim 
Supreme Court invalid. Security forces locked down the Supreme Court and the 
JSC. Furthermore, the president appointed an “Interim Administrative Body” 
(PO, 2010c) to oversee the administrative functions of the Supreme Court during 
that period. The crisis ended when the opposition compromised with the 
                                               
68 The appointment procedure of the commissioners and the changes to the law in this respect is 
discussed in Chapter Six (sections 6.4.3 and 6.8.11) and Seven (section 7.4.3) respectively.  
69 In a radio address, President Nasheed said “members appointed to the cabinet would remain in 
office whether the Majlis approved or disapproved a member”. (PO, 2010b)  
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government to appoint the permanent Supreme Court. Yet another crisis 
unfolded when the chief judge of the Criminal Court was taken into military 
custody on January 16, 2012 – an act that led to daily opposition protests and the 
eventual resignation of President Nasheed. Immediately after the judge was 
taken into custody, the prosecutor general and the Human Rights Commission of 
the Maldives called for his release. The High Court and the Supreme Court also 
ordered the immediate release of the judge. Government refused to obey several 
court orders that followed. The judge was released after President Nasheed‟s 
resignation on February 7, 2012. 
     
Unstable party system. 
 
Although political parties may not be a necessity for democracy to flourish (Ankar & 
Anckar, 2000), most democracies have multi-party systems. In polities with a high 
degree of competition for executive office, political parties usually play an important 
role. More specifically, political parties can make an important contribution during 
the later stages of the transition after authoritarian rule has been replaced (Randall & 
Svåsand, 2002).  
 
With their new found freedom, a big majority of the voting population in the 
Maldives joined political parties (see table 4.9). By the end of 2009, 13 political 
parties (Elections Commission, 2010) were registered.  
 
Political parties continue to lead the democratisation process in the Maldives. 
However, as political parties are a recent introduction to the polity, a conducive 
environment for parties to operate harmoniously is yet to be found. Firstly, the 
primary aim of all political parties has been to increase party membership, as the 
level of funding received from the state budget depends on it. Little or no attention is 
given by most parties to strengthening the level of internal democracy within the 
parties. Even when elections are held within parties, it is common for losers in those 
elections to leave and join a rival party. 
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Table 4.9: Membership of political parties 
 End of 2007 End of 2008 End of 2009 
MDP 19,420 19,392 29,476 
DRP 32,141 30,851 30,132 
AP 6331 6066 6078 
IDP 7743 6481 5445 
SDP 4604 3630 2944 
SLP 1617 1149 988 
PP 3894 2790 2403 
MNC 3357 2639 2340 
PA - 3307 3173 
JP - 8134 7779 
MLP - - 2023 
GI - 2639 3726 
DQP - - 3533 
PEP - 3038 - 
TOTAL 79,107 90,116 100,040 
Source: Elections Commission (2008b, 2009a, 2010) 
 
Secondly, a large number of individuals join a governing party. In this regard, after 
the election victory in the 2008 presidential election, the membership of MDP rose to 
over 45,000 by April 2011 (F. Ahmed, 2011). In contrast, the main opposition party, 
the DRP, split into two parties after factional conflict. Smaller parties are relatively 
insignificant because they are without a power base at the grass roots level. Thirdly, 
parties are more likely to be held together by personal loyalty to a leader than by 
ideology or class. This is a shortcoming in the efforts made to try and strengthen the 
parties.  
 
Fourthly, “party hopping” among senior officials also appears to be a significant 
challenge because it has a wider relevance towards maintaining political stability. 
Though an opposition coalition claimed a majority in the 2009 parliamentary 
election, that majority was reversed in favour of the ruling MDP by May 2011 (refer 
to table 4.10). Several opposition and independent MPs “hopped” on to the ruling 
party. A report by Transparency International (2011) revealed that the Maldivian 
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parliament was perceived by the public to be the most corrupt public institution in 
the Maldives.  
 
Table 4.10: Parliament composition 
 March 2009 May 2011 
MDP 26 34 
DRP / PA
70 35 31 
JP 1 3 
DQP 2 1 
Independent 13 8 
Source: Elections Commission (2009b); A. A. Saeed (2011) 
 
Although political parties have been an important introduction to the highly 
contested Maldivian polity, the omnipresence of parties in the daily life of society 
has ensured a politically-charged environment that has at times been blamed for its 
polarisation. In this regard, islands and families divided by split party loyalties are 
evident throughout the nation (Interviewee FO5) (discussed further in section 4.5.4). 
Burnell and Gerrits (2010, p. 1073) state that the “political and institutional 
environment in many new democracies is not particularly conducive to solid and 
vibrant democratic parties and competitive party systems”. The Maldives evidence 
suggests risks to “solid and vibrant” political parties although the party system seems 
quite competitive.    
    
Weak civil society sector. 
 
A vigorous civil society is an important ingredient for sustaining and consolidating 
democratic values. As Diamond (1993, p. 431) points out, in addition to the 
importance of political elites and activists:  
 
to ignore the beliefs of the wider society is to fail to appreciate the 
considerable degree to which influence and pressure for action may flow from 
the bottom up, constraining elites and perhaps vitiating or undermining even 
                                               
70
 After the splitting of DRP in late 2011, this coalition ceased to exist.  
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their sincerely democratic inclinations. This is one reason why stable 
democracy requires mass habituation to democratic values and orientations, 
and thus why a vigorous civil society is important, alongside a well-articulated 
party system, to provide arenas in which citizens can practice democracy, 
internalize its values and limits, and hold elites accountable.  
 
In the absence of any legal impediments to the establishment of CSOs, traditionally 
the Maldives have had a relatively active civil society, especially at the island level. 
Such organisations can vary from being generalist to being focused on a specific 
target group or function. Among them a total of 34 CSOs which make up 5.8% of all 
CSOs can be considered to be focused on promoting good governance and 
democracy (UNDP Maldives, 2011). However, with the arrival of democratic 
reforms and the impact of politicisation of the public life, the role of the civil society 
is yet to be determined as CSOs have a relatively little impact on political matters. 
This may be due to a number of reasons. A government led national conference of 
CSOs held in August 2010 highlighted the main challenges faced by CSOs. Some of 
the germane issues are listed below:    
 
a) Lack of a framework for financial assistance from the state and businesses.  
b) No government budgetary allocation for CSOs to provide services to the 
public.  
c) Lack of awareness among government officials of the role of civil society.  
d) Lack of consultation by the government in setting, planning, and 
implementing policies.  
e) Continuous pressure by politicians on CSOs.  
f) Lack of opportunities for civil society to develop because government and 
state-owned enterprises provide similar services to the public.   
g) Lack of opportunities for capacity-building.  
h) Lack of office space. (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010) 
 
Past experiences, especially at the island level, have shown that civil society can be 
an effective force in moulding a society. Several initiatives by CSOs have arguably 
“gone cold” due to a combination of the reasons mentioned above. Strengthening of 
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civil society is important because it can contribute to consolidating democracy and 
make “reversal to authoritarian rule more difficult” (Sørensen, 2010, p. 453).  
 
4.5.2 Challenges to free media. 
 
Media is undoubtedly an integral part of a modern democracy. The outreach of 
media in the Maldives has meant that media agencies are the prime source of 
information for the general public. As Loveless (2008) concluded, citizens in new 
democracies purposively use the media for obtaining political information. However, 
even after the Maldives moved into a multi-party electoral democracy, the media has 
had difficult times (International Federation of Journalists [IFJ], 2011). Some of the 
main challenges faced by the media during the past few years are:     
 
a) The Maldives Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Bill was ratified by 
President Nasheed on April 20, 2010. Under the Act, the MBC was to be 
the public broadcaster and all assets held at that time by the state-owned 
media (TV and radio) were to be handed over to the statutory corporation. 
In accordance with the law, a nine-member board was appointed by the 
parliament but the government refused to hand over the assets to the 
corporation. Although the civil court ordered the government on May 12, 
2011, to hand over the assets to MBC within 20 days (“Dhaulathuge Media 
20 Dhuvahuge,” 2011), government maintained its refusal to do so.71 The 
general perception was that the government held on to the state media 
because it was used as a propaganda arm for the ruling MDP (IFJ, 2011).  
b) Maldives Media Council is the statutory authority entrusted with regulating 
the media. Of the 15 members in the council, seven members are elected 
from the general public, but to run for office they legally require 
government endorsement. In the election of May 2010, allegations were 
made that the seven members of the public who received government 
endorsement were party loyalists (IFJ, 2011).  
c) When covering protests, the police have been accused of using excessive 
force against journalists and at times arresting them. This was evident in 
                                               
71
 State media was handed over to MBC after President Nasheed‟s resignation.   
133 
 
October 2010 when journalists were allegedly beaten by batons, some were 
shackled and some briefly detained during a protest (IFJ, 2011). Two 
journalists were also detained briefly when covering an opposition protest in 
late April 2011 (IFJ, 2011) while a number of journalists sustained various 
injuries while covering those protests that continued for almost a week 
(Maldives Journalist Association, 2011).    
d) The coverage of the parliamentary sittings was also questioned when in 
December 2010, the General Committee of the parliament summoned 
journalists from two private TV channels, where they were accused of 
selectively editing video footage of a parliament member (IFJ, 2011).  
e) In February 2011, two journalists were summoned for interrogation by the 
police after reporting on a pornographic video racket scheme, which 
involved a number of senior government officials and prominent figures. 
The journalists were pressed to reveal the source
72
 of their information, 
which was a clear violation of the constitution.   
f) The biggest opposition protest against President Nasheed was held on 
December 23, 2011. Due to the coverage given by the media, soon after, the 
Minister of Defence threatened to take action against any media outlet that 
“do not protect national security” (“Salaamathaa Behey Kanthah,” 2011). In 
January 2012, government also warned the media that steps would be taken 
against media operators who “commit the crime of spreading false 
information” (“Press Secretary Warns,” 2012). The Maldives Broadcasting 
Commission and the Media Council condemned the intimidation of media 
by the government (“Threatening The Media,” 2012).   
g) TV channels that broadcast coverage of opposition protests and news were 
often targeted by the ruling MDP. In one of many such incidents, the 
parliamentary leader of MDP, Moosa Manik, referred to private TV 
channels in the Maldives as the fruit of “ill-gotten” wealth and vowed to 
teach them a lesson during remarks made in 2010 (IFJ, 2011). Protests by 
the members of the ruling MDP outside private TV stations were also 
                                               
72 Article 28 of the present constitution states “Everyone has the right to freedom of the press, and 
other means of communication, including the right to espouse, disseminate and publish news, 
information, views and ideas. No person shall be compelled to disclose the source of any information 
that is espoused, disseminated or published by that person.”   
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common when programmes that criticised them were aired. During the 
opposition protests of January/February 2012, two TV channels were 
attacked several times with arson at one station on February 6, 2012.  
  
Many new democracies are yet to succeed in transforming their media into fully 
democratic institutions (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009). Therefore, the experiences of 
the media in the Maldives, especially the challenges faced, are not unique by any 
means. At the time of this research, some significant risks remained to media 
freedom. The expectation is that, as democracy matures, such challenges will be 
overcome.       
 
4.5.3 Speed of reform. 
 
The speed with which the Maldives transformed into a democratic polity is 
significant, a process that probably only a handful of nations went through in such a 
short period. Though democratic transition in countries such as the United Kingdom 
took many decades, “contemporary societies must telescope such a long historical 
process into a few critical years” (Linz, 1990, p. 143). Some believed that reform 
came far too quickly for people to digest in the Maldives: “the people were not 
prepared to adjust themselves to the democracy that was brought in a very sudden 
manner” (Interviewee FO11). This may be due to lack of adequate time to fathom 
the reforms as well as inadequate consultation and awareness campaigns regarding 
democracy.    
 
Apart from the extensive changes made to the constitution, the number of bills 
passed by the parliament also increased significantly (see table 4.11). Several of the 
laws passed since 2007 were aimed at establishing statutory bodies that operate 
relatively independently of the political executive. The Maldivian state sector was 
new in operating all the independent bodies simultaneously. One interviewee 
summarised the impact: 
   
As a result of creating too many laws and too many institutions over a short 
period of time, our unconscious minds have been unable to absorb all this. Still 
we go along with our experience or do things the way we have been used to, 
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then we make decisions based on this. When a problem arises, only we realise 
that in doing so we have violated the boundaries of another institution. By then 
so much friction has clogged up relationships between both parties. 
(Interviewee, GO6, Aminath Nihan Translation)  
 
Table 4.11: Bills submitted and passed in the majlis 
 
Source: Rayyithunge majlis (n.d.) 
 
4.5.4 Island politics. 
 
Smallness can pose considerable challenges during the consolidation of a 
democracy. This has proved to be the case in the Maldives. Although it makes sense 
for small societies to work together to promote common good, in practice this has 
proved a difficult task (J. Henderson, 2003, p. 229). Political elites in the Maldives 
often find ways to resolve differences through negotiation. However, for the society 
at large, features such as social closeness have not necessarily aided in bridging the 
political divide. That is because, firstly, a stable multi-party political culture has yet 
not fully developed in the Maldives. Secondly, the country‟s political culture cannot 
yet fully support what Weber refers to as “legal-rational” form of authority. The 
newly injected democratic ideals are putting a strain on a population that is mostly 
confined to small islands with a couple of hundred citizens in most cases (see table 
Year Bills submitted Bills passed 
2000 4 4 
2001 7 5 
2002 3 3 
2003 8 7 
2004 8 4 
2005 17 6 
2006 30 4 
2007 17 6 
2008 25 15 
2009 60 16 
2010 29 21 
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4.1). The loss of social fabric and a growing polarisation among small communities 
of the Maldives is also evident.  
 
Political parties have been proved to be a particularly divisive factor in some of the 
island nations of the Pacific (J. Henderson, 2003, p. 230). To some extent, this is also 
true for the Maldives. The two major parties of the MDP and the DRP often focus on 
personal politics rather than on issues and this creates deep divisions in society. As 
an interviewee points out, “Our society after the introduction of political parties is 
more divided than ever; never in the history of Maldives... this country was this 
much divided” (Interviewee FO1). Describing the deepness of the divisions within 
small communities of the islands, one interviewee said, “There are islands where 
people of the ruling party and the opposition will not inter-marry. They will not trade 
from shops from each other‟s party” (Interviewee FO5).  
   
Discrediting someone based solely on false accusations may not be difficult in such 
small communities. The nature of personal politics often creates long-lasting scars in 
some island communities, even within families. One interviewee noted that the 
island communities are increasingly becoming fragmented because all these reforms 
were, “crammed down people‟s throats in such a short space of time” (Interviewee 
FO5), without generating any awareness as to how to live in a multi-party 
environment. In describing the difficulties for small communities, another 
responded:  
 
It is difficult to maintain this type of system in such a sparse population. 
Especially in a place like the Maldives, with blood relations. It‟s a close-knit 
community. So the effects are profound. So to sustain this system, we have to 
put in a lot of effort. We have to spread awareness, create awareness among 
people. Without this, we would face a lot of problems; the social problems we 
have would be amplified. (Interviewee GO1, Aminath Nihan Translation) 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The Maldives has had a strongly centralised and autocratic system of government for 
nearly all of its recorded history, but with qualifications. The main qualifications are: 
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(1) the need for most rulers to take some account of the interests of a small number 
of powerful families; (2) some limited formal constraints on the use of the ruler‟s 
power from the role of advisers and the majlis; (3) some incidents of rulers being 
ejected from office as a result of clashes with the powerful elites; (4) an on-going 
problem of imposing strongly centralised rule over a geographically scattered polity, 
which permitted local economic and social power bases to develop.  
 
More recently, the advancements in economy, education, mass communication, and 
globalising influences – particularly due to the return of the Maldivians educated 
abroad returning with new ideas of governance – have contributed to the rise of self-
expression values, setting the conditions both for the emergence of new elites and for 
increased mass influence on political development. The polity was ripe, in effect, for 
the catalysing events of 2003 that began the process of mass responsive 
democratisation. The process that followed, however, was not a revolution with the 
violent replacement of old elites by new, but a process of transplacement as defined 
by Huntington (1991-2), and the elements of democratisation were effectively then 
negotiated amongst old and new elites. This process of negotiation extended to the 
construction of a wide range of formal institutions including the new CS Act. The 
islandness of the nation was also to some extent a factor in the design of the 
constitutional architecture.  
 
The Maldives is an emerging democracy. Numerous reforms of governance and 
political system of the island nation were undertaken in just a few years. Since the 
2008 presidential election, however, the country has been in almost continuous 
political turmoil, culminating in the highly disputed resignation of the first 
democratically elected president in February 2012. Given these events together with 
the present institutional weaknesses, continuing challenges to the media, and the 
negative effects of multi-party politics on the small-island communities, with no 
workable solution in sight, it is safe to assume that consolidation of democracy in the 
Maldives is still some distance away. Nonetheless, the continuous involvement of 
the general public in the political environment should help sustain the rise of self-
expression values which in turn lead to efforts to strengthen democratic institutions. 
 
The next chapter focuses on the administrative history of the Maldives and the road 
which the nation traversed en route to the formation of a statutory CS.  
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CHAPTER 5: EN ROUTE TO A STATUTORY CIVIL SERVICE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Maldivian system of administration has developed in a manner similar to other 
autocratic systems. The employment framework developed during the 1960s had 
similarities to other jurisdictions, but with rapid change in the political context, had 
to confront a new basic problem, which is the appropriate relation between the CS 
and political executive in an emerging democracy where there were significant 
constraints on the powers of the political executive.  
 
This chapter presents a brief history of public administration in the Maldives that 
eventually led to the formulation of a statutory CS. The aim is to show that the 
Maldives had a system of administration that evolved over the years and when the 
statutory CS was established, the basic elements of administration were already in 
place.  
 
In this regard, this chapter argues that the public administration of the Maldives went 
through three phases en route to a statutory CS: 1) early history to early 1930s, 2) 
early 1930s to mid-1970s, and 3) mid-1970s to 2008. The first phase covers the 
evolution of basic government and institution building. A turning point in the 
nation‟s history occurred in early 1930s with the promulgation of the first written 
constitution of the nation. The last major period from the mid-1970s was the result of 
the expansion of socio-economic activities that required modernisation of 
government organisations and services to keep pace with the changing environment. 
All three phases prior to the CS Act were in the context of an autocratic system of 
government with no executive competition other than by shift of the power balance 
within the ruling elite and very few effective constraints on executive power, 
including over the employment of staff. 
 
5.2 Early history to early 1930s 
 
In a nation where 99% of its area is ocean, sea travel would have existed since the 
first settlers arrived. Along with the art of boat-building and the use of the monsoon 
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winds, journeys to distant places were common. Historical evidence shows that 
cowrie shells were used by locals for trade with other countries (Suryanarayan, 1998, 
p. 121), a tradition which lasted until the latter half of nineteenth century (N. 
Mohamed, 2008, p. 65). The geographical location of the archipelago also made the 
Maldives a convenient stop for trading ships on the Arab-China trade route 
(Chaudhuri, 1985). With increasing knowledge obtained from travelling visitors, the 
locals ventured to distant countries. Records shows frequent trade visits to areas of 
Bengal, Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia on the east and Arabia, the Persian Gulf, 
and East Coast of Africa on the western side (N. Mohamed, 2008, p. 67). Maldivians 
ventured as far as the court of the Roman Emperor Julian
73
 (Rolfe, 1937) and the 
Emperor of China
74
 (Pelliot, 1904, cited in Maloney, 1980, pp. 110-111). With 
advancement in travel, contact with the outside world grew exponentially. Such 
contacts were bound to bring experiences and practices from more advanced 
administrations and civilisations to the Maldives.  
 
Despite this evidence of travel by locals to many parts of the world, little is known 
about the system of administration that existed during that time. Maloney (1980, p. 
313) states that in one of the earliest reference to the Maldives, an Arab historian by 
the name of Al Mas‟udi wrote in 916 A.D. that the country was ruled by a queen and 
the people were subject to one government. N. Mohamed (2008, p. 5) also states that 
according to the writings of Al-Idrisi
75
 in 1150 A.D., a system of tax collection 
existed in the Maldives. This means a number of state servants would have been 
employed for such tasks. State servants would have been employed even for trading 
with other nations. In early as 500 A.D., the ruler of the nation had control over the 
export and exchange of cowrie shells in return for commodities not available locally 
(N. Mohamed, 2008, p. 9). Portuguese travel to the nation in early sixteenth century 
also confirms the existence of such a system (Bouchon, 1975/1988, pp. 42-3). 
 
                                               
73
 Ammianus Marcellinus (c. 330-400 A.D.), a Greek from Antiokia who fought under Emperor 
Julianus writes – “On one side, the peoples beyond the Tigris and the Armenians begged for peace. 
On another, the Indian nations as far as the Divi [Maldives] and the Serendivi [Sri Lanka] vied with 
one another in sending their leading men with gifts ahead of time” (Rolfe, 1937, p. 213).   
74 According to Pelliot (1904), a Chinese document of the Tang Dynasty, written between 785 and 
805 A.D., shows Maldivians visited China in 658 A.D. and 662 A.D.   
75
 Taken from an Arabic book titled “Kitab Nuzhat Al Mushtaq Fi Ikhtiraq Al Afaq”.  
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Traveller Ibn Battuta visited the Maldives twice between 1343 and 1346 and 
confirmed an established system of governance (A. Gray, 1890, p. 435). According 
to his writings, Sultana Khadija was reigning during that period and she employed a 
thousand men as an army who were paid monthly by rice (A. Gray, 1890, p. 450). 
Regarding the composition of the inner circles of the ruling elites, Ibn Battuta writes: 
 
 The people of the Maldives call the Grand Vizier [Vazier], the Sultana‟s 
Lieutenant, Kalakí; and the Kázi [Qaal‟ee], Fandayarkálú [fandiyaaru]. All 
judgements are in the jurisdiction of the Kázi: he is more highly esteemed by 
the people than all other men, and his orders are executed as those of the 
Sultan, and even better. He sits upon a carpet in the audience hall: he possesses 
three islands, whose revenue he places to his private account, after an ancient 
custom established by the Sultan Ahmed Shanúráza. The Preacher is called 
Handíjarí; the Chief of the Treasury, Fámeldári; the Receiver-General of 
Revenue, Máfákalú; the Minister of Police, Fitnáyak; and the Admiral, 
Mánáyak. All these have the title of Vizier. (A. Gray, 1890, pp. 450-1)           
 
Sultans and sultanas reigned from the throne appointing nobles as advisers. Such 
nobles came from the ruling clan, a status that was achieved by being an offspring of 
that elite group or through marriage ties with the clan (Nasheed, 2003, p. 3).
76
 They 
were normally based in the capital, Male‟. In the outer regions, Kangathi Beykalun 
(Governors) were responsible for administration. They were nominated by the 
people in the regions and presented to the sultan, who would appoint and confer the 
titles (DIB, 1990, p. 10). In addition to the significant power and authority they held, 
they were also able to control the wealth of the country. In the atolls, Atholhuverin 
(Atoll Chiefs) appointed by the state were the focal point of the state government. 
Though Kangathi Beykalun faded out of the power circles with time, Atholhuverin 
were very senior and powerful up until the end of 2008.
77
 At the island level, 
                                               
76 Reference is made here to a book authored by President Nasheed. Later in this thesis, reference is 
made to another person with the exact same name.  
77 Under the reforms of 2008, councils were elected in the cities, atolls, and islands. The first such 
election was held in February 2011.    
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Katheebu
78
, the administrative and judicial officers of the islands had multiple 
functions of island magistrate, chief revenue collector, and religious head (Phadnis & 
Luithui, 1985, p. 11). Their religious functions included delivering Friday sermons 
as well as enforcing Islamic behavioural ideals (Maloney, 1980, p. 183). Their 
magisterial functions included conducting of marriages in the islands (Bell, 
1883/2004, p. 64). The bottom of the hierarchy was at the ward level, where Muskuli 
avas was in charge of individual local administration of the wards while Mudhim
79
 
were in charge of individual mosques (Phadnis & Luithui, 1985, pp. 11-2).   
 
As evident from the writings of Ibn Battuta, sultans organised their power structures 
by devolving judicial and religious functions to the Qaal’ee (Judges) and overall 
administration and revenue collection of the state to the Vaziers (Ministers) (Phadnis 
& Luithui, 1985). The chief justice or the fandiyaaru, did not require any family ties 
with the ruling clan, but was required to be educated in Islamic principles (Nasheed, 
2003, p. 5).
80
 In the absence of written laws, Qaal’ee were expected to uphold the 
standards of Islamic shari‟a (Dunn, 2005, p. 231). Reference to treasury house or 
bodu badeyrige has also been given in literature (Nasheed, 2003, p. 61),
81
 indicating 
the centre of state finances. Bodu Badéri or chief treasurer employed accountants 
and clerks to assist with the duties of revenue (Bell, 1883/2004, p. 66). Other 
references to senior posts include harbour chief (Young & Christopher, 1844), army 
chief, palace auditor, customs collector (Bell, 1921) (cited in Maloney, 1980, p. 
199), and port doctor who ensured that the ships docking in the harbour were free of 
diseases (Bell, 1883/2004, p. 67). This shows that basic organisations have existed 
for many centuries in the Maldivian state administration. In a sense, little changed 
over the centuries as far as the overall dynamic of these functions is concerned.   
 
                                               
78 According to Maloney (1980, p. 184), katheebu in northern atolls used to be selected by consensus 
among the islanders, while the position was mostly hereditary in the southern atolls.  
79
 Mudhim need to ensure the mosques are decent and in order, call for prayers, and lead the prayers 
(Bell, 1883/2004, p. 65). At times, the words mudhim and imaam are used interchangeably. These 
titles and functions remain the same even presently. The majority of the mosques are maintained by 
the government (some by wealthy individuals) and almost all the imaam are under the government 
payroll.     
80 Reference is made here to a book authored by President Nasheed. 
81
 Reference is made here to a book authored by President Nasheed. 
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It is widely believed that in none of the instances when the sovereignty of the 
country was interrupted by foreign occupation (see section 4.3.1), did the occupiers 
make any impact on changing the local administrative system. As Maloney (1980, p. 
129) explains, even when the Maldives was under British protectorate status, “the 
British never administered the Maldives, so their stamp left so impressively on the 
rest of South Asia is altogether missing”. There was no physical presence of the 
British in Male‟ to exert any influence on the internal administration of the nation 
(DIB, 1990, p. 3). In particular, the Maldives did not inherit or copy a CS as seen in 
the neighbouring countries. Salleh and Othman (1992, p. 74) stated that in the 
Maldives:   
 
a number of institutions and practices which formed an important part of the 
administrative system in many other developing countries were found lacking. 
The system that evolved was an outgrowth of long heritage and culture and 
was essentially traditional in outlook.  
 
This does not imply there is no influence on the Maldivian system from systems in 
other countries. In the past, the Maldives has invited foreigners to hold high posts 
and this would have some impact on the administrative practices. In this regard, 
foreign sultans who held the Maldivian throne included the Arabs Sayyid 
Muhammad (1466-68) and Sarif Muhammad (1510-13) (Maloney, 1980, pp. 192-3). 
Furthermore, the post of Qaal’ee was at times filled by foreigners. Ibn Battuta, the 
Muslim traveller mentioned previously, was appointed to the post of Qaal’ee during 
his stay in the Maldives (A. Gray, 1890, p. 459). But the basic design of the national 
administrative system as it developed under the sultans were nevertheless a more or 
less unique local product that evolved mostly out of tradition and cultural practices 
(Latheef, 1993).  
    
By the start of the twentieth century, the sultanate was evolving to a figure-head 
position, with the prime minister acting as the head of government. Systems of 
taxation, national defence, justice, and administration were established through the 
practices and conventions that have evolved over the centuries (DIB, 1985, p. 18). A 
major shift in governance was on the horizon with the introduction of the first 
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constitution in 1932 which would change the system where the rulers were advised 
on the matters of the state by advisers and councils (N. Mohamed, 2008, p. 31).    
 
5.3 From early 1930s to mid-1970s 
 
The change of government into a constitutional monarchy marks a turning point for 
public administration and the system of governance. With the first written 
constitution of 1932, the functions of the state were codified in law. Growing 
recognition was given to state officials as the services provided to the public 
expanded. The prime minister and the council of ministers were given legal 
recognition by the constitution (Phadnis & Luithui, 1985). Sir Bernard Henry 
Bourdillion, K.C.M.G., Chief Secretary of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), provided advice to 
the Maldivian government on formulating the constitution (DIB, 1990, p. 3), 
indicating the possible foreign influences that would have been included. Primarily, 
Arabic names were used to denote the portfolios during those times. Along with the 
political changes in the next decades, the portfolios and functions of the ministries 
kept changing, most of which then took English names. Conversion to a republic in 
1953 did not change the status of state officials. Furthermore, as Zameer (1994) 
states, in the absence of a distinct local administration, all government officials 
throughout the nation were considered direct officials of the central government. 
However, it is believed that basic rules of employment were written and used during 
these stages. These rules further developed over the years.     
 
The two decades following the mid-1930s were a period of hardship and suffering 
for the Maldives. The effects of the Second World War were felt hard and it took 
several more years to recover from the aftermath. The daily focus on basic survival 
prevented attention towards any significant administrative reform during this period. 
As a result there were no major shifts in administrative practices. However, towards 
1958, with increases in development, the government started to undergo a period of 
relative modernisation (Zameer, 1994; Interviewee GO4).  
 
The first attempt to provide legal status for government officials in the Maldives was 
in 1968 by Law 1/68J (Official Kanthah [Issues] Chapter 1). Article 3 of the law 
stated, “The President has the authority to appoint, dismiss and transfer personnel for  
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state duties”. Such broad powers given to the chief executive meant that he was able 
to manoeuvre the entire public service as he saw fit.  
 
Once again, the need to reform governance started to appear. This time there were 
two main drivers. Firstly, as a result of growth in the educated population, there was 
an inflow of better educated people into the government employment, and they 
brought ideas and incentives for administrative change. Secondly, economic 
development required a better public service to regulate and guide growth. This was 
led by the introduction of tourism in the early 1970s that required expansion of 
infrastructure to accommodate the influx of tourists.   
 
5.4 From mid-1970s to 2008 
 
5.4.1 Impact of education and training. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (see section 4.4.6), significant developments in 
the education sector since the mid-twentieth century have had a profound impact on 
the democratisation process in the Maldives. Similarly, individuals who pursued 
their education and returned to work in the public sector have had a significant 
impact on the administration of government. Throughout the twentieth century, 
several future leaders gained their education in Sri Lanka which had a Westminster-
type administration (Interviewee GO4). Others studied in the Arab nations, 
particularly in Egypt, and dominated the political spectrum of the nation from the 
1970s. As the years went by, more and more educated professionals returned from 
all corners of the globe to work in the public sector (see section 4.4.6). It is likely 
that what they learned while abroad would have had an impact on the public 
administration and the governance of the nation. However, rather than borrowing 
patterns of administration in a wholesale manner, changes started to appear 
piecemeal with a more Maldivianised outlook.   
 
The opportunities for public officials at all levels to obtain professional training from 
overseas were also significant. According to an experienced former senior 
government official, delays in administration started to appear at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs once a few officials returned after receiving training from the Indian 
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Foreign Service (Interviewee FO9). In other words, bureaucratic practices of the 
Indian Foreign Service started to have an impact on how administration was 
organised in the Maldives. For example, among numerous such reforms borrowed 
from other countries, the performance appraisal system formulated in 2001 had a 
significant influence from Malaysia (Faizal, 2005).    
 
5.4.2 International assistance. 
 
In September 1979, an international mission to examine the state of the CS in the 
Maldives was undertaken by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Two of the main objectives of that mission were: 
 
a) To undertake an overall appraisal of the administrative system with a view to 
identifying specific steps for facilitating the restructuring of the government 
machinery on a planned basis; 
b) To recommend measures for rationalising and reorienting the civil service. 
(Banerjee, 1979, p. 1) 
 
This assessment was considered to be a launching pad for future reforms in an 
environment where systematic focus on administrative reform had been absent, 
resulting in the creation of an administrative culture that had given rise to high levels 
of centralisation. The centralised system was often maintained by appointing close 
relatives and friends of the president to important positions of the government 
(Suryanarayan, 1998, p. 117). To counter such practices, the most pertinent areas for 
public administration development were identified by the ESCAP mission as:    
 
a) To delegate authority and strengthen accountability among all levels of 
government; 
b) To delegate financial and organisational transactions at the central 
government level; 
c) To establish an integrated management system at the apex of government; 
d) To develop strategic objectives for government ministries and departments; 
e) To establish a National Personnel Management and Administrative Reform 
Agency; 
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f) To align the performance of government employees with national 
development goals. (Banerjee, 1979) 
 
In addition to these proposals, one of the significant recommendations made by the 
mission was to provide a legal basis for the CS. The report suggested the inclusion of 
broad principles of the CS in the amended constitution and the formulation of a CS 
Act (Banerjee, 1979). Although most of the report‟s recommendations were not 
adequately implemented,
82
 over the next decades several donor aid projects
83
 aimed 
at reforming the administrative machinery of the government were undertaken which 
contributed to establishing a statutory CS.  
 
5.4.3 Organisational development. 
 
The structure of the Maldives state in 1980 is shown in figure 5.1 and annex 5 gives 
a government organisation chart at the end of July 1979. By 1979 it was evident that 
strategic reform of this government machinery was a necessity because the 
prevailing structures were relatively basic and narrowly conceived. According to 
Banerjee (1979, p. 12), “several broad functions of government which are 
organically intertwined in their subject matter are split into separate agencies; and 
there are admixtures of other functions which violate principles of commonality and 
managerial cohesiveness”. As a result, one of the first major organisational changes 
implemented by the newly elected government of 1978 was to establish a National 
Planning Agency designed to coordinate the entire national planning function of the 
government.  
 
Under the reign of President Gayoom, there were several rationalisations of 
government ministries and departments. More importantly, there was a huge leap in 
the number of public sector organisations: ministries, departments, parastatals, and 
other offices grew from 32 in 1958 to 116 in 1991 (Zameer, 1994). To handle this 
growth, there was an increasing need to strengthen the internal administration of 
those organisations. In this regard, the opening of the Maldives Centre for 
                                               
82 Refer to section 5.4.8 for some success stories. 
83
 Also discussed in section 5.4.8 
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Management and Administration (MCMA) in October 1991 was a milestone in 
developing a professional CS. The centre was established to provide professional 
need-based, highly practical training and development programmes for senior, 
middle, and supervisory level managers in the CS (Zameer, 1994). The centre was 
expected to play an important role in the development of skills amongst the civil 
servants and in the overall socio-economic development of the nation. Over the years 
MCMA evolved more towards academic training rather than professional training 
and eventually became part of the Maldives College of Higher Education (MCHE), 
which in turn became a university. 
 
Figure 5.1: Administrative setup of the Maldives (1980) 
President
(elected every 5 years)
Legislature Executive Judiciary
People’s Majlis
(elected every 5 years)
Council of Ministers 
(including the Attorney 
General)
Chief Justice 
(appointed by 
President)
Ministries
Atoll Chief 
(appointed by 
President)
Island Chief 
(appointed by 
Ministry of 
Provincial Affairs)
Ministry of Justice
Atoll Qazi 
(appointed by President) 
 
Note: Modified based on the diagram by Phadnis and Luithui (1985, p. 106) 
 
Oversight bodies were also established to help ensure political and administrative 
accountability in a government of growing size and complexity. For instance, since 
the establishment of an Audit Office in 1949 (ADB, 1997), the organisation has 
evolved into a statutory body that operates under modern auditing standards. 
Similarly, the government established an Anti-Corruption Commission.           
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5.4.4 Centralisation of administration. 
 
With the geographical dispersion of the archipelago, one might assume there would 
be a strong emphasis on decentralisation in the governance of the nation. 
Historically, this was sometimes the reality, but developments in mass 
communication and transport facilities from the 1960s onwards meant that the 
administration increasingly became centralised
84
. In fact, during the presidency of 
Nasir, the prime minister made the final selection for government jobs after being 
presented with three short-listed candidates (Zaki & Parakh, 2008, p. 86). This high 
level of centralisation is perhaps the most fundamental feature of public 
administration in the Maldives. On the one hand, the high degree of centralisation 
arguably brought substantial benefits that include uniform budgetary processes and 
expenditure in the form of standardisation and redistribution of government revenue 
to all parts of the archipelago irrespective of the level of economic activities. On the 
other hand, it also meant referral was made to Male‟ for decisions on even the most 
trivial matters.    
 
Following the re-election of President Gayoom for a fourth consecutive term in 
November 1993, some degree of devolutionary efforts commenced after years of 
centralisation of the administration and authority in the PO. Until then, even trivial 
financial issues had to be reported to the PO while the Ministry of Finance and 
Treasury (MOFT) played only a peripheral role. Under the structural reforms 
implemented in 1993 most government organisations were placed under sector 
ministries rather than under the direct supervision of the PO. Some administrative 
powers were also delegated to ministerial level resulting in quicker decision-making. 
Consequently, a number of functions at the PO, including preparation of the national 
budget and scholarship management, were delegated to the relevant ministries (I. 
Mohamed, 2005, p. 145). However, the extent of delegation did not go far enough 
and, according to a senior former government official, the ministers themselves 
lacked authority and were considered merely as “elevated secretaries” who had to 
report to the PO regularly (Interviewee FO9).      
                                               
84 One such example is the abolition of the elected atoll committees. Under the “reforms” of 1975, 
those committees that existed under the 1968 constitution were abolished and the post of Atholhuverin 
was appointed by the central government (Phadnis & Luithui, 1985). (Also see section 4.3.1) 
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During recent decades, centralisation has been evident mostly in the administration 
of the atolls. Until its abolition in November 2008, the Ministry of Atolls 
Development (MoAD) had overall responsibility for administering the atolls. That 
included socio-economic development as well as administration. As pointed out 
previously (section 5.2), each inhabited island was headed by a katheebu
85
, who 
reported to the state representative at each atoll, atholhuverin, who, in turn, reported 
to the minister. This long chain of command created bottlenecks which were 
considered to be one of the reasons for limited development in the atolls: often 
katheebu would be reluctant to take decisions unless these were authorised through 
the correct chain of command (Interviewee GO5). In this regard, Maloney (1980, p. 
185) recalls the following incident while visiting one island: 
 
On one occasion I wished to take a photo of a ceremony inside a mosque; I 
knew I could not go in, but wished to stand outside and take it. The mudimu 
said to ask the kuda katibu. The kuda katibu said to ask the katibu. The katibu 
said to ask the atoll office (on another island!). This was a new situation for 
them, and as they were completely beholden to the atoll office and Male‟, 
they would not make a decision.        
 
5.4.5 Inadequate performance management system. 
 
The fact that the personnel management function was a prerogative of the executive 
continually hindered the establishment of a merit-based system. It meant that there 
were a wide range of exceptions to the general rules in appointment, transfer, and 
promotion. This was because, in most cases, a minister personally made all 
important decisions on personnel management and acted as a “glorified human 
resource manager” (Interviewee GO5). Such practices were further complicated by a 
number of peculiarities in the administrative culture (see section 5.4.6). Firstly, a 
widespread conception existed that jobs in the public sector were given for life 
(Interviewee FO3). Such notions prevented the evolution of a performance-oriented 
public service because of the reluctance to sack the non-performers. As one 
                                               
85 From the recent past, katheebu (island headman) is appointed by the central government. Most 
islands have one or more kuda katheebu (assistant to the katheebu) as well. However, under the 
democratic reforms and with the election of councils to each island and each atoll, these traditional 
titles are now being phased out.   
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interviewee said, the Maldives did not have a culture of sacking staff or making them 
redundant (Interviewee FO6). Dismissals were very rare. Though a significant 
number of staff were transferred from one organisation to another, some of whom 
were given no job responsibilities, almost none were sacked and every individual 
was duly paid (Interviewee FO6). Secondly, the vested authority of personnel 
management under the control of political masters meant that pleasing the political 
appointees was the prime objective rather than improving job performance. Though 
job qualifications on the classification ladder were pre-determined, bypassing of 
those requirements was common.          
 
In the past, efforts to link performance to financial incentives had failed (Asim, 
2001). Introduction of a performance appraisal system in 1996 linked to annual 
salary increments was abandoned after three years as almost everyone was found to 
be eligible for the increment. A revamped appraisal system was introduced by the 
government in 2002. However, factors such as the absence of an independent CS, 
lack of political support, and lack of rewards were considered to be the prime 
reasons for a failure to institutionalise the new appraisal system (Faizal, 2005). From 
late 2003, promotions, at times with jumps of three or more levels, were handed to 
selected government employees. Consequently, calls to designate a CS independent 
from all political influences grew significantly.  
 
5.4.6 Administrative culture. 
 
The Maldivian Public Service reflects features usually evident in closely-knit 
communities. Most public servants know each other and are related through several 
means, such as neighbourliness, community activities, friendship or blood relations. 
Latheef (1993, p. 31) points out that, “the probability of one becoming some form of 
acquaintance with, or close relation to a key player in a given situation is many times 
greater in the Maldives than in most societies”. Close personal relations can be 
viewed through a positive lens: they can lead to cooperation in public life. As 
Zameer (1994) states, such closeness may be considered to be a facilitating force in 
bringing about better performance in public service. However, such connections can 
have negative effects as well: relationships can contribute to inefficiency and corrupt 
practices, and also make objective assessments in the work environment a difficult 
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task as managers are often reluctant to take action that may disappoint fellow staff 
(Asim, 2002).  
 
The inability of a government job to adequately support a family has created a 
culture where individuals are allowed to have multiple jobs, in many cases one 
within the government and another in the private sector. As mentioned in Chapter 
Four (section 4.3.2), such practices existed even in the legislature as well as the 
bureaucracy. Phadnis and Luithui (1985, p. 43) state, in the Maldives, “with virtually 
half the legislators being busy simultaneously in administrative work, the initiation 
and implementation of public policies get intertwined to a greater extent than it does 
in other states of South Asia”. As a result, the possibility of conflict of interest grows 
significantly. Complaints about some civil servants doing personal work during 
office hours are common (Interviewee PL1). It is also common for someone to go 
out on personal errands and take a lot of time to return to work (Interviewee PL1). 
This culture of wandering off from work during office hours hinders the creation of a 
professional public service. Over the years, such practices had magnified the need to 
create a professional CS where a civil servant will not have another job obligation to 
fulfill.  
 
5.4.7 Growth in public sector. 
 
The modernisation of the nation since gaining independence has predominantly been 
driven by the government. Mostly developments in the fisheries sector and the 
introduction of tourism in the 1970s created the need to strengthen the regulatory 
functions of the government. State services such as immigration, customs, tax 
collection and many other areas had to be strengthened and developed in order to 
keep pace with the developments in economy and international trade. The significant 
growth that the nation experienced since the early 1980s also contributed to the 
growth of the public sector (see figure 5.2). Consequently, expenditure on salaries 
and wages from the state budgets also increased substantially – from 13.6% in 1995 
(Maldives Monetary Authority, 2001, p. 44) to 33% in 2008 (International Monetary 
Fund, 2009, p. 14).   
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Figure 5.2: Growth of the public service 
 
Source: MPND (2005a, 2007b) 
Note: This figure shows the increase in the number of government employees in relations to the total 
working population (that is age 15 and above). Government Employees represent public servants prior 
to the establishment of the CS and other statutory organisations. The figures include both permanent 
and temporary government employees, expatriates hired by the government, and the government 
employees working at state owned enterprises.   
 
Apart from the expansion in the public service due to economic growth, many other 
specific factors contributed. Islandness was a factor: the geographical dispersion of 
the islands meant that each island community has had to function as a distinct 
administrative unit. The provision of all basic facilities such as school, hospital, 
mosque, judicial court, and administrative office in each and every island was 
considered to be a state function. The public expects the government to provide all 
services (Zameer, 1994, p. 32). Though privately built schools and mosques have 
been in existence for many decades, the responsibility of manning those 
organisations was often handed over to the government. All the basic personnel had 
to be employed despite not having adequate workloads as they had to serve a small 
population base (see table 4.1) in most cases (Interviewee FO2). Maldivians demand 
all such services in their own islands and are reluctant to travel to other islands to 
receive them (Interviewee GO7).   
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In addition to the basic services provided by the state, other sectors such as arts, 
sports, and culture, which are primarily served by CSOs in most countries, had to be 
spearheaded by the government in the Maldives. Especially during the infant stages 
in the development of these sectors, the government had to provide the facilities and 
personnel to operate the necessary activities. The extent of the burden on the 
government is also evident in that it is the government that has had to train and 
employ personnel to bury the dead on every island (Interviewee GO1). Supply of 
personnel to all corners of the nation to promote and operate all these activities and 
functions has also had a profound effect on the rise in numbers in public employment 
(Interviewee GO6).        
 
The high birth rate throughout the 1970s until the beginning of the new millennium 
(refer to figures 4.3 and 4.4) resulted in a significant jump in the number of school 
leavers during the 1980s and 1990s. Though the tourism sector was booming, the 
inability of that sector to absorb substantial numbers of school leavers, along with an 
inability to significantly develop other economic sectors gave rise to a potential leap 
in the unemployment rate. To avoid having a society with a large unemployed youth 
population, the government resorted to absorbing the majority of the school leavers 
into the public sector workforce. Though there was no apparent need for an increase 
in jobs in some public organisations, the government employed people to work in 
them regardless. The nation‟s social security system was weak with no universal 
pension
86
, social benefit, or mandatory retirement age. In such an environment, the 
employment provided by the government was seen as an indirect social benefit 
(Interviewees CV1, FO4, FO5, FO8, FO9). Wages from government employment 
were often used to support immediate and extended family members.  
 
                                               
86 The Maldives had an unusual combination of employment for life and a pension payable while still 
in service. The 1968 constitution guaranteed a pension of half of the basic salary for those who had 
served the government for a consecutive term of 20 years. Through regulations, this provision was 
extended to 40 years of consecutive service at which the person was entitled for a full basic salary as 
pension – once again while still in service. The 1998 constitution extended the provision for pension 
rights to all employees – public and private. This constitution referred to a future pension law. 
However, that law was not formulated until 2009. As a result, a pension was provided only to 
government employees – once again while still in service. The 20 years and 40 years on-the-service 
pension schemes were fully funded by the government budget without any contribution from the 
employee. This scheme was abandoned with the inception of the CS.    
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Especially in the island communities where economic activities were significantly 
limited, the provision of jobs as a social benefit created adverse effects. The 
employment of several members of a single family in various capacities in the island 
has been common practice. As a senior government official puts it, in some islands it 
is “like family-based rule systems” (Interviewee GO2) where the control of all or 
most of the island affairs lies with a single or few families (Interviewee FO3). It was 
also common for influential officials to use their authority to grant jobs to friends 
and relatives (Interviewee FO2). Recruitment based on favours rather than merit was 
common (Interviewee FO11).              
 
As indicated previously (section 5.4.5), the Maldives did not have a culture where 
redundant and non-performers were dismissed from the public payroll. It was 
relatively common, mostly in the outer islands, for some individuals to remain on the 
government payroll until they were deceased, despite their old age and inability to 
work (Faizal, 2005). The societal status of such individuals and the influence they 
held within the island communities meant that the government was eager to garner 
public support through such individuals. Such practices also contributed significantly 
to the high personnel cost.    
 
Yet another cause of the high rise in the numbers in public employment was the 
over-specialisation of tasks. The inability to develop professional public servants 
created an environment of following the job description to the letter. The reluctance 
or refusal by a significant proportion of public servants to undertake additional 
responsibilities, especially those that arose unexpectedly, forced employers to hire 
additional staff for those tasks. Furthermore, a lack of organisational planning in 
combining inter-related tasks was also considered a factor in the rise in the numbers 
in public employment. As one former senior official said, at a typical government 
department‟s reception, “you might find a person to receive the mail, another to open 
the mail, and another to record it” (Interviewee FO2, Aminath Nihan Translation).  
 
5.4.8 Towards a civil service. 
 
A significant move towards codifying the CS began with the deployment of two 
projects from 1981 to 1984. The first concentrated on improving the personnel 
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system, which included drafting a CS code and the formulation of a job classification 
and pay system; and the second focused on improving government organisation and 
administrative systems with specific emphasis on personnel administration 
(Norcross, 1984). Although rules and guidelines on these aspects had been evolving 
for years, these projects aimed to make them more comprehensive.  
 
One of the main outcomes of the early reform initiatives was establishment of the 
National Office of Personnel and Administrative Reform (NOPAR) on November 1, 
1982. NOPAR operated within the framework of the PO. This key organisation 
assumed a leadership role in introducing, fostering, and guiding administrative 
reform with sound personnel management in the CS (Norcross, 1984). The positive 
impact of these reforms was evident almost immediately. The WB reported in early 
1984 that under the aegis of NOPAR, an organisational restructuring resulted in a 
clear definition of responsibilities held, helping avoid duplication and enabling an 
adequate coordination of functions (WB, 1984).         
 
Over the next decades, various reform projects were launched. The projects focused 
on streamlining the government machinery, improving the personnel management 
system, creating a service-centered public service, and improving the performance 
management system. However, the impact of such reforms on establishing a 
professional public service was limited and there were also relative failures at times 
(Asim, 2001). Although the groundwork to establish a professional CS had been 
completed, there was a degree of reluctance to overcome the final hurdles to 
formulate a statutory CS. For instance, there was a lack of political will to press 
ahead with robust and vigorous reform recommendations to implement “best 
practice” in personnel management outlined under the numerous projects.     
 
The reforms of the 1980s and the 1990s did help develop fundamental areas of 
administration; but there was then a need to move forward into a different stage. The 
establishment of the Public Service Division (PSD) in 1999 was the response. This 
organisation was created after NOPAR was disestablished in the early 1990s. The 
PSD also operated within the framework of the PO. The new organisation conducted 
several seminars, workshops, and training programmes on modern public service 
reform initiatives such as strategic planning, customer service, human resource 
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development planning, financial management reform, leadership, change 
management, and knowledge management (Alam & Jasimuddin 2006, p. 29). 
Though not all these reform initiatives are considered a success (Alam & Jasimuddin 
2006, p. 65; Asim 2001), significant improvements were visible such as a greater 
focus on customer service, better planning, and records management. Through the 
PSD, vital changes were being implemented in the public service that eventually led 
to a transition towards a statutory CS.   
 
By the start of the twenty-first century, comprehensive regulations governing 
government employees were in place. Most aspects of the regulations have seen 
incremental changes over the years. The Government Employees‟ Regulation of 
2000 published by the PSD covered all aspects governing the affairs of personnel 
management and general rules. Some of the main areas covered in the Regulation 
include: a code of conduct; procedures for recruitment, appointment, transfer, 
dismissal, and rewards for permanent and temporary employees; disciplinary 
measures; procedures for training and service bonds; and record keeping procedures 
(PO, 2000). Regardless of such extensive regulations, a high degree of centralisation 
existed with PSD authorisation needed on most aspects relating to government 
employees. Thus, until the inception of the CSC, the PO continued to oversee the 
management of government personnel.  
 
One important aspect, a grievance mechanism, was lacking in the 2000 Regulation. 
As a general rule, anyone could appeal directly to the president in writing and could 
submit a case to the civil court. Although such provisions have remained for many 
years, court cases on employment-related issues were rare due to reasons such as 
lack of awareness of legal rights, high legal fees, and too few lawyers. As a result, 
the existing grievance handling mechanism was considered inadequate to uphold the 
rights of public employees. 
 
Though recommendations were made as early as 1979 to change the administrative 
structure to accommodate a statutory CS (Banerjee, 1979), the provisions of the 1968 
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law
87
 (see section 5.3) remained until the inception of the CS Act. Until then, the 
reluctance of the government to provide proper institutional status and functional 
autonomy to the CS was seen by some as an attempt to maintain political control 
over government officials (Interviewee FO3). This ultimately led to the formulation 
of the CS through “revolutionary” means (Interviewee GO4). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the Maldives have had a functional government for 
centuries. It is safe to speculate that Maldivians had contact with modes of 
governance and practices from other nations for several centuries, resulting in some 
borrowing from Arab countries and the South Asian neighbours particularly in the 
detailed regulation of bureaucratic life. However, in the absence of colonial 
imposition of a foreign system of government, the locals borrowed only those 
features which they saw as being compatible with the Maldivian way of 
administration. Smallness and islandness was factors that contributed in such 
developments. Hence several writers have declared that it was a locally evolved 
system. One interviewee said, “it's a pot of bits and pieces that are brought from 
various systems” (Interviewee FO7).  
 
With the developments of the last half of the twentieth century, the rulers of the 
country had several opportunities to establish a professional CS and there was an 
increasingly detailed codification of the administration of government employment, 
but within the principle of virtually absolute presidential discretion. Thus, arguably, 
the desire to exercise political control over the public service along with the 
inadequate strategies of the government compounded by an inadequate 
administrative culture resulted in an unproductive, unprofessional, and politically-
driven public service. As a result, once democracy dawned on the nation, reform of 
the state administration was a key demand, especially by the public service frustrated 
with mismanagement practices. Establishment of a statutory CS thus became one of 
the components of the democratic reform agenda. Significant progress on the CS 
                                               
87 Amendments were brought to the law in 1990 to grant greater responsibilities to the ministers and 
senior public servants (Article 7-9). However, at the implementation level, only insignificant changes 
were observed following those amendments.  
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reform began in October 2005 when a parliamentarian aligned with the government 
submitted a CS bill. The next chapter focuses on the formulation of the CS model in 
the Maldives.   
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CHAPTER 6: FORMULATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE MODEL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Establishment of a statutory CS with autonomy from the political executive in 
matters of employment is a new initiative in the history of public affairs in the 
Maldives. Chapter Four covers the drivers of democratisation and argues that it was 
democratisation that made the CS reform a “necessity”. Chapter Five traces the 
history of the formalisation of public employment but stops before an analysis of the 
specific drivers of the CS Act. This chapter continues from that point onward and 
examines the route of the CS bill to the adopted Maldivian Civil Service Model.   
 
As mentioned in the first chapter (section 1.5.2), most nations in contemporary times 
opt to define the scope, parameters, values, and responsibilities of the CS in law. By 
using the terms “civil service model” and “civil service system” interchangeably, this 
chapter aims to present the route towards the formulation of a CS Act and the main 
aspects of the CS model (based on the Act and the regulations) adopted in the 
Maldives, including possible influences from overseas nations during the process. In 
this regard, a structured narrative of the process in the legislature that led to the 
enactment of a law governing the CS in the Maldives is presented. The analysis 
draws on the explanations of policy development processes and doctrines of the CS 
in a polity that was discussed in Chapter Two (sections 2.4 and 2.6). The analysis 
reveals that the Maldivian CS Model is a combination of three main forces: 1) the 
rule-based culture that was inherited prior to the establishment of the statutory CS, 2) 
the intense political environment present during the passing of the bill that opted for 
a model that is relatively independent of the political executive, and 3) overseas 
practices and models of CS.      
 
The chapter is divided into eight main sections. The first section outlines the 
submission of the bill to the parliament, followed by identification of the main actors 
significantly impacting the policy decisions shaping the bill. The third section 
presents the amendments proposed to the bill. Sections four and five provide the 
rationale for support of the bill from both opposition and government through to its 
enactment. The processes followed in passing the bill are outlined in section six. The 
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seventh section presents the CS model of the Maldives. The last section examines 
possible influences from overseas CS systems during the formulation of the 
Maldivian Civil Service Model. The chapter concludes by summarising the CS 
model of the Maldives.  
     
6.2 Submission of a civil service bill 
 
As examined in the previous chapter, regardless of the existence of a statutory CS 
per se, the institutional setup of a CS has been developing in the Maldives for the last 
few decades. The political reforms that started to sweep through the nation were 
particularly aimed at constraining the powers of the political executive; both 
government and opposition saw a statutory CS that was relatively independent of the 
political executive as an element of these changes. As one interviewee said, “as soon 
as we had liberal democracy and specific cadre of politicians, we needed 
independent people who would run the government irrespective of who is in power” 
(Interviewee FO8).   
 
Though political reforms were initiated towards the end of 2003, and the government 
acknowledged the importance of a CS, a government bill did not materialise for 
submission to the parliament. This was despite the PSD working on drafting a CS 
bill during 2004 and 2005. Such delays on the part of the government prompted 
Ahmed Nazim, the MP from Mulaku Atoll, to submit a public bill to the parliament 
himself. Although it was not an official government bill, it had some support within 
the government. The co-sponsor of the bill was Ahmed Thasmeen Ali, the MP from 
Baa Atoll, who was also the Minister of Home Affairs during that period. Ahmed 
Nazim was within the ruling party and soon after submitting the bill, on October 30, 
2005, he was appointed as the Minister of State for Higher Education, Employment, 
and Social Security.  
 
At the time of submission of the CS bill, private member bills were rare in the 
Maldivian polity. Although MPs could submit their own bills, the firm grip by the 
government on the legislature ensured that almost all bills were submitted by the 
government itself. This trend started to change by the liberalisation movement and 
the election of a new majlis in early 2005 that included several opposition members. 
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As the influence of opposition MPs grew, the ruling party was eager to occupy the 
time slots allocated for private member bills, which at that time were being used 
mostly by opposition MPs (Interviewee FO4). As the CS bill was submitted by a 
faction of senior officials within the ruling elite, openly opposing the bill was not an 
option for the government. The first reading of the bill was held on October 27, 
2005.      
 
The submission of a CS bill was described as timely and necessary by most 
parliamentarians. Prior to the debate, the speaker acknowledged receiving a petition 
on June 19, 2005, signed by a number of senior government officials demanding the 
establishment of a CS independent of the political executive. The need was amplified 
with the introduction of political parties in June 2005 (Interviewees CV1, FO7, FO8, 
GO4, GO5, GO6). During the submission speech, Nazim reiterated the importance 
of having an independent CS in a multi-party political environment. On November 
14, 2005, the second day of the first reading, parliament voted to send the bill to the 
social committee of the parliament.  
   
6.3 Policy actors 
 
The actors involved during the formulation of the bill as well as during the course of 
the bill in the parliament were limited in number. No public consultation on the bill 
was undertaken. During the submission speech on October 27, 2005, Ahmed Nazim 
said:  
 
Although the legal drafting of this bill is quite similar to the bills submitted by 
the government, I would like to mention that no government contribution was 
involved in drafting of the bill. Although I unofficially approached the 
government to submit comments on the bill, the government did not respond. 
(Nazim, 2005a, translation)  
 
According to him, a number of lawyers were involved in drafting of the bill (Nazim, 
2005a).   
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From November 14, 2005 to December 11, 2006, the bill passed through the 
parliamentary committee stage. Before the committee started to debate the bill, a 
new regulation of parliamentary procedures came into effect which required the bill 
to be passed on to the National Development Committee
88
. From July 16, 2006 a 
total of 29 committee meetings were held until a report was finalised on December 
11, 2006. During this period, technical personnel from the PSD attended the 
parliamentary committee to answer questions. The PO also sent written comments to 
the parliament on November 27, 2006. The report compiled by the committee and 
the amendments to the bill were submitted to the parliament floor on December 19, 
2006. The chairperson also revealed that public opinion on the bill was sought 
through CSOs (Shareef, 2006). However, there was not much consultation with 
government employees (Interviewee FO11) affected by the legislation.  
     
6.4 Amendments to the civil service bill 
 
There were some significant changes to the bill between the original proposal and 
the final outcome, particularly seeking to maintain the principle of neutral 
competence and the political neutrality of the CS. How these aspects were viewed 
from the perspective of the opposition and the government is outlined from sections 
6.5 to 6.7. Section 6.8 examines the CS model of the Maldives that covers principles 
such as neutral competence and political neutrality.    
 
Amendments to the CS bill were proposed in two phases. During the first phase, the 
main changes brought during the committee stage include changes initiated by the 
committee and changes proposed by the PO. In the second phase, MPs submitted 
amendments during the second reading of the bill (that was after the committee 
submitted the revised bill to the floor). These changes were submitted in the 
parliamentary sessions of December 19, 2006 and March 7, 2007. 
 
                                               
88 The Committee comprised seven MPs: North Ari Atoll MP Ahmed Zubair; South Ari Atoll MP 
Abdul Muhsin Abdulla; South Nilandhe Atoll MP Ahmed Nashid; South Nilandhe Atoll MP Ahmed 
Siyam Mohamed; Addu Atoll MP Ibrahim Shareef; North Miladhunmathi MP Mohamed Hussain; 
South Huvadhu Atoll MP Ahmed Zahir.  
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6.4.1 Functions of civil service commission. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (section 2.3.3), the CS is usually defined by its 
functions, methods of appointment, legal status, and scope. The extent of such 
parameters can vary across countries. The CSC in the Maldives were to be given 
wide-ranging functions and powers regarding the CS. Specifying the functions 
explicitly in legislation were thus considered important.  
 
The functions of the CSC as stated in the bill include the management of personnel 
for the entire CS (including appointment, dismissal, transfer, and setting salaries), 
regulation of the CS (including regulation for personnel management and code of 
conduct) and investigation of grievances of civil servants. One of the amendments 
proposed by the PO was to split these functions after the establishment of the CS so 
that the CSC retains only the management of the personnel function. The reason 
stated by the PO for such a split was:  
 
to confer good governance, these three roles should operate independently. 
….it might be difficult to make such a distinction at the beginning of the 
implementation of the Act. So a proposal can be submitted to the majlis after a 
specified time following the establishment of the commission. (PO Letter, 
2006, translation) 
 
In other words, the PO suggested continuing with the combined functions in the 
initial phase of the CSC, but to submit an amendment to the majlis later, to assign 
each function to a distinct authority. The PO did not specify who should be 
responsible for the roles that could be removed from the CSC. The committee did 
not accept the suggestion from the PO, arguably because it felt the government was 
attempting to keep one or more functions of the CS within the control of the 
president. Due to the comprehensive political reforms that were underway during 
that period, opposition MPs especially, were not willing to grant the government 
such a leverage to segregate the functions of the CS.  
 
Table 6.1 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome regarding the 
functions of the CSC. 
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Table 6.1: Functions of the Civil Service Commission 
Original proposal in 
the bill 
Changes proposed 
by the PO 
Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Personnel 
management of the 
CS, regulating the 
CS, grievance 
handling. 
Retain personnel 
management 
function at the CSC 
and move the other 
two functions to 
separate 
organisations. 
Reject the proposal 
of the PO and retain 
the original 
arrangements in the 
bill. 
As proposed in the 
bill.  
 
6.4.2 Scope of civil service. 
 
Beyond the general principle that officials exercise the legal authority of the state, 
classical Weberian bureaucracy does not offer any more specific guidance on what 
public organisations should be included in the scope of the CS. The initial drafters of 
the Maldivian CS bill did not have strict preferences on this aspect and relied, to 
some extent, on how other countries determined the scope of their CS (see section 
6.9). They also relied on the past organisational arrangements in the Maldives where 
the government had provided most welfare services (see section 5.4.7). However, 
determining the scope of the Maldivian CS turned out to be the most contentious 
issue in the parliament. 
 
Rather than defining scope of the CS by identifying the organisations and posts to be 
included in it, article 3 of the bill listed the organisations and posts that were to be 
excluded, thereby implying that all other state organisations and posts were part of 
the CS.  
 
This list was the focus of the battle over the scope of the CS. Opposition MPs were 
adamant about minimising its exclusions because they wanted to leave as few public 
employees as possible subject to more direct political control.   
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The most contentious point was the exclusion of heads of island offices (katheebu) 
from the CS in the original bill. Among the many voices against such exclusion, 
Hassan Afeef, the MP from Kolhumadulu, said: 
 
At the moment, the heads of the island offices work under a ministry and 
follow their instructions, which is why I do not believe they can be exempted 
from civil service. But if they are elected positions, as the Maldivian people 
wish, then for sure, they will not be part of the civil service. (Afeef, 2005, 
translation) 
 
Exclusion of the police force from the CS also proved to be controversial because, as 
stated in Chapter Four (section 4.3.3), it was only in 2004 that police were separated 
from the military and made a “civilian” force. There was a growing fear among the 
MPs that the government was attempting to politicise the police
89
 by exempting them 
from the CS Act.  
 
Yet another highly debated issue was the exclusion of political advisers from the CS. 
Afeef (2005) stated in the parliamentary debates, such appointments could be quite 
extensive and the CS could be distorted if the responsibilities of these political 
advisers coincided with the work of the CS. Government eventually gave in to most 
opposition demands as it had other mechanisms at its disposal to make political 
appointments once the new constitution came into place.  
 
Questions were also raised regarding the inclusion of judges
90
 (except the chief 
justice who was excluded under article 42(a) of the constitution – see tables 4.2, 6.2) 
within the scope of the CS (Hussain, 2006). The system of government to be 
enshrined in the new constitution – presidentialism or parliamentarism, was not yet 
determined (see sections 4.3.3 and 6.7). Whatever the future form of government, all 
judges were expected to be independent of the political executive, an issue that was 
                                               
89 At the time of CS bill, a separate Police Act did not exist. A Police Act came into operation from 
August 5, 2008. Under the Act, police officers are not part of the CS.  
90 A CS that includes officials such as judges and police would be consistent with the principle of 
including all those who exercise public authority. However, it raises another principle – that there are 
some matters on which the civil servant is accountable to the law but not subject to the discretion of a 
minister.  
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not addressed in the bill. As the issue of judges was not addressed appropriately, it 
eventually turned out to be problematic for the government (see section 7.4.1).  
 
The final outcome on specifying the scope of the CS was predominantly a political 
decision based on compromise among the MPs after the government gave in to most 
of the opposition demands. Table 6.2 summarises the changes to the CS bill during 
the different stages.  
 
Table 6.2: Changes to the scope of civil service 
Original proposal in 
the bill 
Changes proposed 
by the PO 
Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Positions excluded 
from the CS: 1) 
positions appointed 
and dismissed by the 
president as per 
section 42 (a) of the 
constitution
91
; 2) 
deputy ministers; 3) 
secretary general of 
parliament; 4) retired 
state dignitaries; 5) 
the Maldivian army; 
6) police; 7) head of 
island offices; 8) 
employees of state 
enterprises; and 9) 
assistants, advisers, 
and public relation 
officers of the posts 
mentioned in 1, 2, 
and 3.  
In addition to deputy 
ministers, include a 
general provision 
where other posts 
that are designated 
as equivalent to the 
post of deputy 
minister are 
excluded from the 
CS. 
Committee decided 
to remove numbers 
3, 4, 6, 7, and 9 from 
the original list. 
They also added two 
more to the list: 
executive secretary 
to the president and 
positions excluded 
from the CS by any 
other law. 
Committee also 
rejected the 
amendment proposed 
by the PO.  
Positions excluded 
from the CS: 1) 
positions appointed 
and dismissed by the 
president as per 
section 42 (a) of the 
constitution; 2) 
deputy ministers; 3) 
executive secretary 
to the president; 4) 
the Maldivian army; 
5) employees of state 
enterprises ; and 6) 
positions excluded 
from the CS by any 
other law. 
                                               
91 Reference is made here to the 1998 constitution. Under article 42 (a), the president shall have the 
power for appointment and removal from office in accordance with the constitution, of the vice-
president, chief justice, speaker and deputy speaker of the people‟s majlis, ministers, attorney general, 
representatives sent abroad with special privileges on behalf of the state of the Maldives, atoll chiefs, 
judges, auditor-general, and commissioner of elections.   
167 
 
6.4.3 Qualifications and term limits of the civil service commissioners. 
 
Qualifications and term limits of commissioners
92
 also vary from country to country 
and no universal standard is evident. The Maldivian CS bill initially specified that 
the commissioners should have achieved higher education in the field of public 
administration and gained experience in that field (Civil Service Bill, 2005, Article 
10b). However, it did not specify the minimum academic qualification or any detail 
on how to measure the level of experience. At the time of the bill, it was believed 
that only a few Maldivians had any higher education in public administration. As a 
result, the PO proposed changing the requirement to include minimum experience of 
ten years in a managerial position after completion of a bachelor‟s degree, 
irrespective of the field (PO Letter, 2006). This opened the door for professionals 
from all fields to apply for the post of commissioners.  
 
Initially, the bill provided for the commissioners to be appointed for a maximum of 
two terms of five years each (Civil Service Bill, 2005, Article 13). The PO suggested 
that since the bill specified procedures to remove
93
 the commissioners, there was 
little need to impose a maximum term limit and suggested including a provision 
where the commissioners could be re-instated every five years without a specific 
term limit
94
 (PO Letter, 2006). The committee accepted the recommendation and 
included it in the amended bill that was presented to the majlis floor on December 
19, 2006. Subsequently, Abbas Ibrahim, MP for Huvadhu Atoll Dhekunuburi, 
submitted an amendment to limit the membership to two terms. This amendment 
failed during the voting on March 27, 2007.  
                                               
92 According to the CS Act that was originally passed by the majlis, members of the CSC were to be 
appointed by the president with the consent of the majlis. In the event the majlis rejected a candidate, 
the president had to send a replacement name. When the CSC commissioners were first appointed in 
2007, the majlis rejected several candidates and the president had to send a total of 21 candidates in 
three rounds. A total of five commissioners were appointed.  
93 Provisions for removal of commissioners were given in article 11 of the CS bill. According to it, 
commissioners should be removed from the post by the president if the majlis votes to remove a 
commissioner. Also the president should remove a commissioner when he/she no longer fulfils the 
qualifications of the commissioners mentioned in the bill or becomes bankrupt.  
94 Not imposing a maximum of two term limit appears to be contradictory to the 2008 constitution 
that came after the CS was established. Article 183 of the constitution states that “A member of the 
Civil Service Commission shall be appointed for one term of five years. The People‟s Majlis can 
approve the renewal of the appointment for an additional term of not more than five years”. Though 
CSC has recommended to the majlis to amend the Act to align it with the constitution, the majlis has 
so far not attended to this matter. 
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Another recommendation put to parliament was reduction of the minimum age of the 
commissioners from 35 to 30 years (A. Ahmed, 2005; Didi, 2005). The justification 
for the proposed change was that a significant majority of the population was below 
the age of 30 (see figure 4.4). This change was not deemed controversial and the 
committee agreed.   
 
Table 6.3 summarises the changes during the different stages. 
 
Table 6.3: Changes to the qualifications and term limits of commissioners 
Original 
proposal in the 
bill 
Changes 
proposed by the 
PO 
Changes made 
by the 
committee 
Proposals 
during the 
second reading  
Final outcome 
Appointed by 
the president 
with the consent 
of the majlis. 
Commissioners 
should have 
acquired higher 
education in the 
field of public 
administration 
and gained 
experience in 
the field. 
Maximum of 
two terms with 
five years each.  
Change the 
qualifications: 
work in a 
managerial 
position for 
more than ten 
years after 
completion of 
bachelor‟s 
degree. Also 
remove the 
maximum term 
limits. 
Committee 
accepted the 
changes 
proposed by the 
PO and thereby 
removed the 
original 
qualifications in 
the bill and the 
maximum term 
limits. They 
also added 
detail process 
on how the 
president gets 
the consent of 
majlis.  
Set a maximum 
term limit of 
two terms, five 
years each. 
Reduce the 
minimum age 
of the 
commissioners 
from 35 to 30 
years.  
Changes made 
by the 
committee were 
approved. Age 
limit of 
commissioners 
was also 
reduced to a 
minimum of 30 
years.  No 
maximum term 
limits for the 
commissioners. 
 
 
6.4.4 Retirement age. 
 
One of the key features in classical Weberian bureaucracy is the expectation that the 
civil servant be employed within the CS until retirement, subject to adequate 
performance. Although many countries have a mandatory retirement age, the 
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Maldives was an exception. Consequently, introduction of a mandatory retirement 
age for the Maldivian CS became the most sensitive issue during the debates of the 
CS bill, mainly because it was a new concept for a society accustomed to the idea 
that civil servants held their job for life.  
 
As well as unlimited tenure, government employees could receive a pension while 
still in service. Although the 1998 constitution referred to a future pension law that 
would cover both the public and private sector staff, this law did not exist during the 
time of the CS bill. The CS bill proposed to introduce a mandatory retirement age 
and a government pension upon retirement. Government argued that a pension law 
had to come in before such provisions could be included in the CS bill. So the 
government recommended just a reference to a future pension law in the proposed 
amendments to the CS bill and introducing mandatory retirement only after the 
pension law came into effect (PO Letter, 2006). Aneesa Ahmed, MP and a senior 
government official at that time said:  
 
We should ensure that someone who has served the people for most of their 
life must be made to retire only after adequate measures are taken so that the 
living standard of the person does not fall. In my opinion retiring someone 
without such measures will be very unfair. (A. Ahmed, 2005, translation)  
 
Removal of the provision for a retirement age was adamantly rejected by the sponsor 
of the bill. Nazim said:  
 
We should aim to establish a viable social security system so that the retirees 
receive a good benefit. Due to our current political environment and the 
reforms underway, I do not believe we should delay the establishment of civil 
service until such a social security system is formulated. (Nazim, 2005b, 
translation) 
 
Faced with growing support among the MPs for a maximum retirement age, the 
government eventually agreed to accommodate it. However, as discussed in the next 
chapter (section 7.4.3), the government made attempts after the ratification of the CS 
bill, to delay the retirement of civil servants.  
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Table 6.4 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome regarding the 
retirement age.  
 
Table 6.4: Retirement age 
Original proposal in 
the bill 
Changes proposed 
by the PO 
Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Set the voluntary 
retirement age at 55 
years and mandatory 
retirement age at 65 
years. 
Remove reference to 
a specific retirement 
age. Provide 
reference to 
retirement in a 
proposed pension 
law. 
Reject the proposal 
of the PO and retain 
the original 
arrangements in the 
bill. 
As proposed in the 
bill. 
   
6.4.5 Political participation. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.3.15), determining the exact extent of 
political participation of civil servants is a contentious issue. In the Maldives, 
government was often accused of using government employees for political gains 
(see section 6.5). Some government employees were also accused of being 
politically active. In such an environment, calls to establish a CS independent of 
political influences were widely welcomed and the policy makers opted to restrict 
political participation of civil servants with the aim of establishing a politically 
neutral CS.  
 
Initially, the CS bill was silent regarding political participation of civil servants. 
However, the PO suggested adding an article to the Act to designate a group of civil 
servants to be determined by the CSC to be restricted from political participation 
(PO Letter, 2006). The committee amended it to state that all civil servants should 
refrain from all political participation, probably because MPs believed that this was 
necessary for a politically neutral CS. No further amendment to the article was 
submitted from the parliament floor. As a result, it passed unopposed and 
uncontested. However, to strengthen the definition of “political activities” in article 
97 of the bill (see section 6.8.11), Hassan Afeef, submitted an amendment that would 
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have barred civil servants from membership of political parties. This amendment 
failed during the voting on March 27, 2007. Nevertheless, the Act specifically stated 
that “no employee of the Maldivian Civil Service shall participate in any political 
activity” (Article 53). These restrictions were broadly supported by the opposition 
who frequently accused government employees of political activism.  
 
The ramification of this article was felt as soon as the CSC was established and 
especially after the 2008 constitution was ratified. Legal challenges on the complete 
ban on civil servants‟ participation in political activities were mounted as some 
viewed as it as restricting their civil rights. These issues are further discussed in 
Chapter Seven (section 7.3.1) where the interactions between the CS model and 
democratisation are examined. 
 
Another issue addressed was the provision for civil servants standing for political 
office. The bill stated that any civil servant standing for political office had to resign 
three months prior to election date. However, the PO suggested changing this to 
three months leave before the election date. The justification given was that not all 
candidates standing for political office would do so successfully and so it would be 
more appropriate to apply for special leave rather than to resign (PO Letter, 2006). 
Rather than relaxing the provision, the committee chose to tighten it by stating that 
candidates should resign six months before an election. This latter proposal 
eventually got passed. However, as discussed in the next chapter (section 7.4.3), 
once again, amendments were proposed later to relax this provision.  
     
Table 6.5 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome in the bill in 
regard to political participation.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
Table 6.5: Political participation 
Original 
proposal in the 
bill 
Changes 
proposed by the 
PO 
Changes made 
by the 
committee 
Proposals 
during the 
second reading  
Final outcome 
No specific 
reference to 
political 
participation of 
civil servants. 
However, CS 
candidates for 
political office 
to resign three 
months before 
election date. 
Designate a 
group of civil 
servants to be 
determined by 
the CSC to be 
restricted from 
political 
participation. 
Candidates for 
political office 
to apply for a 
leave of three 
months before 
election date.  
Widen the PO 
proposal so that 
all civil servants 
should refrain 
from all political 
participation. 
Candidates for 
political office 
to resign six 
months before 
election date. 
Restrict civil 
servants from 
membership in 
political parties.  
All civil 
servants should 
refrain from all 
political 
activities. No 
restriction on 
membership in 
political 
parties. 
Candidates for 
political office 
to resign six 
months before 
election date. 
 
6.4.6 Appointment of permanent secretary. 
 
The highest ranked civil servant often acts as the link between the political masters 
and the CS at the organisation level. In some countries the highest ranked civil 
servant is called the Permanent Secretary (PS). The relationship between the PS and 
the political appointees can be crucial for effective organisational functioning. For 
such a relationship to be established and maintained, in some countries, the minister 
has a say in appointing the PS.  
 
This provision was also initially made in the Maldivian CS bill. According to article 
59(a), permanent secretaries should be appointed by the CSC after consultation with 
the minister responsible for the ministry. However, the PO asserted that a 
requirement to consult contradicts the de-politicisation efforts of CS and would run 
counter to the principle of depoliticising the CS (PO Letter, 2006). As the PO‟s 
proposed amendment was consistent with the objectives of MPs – particularly those 
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of the opposition – to reduce political control of the CS as much as possible, the 
committee accepted it.  
 
Table 6.6 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome regarding the 
appointment of PS. 
 
Table 6.6: Appointment of permanent secretary 
Original proposal in 
the bill 
Changes proposed 
by the PO 
Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Appoint PS after 
consultation with the 
minister. 
Remove provision 
for consultation with 
the minister
95
. 
Accepted changes 
proposed by the PO. 
PS to be appointed 
by the CSC.  
 
6.4.7 Senior executive service.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (section 2.3.9), a distinct category of the CS can be a 
senior CS or a senior executive service (SES). Such a category often involves “an 
elite, professionalized, service-wide corps” (Nunberg, 1992, p. 26).   
 
Establishment of a SES, a new concept for the Maldives, was also initially included 
in the Maldivian CS bill. The intention was to create a service that was able to: 
provide professional expertise; provide management and policy advice; foster co-
ordination among government offices; and be exemplary in following the code of 
conduct (Civil Service Bill, 2005). The framers of the bill probably envisaged a 
highly professional group of senior civil servants that could be used across the CS to 
instill a greater work ethic and professionalism on the entire CS. However, probably 
contrary to the concept of creating a “super-class” that would have extra privileges 
and benefits, the SES was to be part of the CS and subject to the same rules as other 
civil servants.    
 
                                               
95  As mentioned in the next chapter (section 7.4.3), the PO later suggested reversing this 
recommendation thereby including a say by political head of the organisation while appointing the 
PS.  
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Due to the concerns
96
 raised by the PSD that there could be relatively few personnel 
qualified for an SES, the entire concept was removed from the bill during the 
committee stage (Nazim, 2006). Removal of these provisions from the bill did not 
raise any concerns in the majlis. These changes meant that there would be one 
unified CS in the Maldives.    
 
Table 6.7 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome regarding 
SES.       
 
Table 6.7: Senior executive service 
Original proposal in the bill Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Establish a SES to provide professional 
expertise; provide management and policy 
advice; foster co-ordination among government 
offices; and be exemplary in following the code 
of conduct. Head of overseas missions to be 
chosen from SES. 
Remove the entire 
concept of SES. 
No SES. 
 
6.4.8 Public service minister. 
 
A minister responsible for the CS can also be an important aspect in linking the CS 
to the political executive. An entire chapter in the Maldivian CS bill was dedicated to 
outlining the responsibilities of the public service minister, including advising the 
CSC on the implementation of the Act. As mentioned previously (section 6.4.6), the 
view held by most MPs was to limit political control over the CS as much as 
possible. Abdullah Shahid, MP and a senior government official at that time, said, “I 
wonder if the authority of the commission could be diminished if we have a minister 
and a chairperson of the commission. So we should prevent any contradictions” 
(Shahid, 2005, translation). The appointment of a cabinet minister responsible for the 
CS was, therefore, seen as a possible route whereby the president could exert 
authority to politicise the CS. As a result, to ensure the integrity of the commission 
                                               
96
 The PSD did not raise this issue in writing. It is believed such concerns were raised informally.  
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the entire chapter on the public service minister and any reference to the minister in 
the bill was removed by the committee (Shareef, 2006).  
 
Table 6.8 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome on the 
provision for a public service minister. 
 
Table 6.8: Public service minister 
Original proposal in the bill Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Provision of a public service minister 
to advise the CSC in the 
implementation of the Act. 
Remove the entire 
chapter. 
No provision for a minister 
responsible for the CS. 
 
6.4.9 Civil service tribunal. 
 
A mechanism where decisions regarding civil servants can legally be challenged can 
be important for natural justice. The Maldivian CS bill made provision for a CS 
tribunal. The bill contained the composition of the tribunal, appointment/dismissal 
procedures for its members and its authority.  
 
On July 13, 2006, while the CS bill was in the parliamentary committee, the 
government submitted an employment bill
97
 to the parliament. The employment bill 
contained a similar provision of an employment tribunal. Since the employment bill 
covered both public and private sector employment, the committee decided to scrap 
the CS tribunal as the employment tribunal could cater for all employment 
grievances (Nazim, 2006). The committee also felt that having two separate tribunals 
may lead to different criteria in judgments between civil servants or other workers 
(Shareef, 2006). Having a single tribunal was also believed to be a cheaper option. 
The grievance management process is discussed later in this chapter (section 6.8.14) 
where the Maldivian CS model is discussed.  
                                               
97 The bill passed and was ratified on May 26, 2008. Civil Service Act predates the Employment Act. 
The Employment Act covered both the private and the public sector. Civil service also came under the 
jurisdiction of the Employment Act. The only exclusion from the Employment Act was the police, 
armed forces, and any other organisation exempted by another statute (Provisions of the Employment 
Act that relates to the CS is presented in section 6.8.2 – material scope of CS).   
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Table 6.9 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome regarding the 
CS tribunal.   
 
Table 6.9: Civil service tribunal 
Original proposal in the bill Changes made by the 
committee 
Final outcome 
Provision for a quasi-judiciary 
tribunal appointed by the president. 
Decisions of the tribunal could be 
appealed at the High Court.  
Remove the entire 
chapter due to the 
provision of an 
employment tribunal 
in the employment 
bill.  
No provision for a separate 
tribunal for the CS. 
Provisions for civil servants 
to submit complaints to 
employment tribunal if they 
are dissatisfied with the 
decision of the CSC. 
 
6.4.10 Transition period. 
 
The Maldivian CS bill had a provision of six months as a transition period (Civil 
Service Bill, 2005, Article 92a). This period was intended to provide the CSC 
adequate time to complete implementation of all aspects of the statutory CS. The PO 
proposed increasing the transition period to three years because the Act would bring 
fundamental changes to the personnel functions and six months would be too short 
for all the aspects of the Act to be implemented (PO Letter, 2006). However, 
considering the volatile political environment at the time and possible opposition to 
such an extended transition period, as a compromise the committee recommended a 
one year transition period. Opposition MPs expressed their disappointment in what 
they perceived as the government‟s attempt to delay the formation of the statutory 
CS. An amendment proposed by Ahmed Hamza, MP from Nilandhe Atoll 
Uthuruburi, to reduce the transition period from one year to six months failed during 
the voting held on March 27, 2007. Regardless of such setbacks, opposition MPs 
urged the government not to delay formation of the CS by using the full transition 
period. Ultimately the bill passed with a one year transition period effective from the 
date of ratification of the bill.  
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Table 6.10 summarises the proposed amendments and the final outcome regarding 
the transition period.   
 
Table 6.10: Transition period 
Original 
proposal in the 
bill 
Changes 
proposed by 
the PO 
Changes made 
by the 
committee 
Proposals during 
the second 
reading  
Final outcome 
Maximum of 
six months to 
implement all 
aspects of the 
bill. 
Extend six 
month period 
to three years.  
Set one year for 
implementation 
of all aspects of 
the bill.  
Change 
committee 
recommendation 
to original period 
mentioned in the 
bill.  
One year set for 
implementation 
of all aspects of 
the Act.  
 
6.5 Opposition support for the bill 
 
Opposition MPs openly welcomed the CS bill (Maldives parliamentary debates, 
2005). Though they did not have a majority in the majlis, they pushed for the bill to 
pass speedily through the parliamentary stage. There were two widely stated 
arguments by the opposition MPs in support of the bill:  
 
1. President Gayoom was allegedly using government employees to consolidate 
his powers, most visibly in the islands. Therefore, the CS should be given 
autonomy from the political executive in matters of employment for an 
opposition party to have a fair opportunity to win elections.  
2. A neutral and competent CS was needed, which would implement the 
policies of the government of the day.   
 
The latter is a classic argument for having a CS as an independent institution, which 
is an implicit bargain between different political factions each of which assumes that 
it will spend time both in and out of the government. However, some argued that, 
because democratic reforms were in their infant stages during the time of this bill, 
the opposition was supporting the bill not on some basic philosophy of governance, 
but simply to curtail any authority of the incumbent president.  
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The main opposition party during the period of the CS bill, MDP, won the first 
democratic presidential election in 2008 and came to power. In arguing that MDP 
pushed the CS bill simply to curtail the powers of the then President Gayoom, one 
interviewee pointed out, “the current government98 never ever thought they would be 
able to come into power. They wanted to make things difficult for the government of 
that time” (Interviewee FO11). Evidently, parliamentary discussions and the 
amendments proposed to the CS bill by MPs aligned with MDP focused mainly on 
widening the scope of the CS and limiting presidential powers rather than the overall 
framework of the CS bill. Furthermore, the opposition also made compromises on 
some aspects of the bill and they were in general satisfied with the final outcome as 
it removed a large number of government employees from the direct authority of the 
government (Interviewee PL2).  
 
6.6 Government support for the bill 
 
Apart from tax related bills which can be submitted only by the government, MPs 
had the authority to submit any bill to the majlis. Government support was not a 
necessary for such bills to be debated or to proceed to a committee. However, since 
the CS bill was a public bill, support of the government was a necessity, at least for 
implementation. While the entire governance structure was under review with 
constitutional reform progressing since 2004, the government was hesitant to 
publicly object to the CS bill. As mentioned previously (section 6.2), the bill was 
submitted and sponsored by two senior officials from the ruling elite. Consequently, 
government decided to support the bill in the parliament (Interviewees FO4, FO6) as 
there were much bigger challenges ahead for the government than this piece of 
legislation (Interviewee PL2). Due to the general support for the bill, the 
government‟s support followed despite strong reservations from a number of long-
serving members of the government (Interviewee FO2) and it was not believed to be 
a willing decision (Interviewee FO3).   
 
Some even argued that the input from the PO, which was the custodian of 
government employees at the time, was inadequate and untimely (Interviewees FO3, 
                                               
98
 In reference to the government of President Nasheed. 
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FO4, FO9). As noted previously (section 6.3), the PO submitted written comments at 
a very late stage during the parliamentary process. Although the PO attended a 
number of committee meetings at the request of the majlis, the PO were often 
accused of not participating adequately in bringing the appropriate changes and not 
sharing its technical expertise sufficiently (Interviewee FO9).        
 
Such a distancing attitude from the PO was believed to be the result of a degree of 
resentment or reservation within a group of senior politicians. According to one 
senior official, “government … never wanted a [statutory] civil service in this 
country” (Interviewee FO4). Some even accused a number of senior politicians at the 
PO of obstructing the bill for fear of losing the grip on state employees (Interviewees 
FO9, PL2). Regardless of the opposition from some government MPs and senior 
government politicians, government instructed MPs aligned with the government to 
vote in favour of the bill to show government‟s genuine support for political and 
governance reform. As one interviewee stated “when they accepted this, it wasn‟t 
with wholehearted agreement. It was like taking a bitter medicine. They just 
swallowed it” (Interviewee FO2, Aminath Nihan Translation).    
     
6.7 Passing of the civil service bill 
 
MPs aligned with the opposition and those aligned with the government may thus 
have had different reasons for supporting the CS bill. In any event, open objection to 
the CS bill was absent in the parliament. An increasing number of MPs considered it 
as one necessary piece of legislation in the democratisation process. Along with the 
constitutional amendments underway during that period, a growing consensus 
appeared to push this legislation through without delay after the committee had 
submitted its report. However, little attention was given by the MPs to the scale of 
the changes that were to follow. Constitutional amendments took precedence to the 
specific details in the CS bill. According to a senior government official “they 
probably didn't look at this in depth. There were probably very few MPs that were 
really concerned about what was going to come out of this bill” (Interviewee GO5). 
The task of constitutional amendments was the dominant agenda for most MPs and 
although CS reform was one component of the democratic agenda, the CS bill 
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appears to have not been given the attention it deserved which had consequences 
later on (see section 7.4).  
 
Voting for the proposed amendments to the CS bill proceeded on March 27, 2007. 
As shown earlier (section 6.4), all significant changes were made during the 
committee stage. A total of 55 amendments were proposed during the second reading 
of the bill. The majority of the proposed changes were editorial which did not have a 
significant bearing on the model of the CS. A total of 31 amendments passed.    
 
After about two and half years in the parliament, voting on the entire CS bill was 
held on April 4, 2007. In the deliberations prior to the voting, most MPs reiterated 
the importance of amendments that would be needed later on, but also the 
importance of passing it at that stage despite some possible gaps in its provisions. 
The main issue was regarding the compatibility of the bill with the form of 
government
99
 - either parliamentary or presidential – to be decided when the 
constitution was amended, a process that was not completed until August 2008. As a 
result, the CS Act came into existence under the 1998 constitution, which accorded 
the executive powers that would be significantly abridged by the 2008 constitution. 
The main challenges that rose as a result of this are discussed in Chapter Seven 
(section 7.2). Regardless of concerns raised by some MPs on the final outcome of the 
bill, the 36 MPs present voted unanimously to pass the bill. The president ratified the 
bill on May 2, 2007.     
 
6.8 Civil service model of the Maldives 
 
To assess the Maldivian model, the rules, structures, roles, and norms of the CS are 
presented by studying the CS Act, the CS regulations, and administrative practices in 
relation to the attributes or properties of a more general CS model. The discussion 
follows the general structure presented in sections 2.3.5 to 2.3.19 of Chapter Two 
where the components of a CS model are presented. 
 
                                               
99 As mentioned in Chapter Four (section 4.3.3), a public referendum was held to decide the form of 
government – presidential or parliamentary – to be enshrined in the new constitution. This vote was 
held in August 2007. Therefore, at the time of passing the CS bill, it was not clear whether the new 
constitution would have provision for a president with significant executive powers. 
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6.8.1 Legal basis of civil service. 
 
The Maldivian CS comprises three main tiers of legal provision: constitution; Act; 
and regulation. As shown in Chapter Four (table 4.3), the CSC was made a 
constitutional organisation by the 2008 constitution. Reference to the CSC as an 
“independent and impartial institution” (Article 179b) in the constitution lays the 
foundation for the CS. A commission independent of the political executive that is 
assigned full responsibility for management of the CS marks the beginning of a new 
chapter in the governance of the Maldives. A five member commission which is 
appointed and reports to the parliament, and the absence of any cabinet portfolio for 
setting the CS policy, is meant to provide the independence and the impartiality of 
the CS that the lawmakers demanded. The lack of linkages between the political 
executive and the CSC has at times been the source of friction, some of which is 
examined in the next chapter (see section 7.2.1).   
 
The main responsibilities and powers of the CSC are also specified in the 
constitution. On the one hand this ensures orderliness, but on the other hand it 
hinders flexibility. The constitution grants the CSC powers of personnel 
management for the CS, formulation of rules and regulations for the CS, and sets out 
the general reporting mechanism for the CSC. The procedures for appointment, 
dismissal, and resignation of commissioners, their qualifications, and their term 
limits are also specified in the constitution. As noted earlier (section 6.4.3), the only 
contradictory aspect in the Act in relation to the constitution is the imposition of a 
maximum limit of two terms for the commissioners in the constitution, whereas the 
Act provides the provision for renewal every five years without a term limit.  
 
The CS Act provides the second tier of legal basis and covers aspects such as 
definition of the CS, general guidelines for civil servants, detailed powers and 
responsibilities of the CSC, duties of permanent secretaries and the CS advisory 
committee that advises the government on matters relating to management of the CS. 
The Act has been amended twice since its passage in 2007, although other 
amendments have been proposed (see section 7.4.3). Out of these, the only 
comprehensive amendment proposed to the Act has been by the CSC itself, which 
the parliament has so far not debated.   
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The CS regulation provides extensive detail on different issues. The CSC has 
authority to formulate and revise regulations.  Presently, the Maldives Civil Service 
Regulation (MCSR) 2010 is in effect (CSC, 2010a). Periodic revisions are 
undertaken and thus it has expanded from 19 chapters in March
100
 2008 to 32 
chapters by February 2012 (also see section 7.4.1). Some of the most important 
aspects in the regulations are examined in the following sections.     
 
6.8.2 Scope of civil service. 
 
This section examines the scope of the Maldivian CS and its implications.   
 
Vertical scope – Permanent secretaries are the highest ranked civil servants in the 
government ministries of the Maldives. However, outside the purview of the CS Act, 
the constitution grants the president powers to appoint any number of political staff 
into the ministerial hierarchy. Such provision provides virtually unlimited powers 
that could be used for patronage appointments.
101
 Although these powers have 
mostly been used to appoint state ministers, deputy ministers, and advisers to the 
ministers, lower level positions that undertake civil servants‟ tasks have also been 
filled occasionally by politically appointed staff (for example appointment of a 
senior project director to the Ministry of Housing and Environment, a post 
equivalent to director general on the CS hierarchy).
102
  
 
For organisations other than ministries, the highest ranked civil servant is the 
responsible officer (performing duties similar to a PS) who is appointed by the CSC. 
Even for such organisations, the president can make any number of political 
appointments. For the elected city, atoll, and island councils too, the CSC appoints a 
responsible officer who is the highest ranked civil servant in the councils.
103
     
 
                                               
100 The first CS regulation was published in March 2008 in preparation for the launching of CS in 
May 2008. 
101 The extent to which this power has been used is discussed in section 7.3.3. 
102 More examples of such appointments are given in section 7.3.3. 
103
 Controversy surrounding the appointment of responsible officers is discussed in section 7.2.1. 
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As mentioned above, the past few years of the statutory CS has shown that lower 
level positions that undertake civil servants‟ tasks have also been filled occasionally 
by politically appointed staff. However, as there have been few such appointments, it 
is too early to conclude that they are evidence of an attempt to create a parallel 
political administration. These appointments seem more likely to be an attempt to 
keep certain individuals within the public sector, based on their capabilities rather 
than their political affiliation, by offering greater benefits than those offered by the 
CS. As a result, it is safe to assume that the vertical scope of the CS has been 
relatively intact so far.  
 
Horizontal scope – The CS Act sets the horizontal boundary of the Maldivian CS by 
listing the organisations and designations that are not part of the CS. Armed forces 
personnel and employees of state owned enterprises (SOEs) are specifically 
excluded. The CS Act also allows for any organisation or designation to be excluded 
from the CS through other legislation. Since the CS Act came into existence, this 
provision has been used widely to significantly narrow the scope of the CS. 
Organisations such as the police and the entire judicial sector which are significant 
employers were both excluded under the governance reform of 2008. The university 
and customs service, both also with considerable staff, along with several other 
smaller organisations have followed suit (tables 6.11 and 6.12 list organisations 
included and excluded from the CS by the end of 2011). 
 
Table 6.11: Organisations included in the civil service 
Organisations included in the CS 
Ministries 
Attorney General‟s Office 
Departments and offices responsible to a ministry 
City councils, atoll councils, island councils 
High commissions, embassies, overseas missions
104 
Maldives Media Council
105 
National Archives
106 
                                               
104 The most senior posts in the missions are appointed by the president. 
105
 Media council is a statutory body with elected members. The staff of the council belong to the CS. 
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National Social Protection Agency
107 
National Plant Protection Organisation
108 
Dhivehi Language Academy
109 
Hospitals (those not corporatised) 
Schools
110 
 
Table 6.12: Organisations excluded from the civil service 
Organisations outside the CS 
Judiciary 
People‟s Majlis 
President‟s Office 
Maldives National Defence Force 
Maldives Police Service 
State owned enterprises 
Hospitals (those corporatised) 
Human Rights Commission of the Maldives 
Capital Market Development Authority 
Maldives Monetary Authority 
Auditor General‟s Office 
Judicial Service Commission 
Police Integrity Commission 
Civil Service Commission 
Prosecutor General‟s Office 
Elections Commission 
Anti-Corruption Commission 
Labour Tribunal 
Maldives Pension Administration Office 
Maldives Inland Revenue Authority 
                                                                                                                                     
106 National Archives is a statutory body. Except for the director general who is appointed by the 
president, all staff belong to the CS. 
107 NSPA is a statutory body in charge of health insurance. The chief executive officer is appointed by 
the president. Other staff belong to the CS. 
108 NPPO is a statutory body. The minister chooses the head of the organisation and phytosanitary 
inspectors in accordance with the CS Act.     
109  Five members of this statutory organisation are appointed by the president. The staff of the 
academy are civil servants.  
110
 A few public schools were privatised by Nasheed‟s government. 
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Tax Appeal Tribunal 
The Maldives National University 
Local Government Authority 
Maldives Broadcasting Commission 
Maldives Civil Aviation Authority 
Maldives Customs Service 
 
One of the controversial approaches used by the government to redefine the 
horizontal scope of the CS has been to corporatise government organisations. While 
15 SOEs existed at the end of 2008 (MOFT, 2009, p. 6), there were 65 at the end of 
2011 (MOFT, 2011). Most of the newly established SOEs were previously 
government organisations. As a result of their corporatisation there has been a 
significant reduction in the number of civil servants. The biggest sector that has been 
corporatised so far is the government hospitals, which previously comprised entirely 
civil servants. A number of government schools have also seen such a move. The 
changes in the horizontal scope of the CS have meant that the number of civil 
servants has significantly declined from 2008 to 2011 (see figure 6.1). Chapter Seven 
(section 7.3) further examines the impact of politicisation of the CS.  
 
Figure 6.1: Civil servants versus staff moved out of civil service (2008-2011) 
 
Source: CSC (personal communication, March 21, 2012; August 27, 2012)111; DNP (2010, 2011) 
                                               
111 The data provided by CSC for the year 2008 is revised here. Schools and hospitals are excluded 
because the staff excluded from CS are mostly expatriate workers, all of whom were handed contracts 
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Material scope
112
 – Other Acts besides the CS Act affect the material scope of the 
Maldivian CS. The two most important Acts are the Employment Act (No. 2/2008) 
and the Pension Act (No. 8/2009). The Employment Act covers all the general 
principles of employment to which the CS also must adhere. The general principles 
covered in the Employment Act include: basic rights of workers; restrictions on 
employment of minors; guidelines for employment contracts; principles of work 
ethics; procedures for disciplinary measures and dismissal; limit of working hours; 
entitlements on leave; guidelines on remuneration and basic wage; and occupational 
health and safety. Although a statutory CS was in place when the Employment Act 
was passed, the lawmakers opted for CS to follow the Employment Act with detailed 
CS regulations to be in line with the general employment guidelines.
113
   
 
As it is mandatory for all public and private sector workers to enter the statutory 
pension scheme, civil servants also contribute to the scheme. Other legislation that 
affects the CS covers aspects such as presidential powers on setting the mandate of 
government organisations and general responsibilities of government employees 
(Official Kanthah [Issues] Chapter 1 (law no. 1/68)), procedures for writing official 
letters and reports (Official Kanthah [Issues] Chapter 2 (law no. 2/68)), service 
bonds for receiving government funded education (Service Bond for Government 
Funded Education Act (No. 29/76)), and general guidelines for the language used in 
official documents (National Language (priority) Act (law no. 9/2011)).  
 
Since the establishment of the statutory CS, no serious concerns have been raised 
regarding its material scope. However, some changes may be needed to align with 
the present day legal framework. For instance, the Acts of 1968 mentioned above are 
in need of amendments to ensure a high degree of accountability of state officials. In 
                                                                                                                                     
from the inception of CS in May 2008. Furthermore, organisations such as the Defence Force, SOEs, 
Auditor General‟s Office, Human Rights Commission of the Maldives, Capital Market Development 
Authority, Maldives Monetary Authority, and Parliament Secretariat are also excluded because the 
staff in those organisations were not considered civil servants at the inception of CS. Additionally, the 
total number of civil servants for the years 2009 and 2010 is derived from the Statistical Yearbooks. A 
breakdown of the number of civil servants moved out of CS is given in the next chapter (Tables 7.3 
and 7.4).   
112 As stated in section 2.3.6, material scope is concerned with aspects of the CS employment such as 
pensions, working hours or holidays that can be regulated by more general labour laws.    
113 Recently, the Attorney General of the Maldives cited a number of inconsistencies between the 
Employment Act and the newly revised Civil Service Regulation of June 2012, a regulation 
formulated under the CS Act (Attorney General‟s Office, 2012). 
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addition to that, minor inconsistencies exist between the CS Act and Employment 
Act (Interviewees GO1, GO5, GO6). Such issues are mainly because the CS Act 
predates the Employment Act and the CS had to realign its regulations after the 
Employment Act came into effect.  
 
6.8.3 Management of civil service. 
 
Management of the CS is linked to the responsibilities of the state as the employer of 
civil servants. In the case of the Maldives, in the absence of a central ministry, the 
CSC centrally manages the entire CS. The main functions carried out by the 
commission include: 1) formulating regulations on personnel management functions 
of the CS (for example appointment, dismissal, transfer, setting benefits, grievance, 
discipline); 2) managing the personnel management function (for example approval 
of appointments and dismissals); and 3) investigation of grievances and sanctioning 
of civil servants. Additional responsibilities of the commission include formulating a 
code of conduct, setting the classification system for the entire CS and approving the 
organisational structure for all CS organisations – creating the need for reconciliation 
of the CS and national budget.
114
 Such extensive authority is meant to ensure 
uniformity across the Maldivian CS.   
 
The CSC delegates limited authority on employment processes to the ministries and 
organisations. As discussed in the following sections, the CSC set the rules and 
guidelines for all processes of personnel management. Written approval is sought 
from the CSC for all the main functions of personnel management such as 
appointment, dismissal, or transfer. Individual ministries merely carry out those tasks 
at the organisational level. At times, this has raised concerns because the centralised 
procedures that existed prior to the establishment of the CSC have been continued 
(Interviewee FO6).  
 
                                               
114  The government formulates organisational mandate. The CSC approves the organisational 
structure. All the posts in the organisation need to be included in the organisational budget. The 
MOFT has the right to amend organisational budgets before sending them to the majlis for approval. 
Once budget is approved, individual organisations can create any new posts specified in the approved 
budget. Additional approval from the MOFT is not required. However, to create a new post not 
included in the approved budget, approval from the MOFT is often required.    
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During the drafting of the bill no discussion took place on introducing a greater 
degree of decentralisation of the CS management. No radical shift in personnel 
management was proposed in the Act other than removing the prerogatives of the 
president and handing it over to a statutory body. As a result, the previous centralised 
system of management is maintained within the statutory CS. This has a number of 
implications in the context of an emerging democracy, a topic discussed in the 
following chapter (sections 7.2.2 and 7.4).  
 
6.8.4 Code of conduct. 
 
The first attempt to provide legal status for government officials in the Maldives was 
by a law in 1968 (see section 5.3). The general responsibilities of government 
employees were specified in that law. Since then, such principles have been written 
into the regulations governing government employees – as mentioned earlier (section 
5.4.8), a code of conduct for government employees was in place even prior to the 
statutory CS. Those principles had been evolving over the years. With the formation 
of the CS, they have been specified in more detail (chapter 2 of MCSR). They are 
also in line with the general principles of conduct specified in the 2008 constitution 
(Article 182b).  
 
The Maldives has, arguably, adopted a law-based approach. In this respect, the CS 
Act specifically states that a code of conduct needs to be devised by the CSC (Article 
18f). Therefore, rather than having a code at the level of general principles, the 
Maldives have opted to cover detailed prescriptions in such secondary legislation 
(refer to section 6.8.13 for some of the principles outlined in the code of conduct).    
 
6.8.5 Categories of civil servants. 
 
A key feature of classical Weberian bureaucracy is having a substantial degree of 
horizontal coherence across the CS that includes uniform terms and conditions. The 
Maldivian CS reveals a number of departures from such a classical model.  
 
In broad terms, the Maldivian CS is a unified CS. As mentioned earlier (section 
6.4.7), the concept of SES was dropped during the parliamentary debates, based on 
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the argument that not enough personnel would qualify for such a core group of civil 
servants in a small nation such as the Maldives. Nonetheless, the CS Act and the 
corresponding regulation have provision for four categories of employees: 
permanent employees, temporary employees, contract employees, and volunteers. 
Both temporary and contract appointments are exceptions to the classical model of a 
career CS.  
 
Temporary staff are employed to carry out a project for a specified time period, or to 
complete a temporary task (Clause 125 of MCSR). In all respects other than their 
limited tenure, temporary civil servants are subject to the same rules as permanent 
civil servants. Contract employees can be hired for jobs for which eligible and 
competent persons are scarce (Clause 134 of MCSR) and upon approval from the 
CSC can receive additional financial incentives – which is also a departure from the 
classical model that demands uniformity in remuneration. Unpaid volunteers can 
also be hired in the case when a qualified person did not apply for the vacant job or 
as a source of advice and guidance to staff (Clause 139 of MCSR). Volunteers are 
normally hired for a fixed period through organisations such as Voluntary Service 
Overseas (VSO).  
 
The Employment Act requires that all workers that come under its jurisdiction 
should have an employment contract signed between the employee and the 
employer. This provision applies to all categories of civil servants. Although 
permanent employees do not have a term limit in their contracts, the contract needs 
to be in line with the Employment Act and the CS Act. For instance, arbitrary 
termination is not permitted. Furthermore, in these employment contracts, people are 
appointed to a particular organisation or position rather than a CS – which is also a 
departure from the career system where the civil servant is assigned to the CS rather 
than to a specific organisation.   
 
The Maldivian CS also hires a large number of expatriates on a fixed term, 
especially for teaching and health professions. They are hired only when qualified 
locals are not available (Article 41c of the CS Act) and thus do not compete with the 
locals.  
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All these provisions give the CSC significant flexibility in filling the posts through 
the use of different types of staff, either on a permanent basis, temporary basis, or 
fixed-term contracts.  
        
6.8.6 Merit system. 
 
The classical CS model also features a permanent CS where recruitment and 
promotion are based on merit rather than by patronage or political affiliation. Until 
the CS Act, merit had been an alien concept for employment in the Maldivian 
government. During parliamentary debates, lawmakers argued that in the absence of 
merit, a wide range of exceptions, especially close to election periods, were evident 
in appointment, transfer, and promotion of public officials (see section 5.4.5). They 
opted to give those powers to a statutory body rather than the president and they 
decided that the best criteria that can be used in personnel management were merit-
based. To ensure no discrepancies exist in the application of merit, they chose to 
carefully define what merit connotes. According to the CS Act, when using merit at 
all levels of appointments (recruitment and promotion), preference should be given 
to academic results followed by past experience in the field of work (Article 5e). So 
far no evidence is available that the CSC has violated the application of merit. Any 
violation risks legal challenges.      
 
6.8.7 Recruitment system. 
 
Recruitment is closely tied with the concept of merit. All recruitments in the 
Maldivian CS, including appointments to all vacancies at all levels, and positions 
filled by transfers, require the approval of the CSC. Recruitment practices in the 
Maldivian CS are inclined towards a more open system model than the closed-entry 
recruitment system.  
 
Six main features relating to the open system model are of significance. Firstly, 
lateral entry to any level of the hierarchy was allowed before the statutory CS and 
remained permissible under the new Act. However, since the private sector normally 
pays relatively high wages, especially for technical and professional jobs, it is 
uncommon for private sector workers to join the CS through lateral entry. In most 
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cases, staff who have a service bond as a result of state-funded higher education, 
normally enter the designated job laterally. Secondly, previous work experience in 
both the public and private sectors can be recognised for appointment. This provision 
is allowed to encourage movement between public and private sectors. Thirdly, 
vacant positions are filled by open competition, with internal and external candidates 
vying for the position. Public advertisements are a requisite for any vacant position 
regardless of whether an eligible person is available within the organisation. This is 
basically a continuation of the rules that existed in the pre-civil service period. 
However, given the nature of the CS conditions, there are rarely external applicants 
and therefore appointments of internal staff are the norm.
115
  
 
Fourthly, entrance examinations for civil servants have never been used in the 
Maldivian public sector and currently play no part in appointments to the statutory 
CS either. However, by early 2012, the CSC was consulting with stakeholders to 
assess the feasibility of introducing an entrance examination. Fifthly, as mentioned 
previously (section 6.8.5), short-term contract employment is also permitted. Such 
provisions are used in fields with a shortage of qualified personnel. Sixthly, a high 
degree of horizontal mobility from one organisation to another is allowed within the 
CS (see table 6.13).  
 
Table 6.13: Total number of transfer applications approved by the civil service 
commission 
 2009 2010 2011 
Approved transfers 1304 797 2177 
Source: CSC (personal communication, August 27, 2012)116 
 
Although recruitment practices thus lean towards an open system model, there are a 
number of features found in the classical model. One already mentioned is the 
requirement for the CSC to approve all placements including appointments, 
transfers, and promotions. This centralisation is often cited as a source of delay. 
                                               
115 Details on applications are maintained by individual organisations. Since such information is not 
available centrally, statistics on internal/external recruitments are difficult to obtain.  
116 At times, CSC can reject transfer applications. According to the CSC, they do not maintain records 
of the total transfer applications submitted for approval.  
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Ministries run their own recruitment processes
117
 but require CSC approval which it 
can refuse if the merit principle is not upheld. The CSC oversees ministries‟ 
recruitment by requiring them to send it the results of all the interviews, both 
successful and unsuccessful (Schedule 9 of MCSR). A second feature is the use of 
selective entry requirements. These requirements are pre-defined and formulated 
centrally by the CSC. The following section on classification system in the 
Maldivian CS examines these aspects more closely.  
 
Table 6.14 shows the total number of approved applications for appointments 
(excluding transfers) sent to the CSC for the period 2009-2011.  
 
Table 6.14: Total number of appointment applications approved by the civil service 
commission 
 2009 2010 2011 
Approved applications 2672 4467 3577 
Source: CSC (personal communication, August 27, 2012)118 
 
6.8.8 Classification system.  
 
The CSC has developed one unified position classification system for the entire CS. 
It is a hybrid of closed and open systems containing features of both rank-in-job and 
rank-in-person classification systems.  
 
Typically for a rank-in-job system, position classification in the Maldivian CS is 
based on the assumption of equal pay for work of equal value. Jobs of the same 
nature, duties, responsibilities, and workload are grouped together (Clause 34(b) of 
MCSR) (refer to figure 6.2 for the administrative structure of designations
119
). 
                                               
117 These practices are similar to those found in many other countries. They include interviewing all 
the eligible candidates by a panel that does not include any family member or political appointee 
(Clause 106 of MCSR), and awarding points based on academic qualifications, extent of past work 
experience, skills needed, and individual competencies (Schedule 8 of MCSR). Unsuccessful 
candidates are also informed of the outcome (Clause 108 of MCSR). Similar criteria were used for 
recruitment even before the statutory CS.     
118  At times, CSC can reject appointment applications. According to CSC, they do not maintain 
records of the total appointment applications submitted for approval. 
119
 The provisions for increments are discussed later in this section.  
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Furthermore, each of these organisational groups has a unified salary structure. For 
instance, all grade six officers, irrespective of the organisation, generally receive the 
same remuneration.
120
  
 
Figure 6.2: Administrative structure of designations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
EX 3-4
Deputy 
Director 
General
EX5-6
Director 
General
MS 3-4
Deputy / 
Assistant 
Director
EX 1-2
Director
GS 1-4 , MS 1-2
Officer
SS 1-4
Support Staff
Able to progress with a minimum 
of Certificate Level 4 and 3 years 
of experience in each grade 
(provided that a vacant position 
opens up to which the person 
competes with all applicants)
Able to progress with 3 years of experience in each grade 
(provided that a vacant position opens up to which the 
person competes with all applicants)
Senior Civil Service
Middle Management Service
Support Officer
Support 
Service
Grades
 
A number of features related to the rank-in-person system are also evident in the 
Maldivian CS. Firstly, academic qualifications are important at some of the entry 
points which can be used for lateral entry (for example at grade 14). Secondly, once 
in the job, the civil servant can progress through the grades, provided that a position 
becomes vacant and the civil servant meets the job specifications and competes with 
all applicants to the new position (for example from grade 1 to 13). Thirdly, rather 
than basing the specification entirely on academic qualifications, work experience 
(often calculated based on the number of years in service) is also considered an 
important aspect (for example from grade 14 onwards). 
 
                                               
120  An exemption is given to a number of selected professions that are offered higher service 
allowances and thus their total remuneration can be higher (refer to section 6.8.9).  
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As evident in most traditional civil services, the classification system is based on 
providing a salary increment. However, rather than basing it on solely on the length 
of service, adequate performance is a requirement in the Maldivian CS. The CSC has 
devised a ten-step salary increment system that operates within each grade, with a 
fixed increment of MVR200 for each step. The civil servant is eligible for this 
increment based on the outcome of the performance appraisal system. Although this 
new system has been in place since 2009, salary increments have not been provided 
mainly due to the unavailability of funds to cover the costs. One other possible 
reason could be the inability to effectively institutionalise the appraisal system, 
making the government reluctant to commit financially as the failure of the 
performance appraisal in the 1990s is still fresh (see section 5.4.5). Nonetheless, as 
figure 6.3 shows, appraisal forms are at least completed for the majority of civil 
servants although it is not possible to conclude that the system achieves its outcomes 
of accurately assessing or improving individual performance. Furthermore, as shown 
in table 6.13, horizontal mobility across the CS is quite common in the absence of an 
automatic promotion system (see section 6.8.10), as civil servants aim to maintain 
their career progression by moving to other organisations where openings occur.     
 
Figure 6.3: Completion of performance appraisal forms 
 
Source: CSC (2011a)  
 
In line with other features of the centralised administration in the Maldives, the 
classification system is developed and revised by the CSC. All new jobs are required 
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to be included in the unified system and approval for any such inclusion needs to be 
obtained from the CSC (Clause 32(b) and 37 of MCSR).
121
 Another feature evident 
in the Maldivian CS is the high number of civil servants at the lower grades of the 
classification system (see table 6.15). Such bottom-heaviness is the long term effect 
of employment generation that occurred before the formation of the statutory CS (see 
section 5.4.7).  
 
Table 6.15: Civil servants and their ranks at the end of 2010 
Classification Rank Number of civil servants 
Permanent secretary ZV7 16 
Senior civil service 
EX 5-6 64 
EX 3-4 61 
Middle management 
service 
EX 1-2 226 
MS 3-4 1339 
Support officer 
MS 1-2 5274 
GS 1-4 7841 
Support service SS 1-4 7024 
TOTAL  21,845 
Source: DNP (2011) 
 
6.8.9 Salary and reward. 
 
In the traditional career CS model, a statutory remuneration scheme is often 
developed for civil servants with standard rates for each grade. In models that shift 
from the classical model, differentiated and/or individual rates of pay are set. 
Remuneration in the Maldivian CS lies in between these two extremes.  
 
There is no law setting remuneration for civil servants. A uniform salary and reward 
structure is developed and managed by the CSC. As mentioned in section 6.8.8, 
permanent civil servants on the same grade generally receive the same benefits 
irrespective of the organisation. Variation in benefits is allowed only for contract 
staff (refer to section 6.8.5).  
                                               
121 Civil servants also have the right to recommend changes to the classification system by submitting 
proposals to the CSC (Clause 36 of MCSR). 
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The CS salary and benefits are based on a pre-determined salary and a service 
allowance (based on the rank in the classification system) combined with a number 
of general allowances and welfare allowances (based on the organisation and type of 
work) (CSC, 2009a). Figure 6.4 summarises the salary and benefit structure.  
 
Figure 6.4: Salary and benefit structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.16 provides an overview of the pay scales in relation to the classification 
system. It also shows the salary differences within each rank. As the table shows, the 
least difference between the ranks is evident in the middle ranks with the highest 
disparity at the top and the lowest ranks. Furthermore, in a clear deviation from the 
classical model, higher service allowances are paid to some of the professions which 
are considered scarce.   
 
As mentioned previously (section 6.8.3), the CSC determines all the allowances and 
who is entitled to them. On the positive side, having a unified system managed by 
the commission ensures that the benefits of every position are standard and publicly 
known. On the negative side, the inflexibility and the continuous authorisation 
protocols for allowances often create backlogs and delays in management of 
government organisations. The extent of the centralisation of the rules is evident 
from Clause 66(a) of MCSR which states “The commission shall determine the 
employees who shall be given uniforms, the design of the uniform and number of 
uniforms which shall be provided annually and the amount to be given for stitching 
of the uniform”. Once again, a central and uniform system as far as financial benefits 
are concerned is one that is inherited by the commission which has decided to 
maintain the status quo.  
 
 
   
Service 
Allowance 
Salary 
General Allowances  
1. Regular Allowances 
2. Special Allowances 
Welfare Allowances  
Food Allowance 
Overtime 
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Table 6.16: Pay scale 
Classification Rank 
Number of 
civil 
servants
122 
Monthly salary
123
 
range (In MVR) 
Inter-rank 
salary 
difference (In 
MVR) 
Permanent secretary ZV7 16 35,500  
Senior civil service 
EX 5-6 64 14,090 – 15,760 1670 
EX 3-4 61 11,265 – 12,600 1335 
Middle management 
service 
EX 1-2 226 9035 – 10,090 1055 
MS 3-4 1339 7235 - 8075 840 
Support officer 
MS 1-2 5274 5810 - 6495 685 
GS 1-4 7841 3765 - 5220 1455 
Support service SS 1-4 7024 3300 - 4540 1240 
TOTAL  21,845   
Source: CSC (2010b); DNP (2011) 
Note: The household income and expenditure survey conducted by the government in 2009/2010 
revealed that, at the national level, the average monthly income per earner was MVR6727 (DNP, 
2009/2010). 
 
6.8.10 Promotion system. 
 
The promotion system in the Maldives reveals features of both career system and 
position-based systems. Firstly, promotion is based on the principle of merit. 
According to the regulation, promotions are awarded “to assign a greater 
responsibility for employees who can prove that the responsibilities of their job has 
been carried out properly, their level of job performance was good, and the employee 
has good work ethics” (Clause 97 of MCSR). Secondly, though, regardless of the 
suitability of an individual employee for promotion, it can proceed only when a 
vacancy opens up in the organisation for which qualified internal and external 
candidates can compete. Similar to recruitment, an interview process needs to be 
followed before a promotion decision.  
 
                                               
122 Number of civil servants at the end of 2010. 
123 Salary is calculated by summing the basic salary and the fixed service allowance. Some of the 
professions are offered higher service allowances and thus the salary will be higher for them than 
those given in the table.  
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The requirements for open competition for promotion and the existence of a vacant 
position are new since the inception of the statutory CS. Previously, promotion could 
be recommended by the organisation after considering performance, attendance, and 
length of service even in the absence of a vacant position.        
 
In line with the centralised nature of administration that existed even before the 
statutory CS, promotion is confirmed upon approval by the CSC. The salary 
increment system mentioned previously (section 6.8.8) does not connote a promotion 
and since the increment system is presently not functional, no performance-based 
pay is in place. The only current option for a salary increase is promotion to the next 
grade (refer to figure 6.2).    
 
6.8.11 Political rights and neutrality. 
 
A key feature of the classical CS model is the clear separation of functions and 
responsibilities between civil servants and their political masters. Such separation 
can be important to maintain the political neutrality of civil servant and a clear 
separation between public duty and private interest. This demarcation can be blurred 
in any government but may be more problematic in small societies (see section 
5.4.6).  
 
In the absence of the statutory CS, such demarcations were not visible in the 
Maldives. The framers of the Maldivian CS have chosen to clearly define those lines 
in the legislation. Civil servants have limitations on their political participation. 
Article 53 of the CS Act states “No employee of the Maldivian Civil Service shall 
participate in any political activity”.124  
 
The importance of defining the extent of political participation is evident from the 
CS regulations published in 2008 which had an entire chapter focused on outlining 
                                               
124
 The definition section of the Act further defines the term “political activities” as: a) Lobbying to 
garner support for any political person or participating an activity thereof; b) Organising or 
participating in any political activity against any political person; c) Participating to garner support for 
or against a candidate competing in an election under the Constitution and the Laws of the Republic 
of Maldives; and d) Standing to be elected to a political position under the Constitution or the Laws of 
the Maldives or seeking to be a candidate (Article 77 of the CS Act).  
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the parameters of political activities. However, as discussed in the next chapter 
(section 7.3.1), the CSC removed that chapter in face of legal challenges to article 53 
of the Act. The nullification of the political participation aspect of the CS Act does 
not necessarily politicise the Maldivian CS. Civil servants are still required to 
provide impartial and unbiased service to all citizens. Several references to such 
principles are laid down in the CS Act
125
 and in the code of conduct
126
. Any action 
contrary to such principles can be sanctioned by the CSC within the confines of the 
legislation. 
 
In practice, civil servants in the Maldives appear to have accepted as the norm that 
they enter the service with the knowledge that restrictions will be placed on them 
regarding political participation. Several interviewees reiterated this aspect 
(Interviewees FO1, FO5, FO8, FO11, GO1, GO2, GO3, GO4, PL2). So far there 
have been very few instances in which civil servants have been caught up in 
controversies regarding political participation. A number of such incidents are 
discussed in the following chapter (section 7.3.1).    
    
Maintaining a clear separation between public duty and private interest is also an 
important aspect for an apolitical CS. In this regard, the CS Act
127
 and subsequent 
regulations
128
 contain a number of specific provisions covering conflict of interest, 
adherence to professionalism, and impartiality in dissemination of duties. There are 
penalties in law for violations of these principles. However, as the provisions are 
relatively new, there is currently very little evidence of their effectiveness.
129
   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter (section 5.4.8), the Maldives had a long 
tradition of government employees being appointed at the discretion of the president. 
                                               
125 Article 4a, 4b, 5a, and 18b. 
126 Clause 25b, 25c, 25g, 25h and 27h of MCSR. 
127 They include professional responsibility of civil servants (article 26), service guidelines (article 
27c), disclosure of information (article 28c, and 28e), secrecy (article 29), and misuse of authority 
(article 36). 
128 According to the MCSR, they include professional standards (clause 9dii and 9diii), utilising office 
resources (clause 15, 18 and 21), prohibition of personal work during official hours (clause 17), and 
attire (chapter 16).   
129 Transparency International (2011) reported that among the South Asian countries, civil servants in 
the Maldives were perceived to be the least corrupt. 
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The powers of the president to manoeuvre state employees at his will, as mentioned 
previously (section 6.5), has been cited as one of the reasons for establishing a CS 
independent of the political executive. While maintaining the powers of the political 
executive to direct the CS in matters of public policy, the Act significantly reduced 
the president‟s direct control in matters of employment. What control remained has 
been further reduced since the passage of the Act. An amendment to the Act in 2010 
transferred the president‟s role in appointing and dismissing the CS commissioners 
to the majlis and removed his power to nominate the chairperson and deputy-
chairperson of the CSC for the majlis’s approval.130  
 
These further changes followed the political turmoil that the nation experienced after 
the parliamentary election of 2009. They reflected ongoing tensions between the 
principle of neutral competence and the duty of civil servants to the elected 
government. These tensions played out in other conflicts between the political 
executive and administration and are discussed at greater length in the next chapter.   
 
6.8.12 Employment rights and protection. 
 
Another key feature of classical Weberian bureaucracy is the expectation that civil 
servants should be employed within the CS until retirement, subject to adequate 
performance. In line with the global shift away from such practices, the “job for life” 
concept appears to have eroded in the Maldives as well. Along with different 
strategies used to trim and reshape the CS, the protection that was once associated 
with state employment no longer holds sway. However, for those staff that remain 
under the scope of the CS, significant restrictions are still in place against arbitrary 
dismissal. 
 
Protection for civil servants from unfair dismissal is provided by both the CS Act 
and the Employment Act. The Employment Act states that as a general principle:  
 
An employee shall not be dismissed from employment without showing 
appropriate cause as to failure to maintain work ethics, inability to carry out 
                                               
130
 Chairperson and the deputy-chairperson are chosen from the five commissioners.  
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employment duties and responsibilities related to the proper functioning of his 
place of work; even after measures have been taken to discipline the employee 
or upgrade skill deficiencies. (Article 21a)  
 
Under the CS Act, the grounds on which a civil servant can be dismissed include: 
inability to perform duty; failure to complete a training programme; violation of CS 
regulations; proven retention of employment in violation
131
 of the law and regulation; 
and contesting public office (Article 47). No reference to restructuring or downsizing 
is given. Generally, notice is also required before dismissal and whistle-blower 
protection is also ensured under the law. Such measures and specific criteria for 
dismissal ensure that, although tenure for life no longer exists, significant protection 
against unfair dismissal is still in place in the Maldivian CS. 
     
Specifying employment rights in such detail in the CS Act and the Employment Act 
along with subsequent regulations was an intentional decision taken by the policy 
makers. To some extent, such aspects were covered in rules, regulations, and systems 
even before the statutory CS was established (Interviewee GO7). However, there 
were constant accusations that civil servants were being dismissed unfairly 
(Interviewees GO7, PL2) which appears to be one of the reasons for a number of 
MPs pursuing the establishment of a statutory CS (Interviewee PL1). Providing 
significant details on the mechanisms to protect the rights of the employees was thus 
believed to be due to alleged abuse of the rules in the past.  
 
Restrictions on career civil servants from undertaking additional employment are 
also a key feature in the classical Weberian CS model. In the Maldives, only few 
such restrictions exist. As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 5.4.6), the 
smallness of Maldivian society means that a number of individuals have multiple 
roles. Furthermore, the inability of a government job to adequately support a family 
has created a culture in which public officials are normally allowed to have multiple 
jobs, in many cases one within the government and another in the private sector. The 
CS regulations have however put significant restrictions on additional employment 
                                               
131
 That includes falsifying documentation during application for the job. 
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for a number of professions in the CS to prevent any possible conflict of interest
132
 
that may arise. As compensation, additional financial incentives are often provided 
for these professions. Protection of professional integrity is given prime importance, 
as discussed earlier (see section 6.8.11). Although disclosure of personal wealth is 
not required for any civil servant and most of them have the right to seek a secondary 
job, the code of conduct applies to all civil servants which promote professionalism. 
Nevertheless, the provision for most civil servants to seek extra employment in the 
Maldives opens the possibility of conflict of interest.      
 
6.8.13 Disciplinary procedures. 
 
A further feature of the classical CS model is a pre-defined disciplinary procedure 
for breach of the code of conduct. Special disciplinary legislation is also enacted in 
some countries with features of the classical model. Although the Maldives do not 
have a specific law in this respect, the processes followed in the Maldivian CS are 
closely aligned with the classical model.  
 
According to the code of conduct, civil servants should interact with others fairly, 
impartially, courteously, and considerately. Working relationships between 
employees are also governed by the code; for example, a conducive work 
environment where lawful instructions of the superiors are to be followed 
effectively. There is extensive detail on how employees should proceed in fulfilling 
their duties. The attributes expected from each civil servant include effectiveness, 
efficiency, innovativeness, professionalism, accountability, confidentiality, and 
abstaining from conflict of interest and graft.  
 
Most of the principles and attributes outlined in the code existed in regulations 
before the CS Act. However, since inception of the CS, they have been clearly laid 
out in detail for the first time. Though the time frame provided for the civil servants 
to become familiar with these detailed guidelines was short, they appear to have 
adapted to the new code relatively well. Several interviewees are adamant that most 
civil servants adhere to the code of conduct (Interviewees CV1, FO1, FO5, FO6, 
                                               
132
 For instance, government lawyers and doctors, some of whom also have private practices. 
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FO8, GO2, GO5). Only a few instances of violation have been cited (see section 
7.3.1).      
 
If a civil servant is found in violation of the code, the legal basis for disciplinary 
measures is provided in the CS Act and the Employment Act. Measures that can be 
taken include advising, reprimanding, re-assignment of duties, fine, reduction in 
classification, and dismissal. Offences under which such measures can be taken are 
listed in the CS regulation. While individual organisations can take disciplinary 
measures for lesser offences, the CSC takes direct action for severe offences. The 
employee retains the right to appeal the decision of the CSC to the Maldives 
Employment Tribunal (Clauses 12 & 242 of MCSR). The decision of the 
Employment Tribunal can be further appealed at the Maldives High Court (Article 
86 of Employment Act). Grievance procedures are discussed in more detail in the 
following section.    
 
Disciplinary procedures are, in general, the same as were followed before the 
statutory CS. Although the CSC has provided additional detail on the offences that 
can constitute breaking of the code of conduct, knowledge regarding such practices 
appears to be relatively institutionalised in the CS.    
 
6.8.14 Grievance procedures. 
 
Civil service laws generally have some provision for appeal or review of decisions 
based on the principle of the right to due process. The Maldivian CS Act provides 
similar provisions. According to the CS Act, a transparent, fair, and reasonable 
appeal system should be established to review decisions that are considered unjust by 
civil servants (Articles 4g & 4h). The first point of contact to report any breach of 
law or regulation is the PS or the highest ranked civil servant in the organisation (CS 
Act, 2007, Article 30). If the decision taken remains unsatisfactory, the case can be 
submitted directly to the CSC (CS Act, 2007 Article 31). Cases where the complaint 
is against the PS, or the highest ranked civil servant can be submitted directly to the 
CSC (Clause 236c of MCSR).   
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Investigation of cases submitted to the CSC is normally carried out by legal staff at 
the CSC (Clause 239e of MCSR). However, the CSC can choose to investigate the 
case through a standing committee
133
 although the decision of the committee is not 
binding. After the commission makes its final decision, the civil servant has the right 
to appeal the decision to the employment tribunal.       
 
The procedures followed in the Maldivian CS appear to be in line with most other 
statutory civil services. As far as statistics on such cases are concerned, no central 
organisation has maintained records of cases submitted to courts prior to the 
establishment of the CSC making it difficult to compare trends before and after the 
statutory CS was established (refer to section 5.4.8 on the grievance procedures 
before the statutory CS). However, records collected recently show a degree of 
awareness among the civil servants regarding their rights and protection (see table 
6.17).   
 
Table 6.17: Cases submitted to employment tribunal and the courts 
  Employment Tribunal Courts 
 Submitted Completed Submitted Completed 
2009 51 33 3 1 
2010 195 101 52 2 
2011 35 21 40 21 
Source: CSC (2011a); CSC (personal communication, December 11, 2011) 
 
6.8.15 Pension and retirement. 
 
As discussed in section 2.3.19, a special statutory pension scheme for civil servants 
was a common feature of the classical CS model. Presently, however, with changes 
in economy and demography, many countries are reforming their pension schemes. 
That includes moving away from specific CS pension schemes towards general 
pension schemes. Additionally, countries are moving to fully funded employee-
employer contributing schemes with changes to their retirement ages.   
                                               
133 Comprises a senior lawyer at the CSC, a lawyer assigned by the legal consultant of the CSC, an 
independent lawyer, a representative of the Labour Relations Authority, and a member from the 
Human Rights Commission (Clause 239a of MCSR). 
205 
 
The reform of the pension in the Maldives reveals a move along similar lines. As 
indicated in the previous chapter (section 5.4.7), in the absence of any law governing 
pensions, a specific pension scheme existed for all government employees before the 
Pension Act of 2009. Pensions were fully funded by the government and did not 
require any contribution from the employee. The CS Act as well as the Pension Act 
completely changed the picture. 
 
Firstly, the CS Act introduced mandatory and voluntary retirement ages for the first 
time. Secondly, the Pension Act covers all state employees as well as private sector 
employees and made the pension scheme a contributory scheme to which both the 
employee and the employer contribute equally.
134
 Such sweeping reforms were 
highly debated during the parliamentary stages of the CS bill (see section 6.4.4). 
Attempts by the government in 2008 to delay implementation of the retirement age 
by submitting a CS amendment bill showed the sensitivity of the issue to Maldivian 
society (see section 7.4.3). Nonetheless, the implementation of the CS retirement age 
and the general pension scheme, both politically sensitive issues, has been successful.    
 
6.9 Overseas influences on the Maldivian civil service model 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter (section 5.2), although in an autocratic mode of 
governance, there has been a CS in the Maldives in one form or other for many 
centuries. The administration of state officials has evolved over that time by adapting 
local institutions with some borrowing from other jurisdictions. However, the 
deliberate framing of a statute to align with concepts and practices of other countries 
was a significant departure in some aspects. This section examines the possible 
aspects of policy transfer and influences from other civil services in shaping the 
Maldivian CS model.   
 
The Maldivian CS model cannot be considered a direct emulation of a single foreign 
CS system. During the submission of the bill, Ahmed Nazim said that reference was 
made to the Australian Public Service Act, Canadian Public Service Employment 
                                               
134 Until the Pension Act came into force, the CSC devised a pension scheme that was fully funded by 
the government. This provisional scheme was abandoned once the contributory pension scheme 
started.   
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Act, and the Latvian State Civil Service Law (Nazim, 2005a). These laws 
represented a mixture of borrowing from established democracies and emerging 
democracies. Furthermore, in relation to participation in political activities and 
political influences, the chairperson of the parliamentary committee also revealed 
that practices in countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, and Singapore were studied during the committee stage (Shareef, 
2007). References made to the laws of other countries show that a degree of policy 
transfer occurred in the formulation of the Maldivian CS Act (refer to section 2.6 on 
policy transfer).  
 
Several components in the original CS bill, introduced by Nazim, were new to the 
Maldivian context. These include the concept of merit, an independent commission 
to run the affairs of the CS, a senior executive service, permanent secretaries 
independent of the political leaders as the operational head of government ministries, 
management advisory committee, whistle-blower protection, retirement, a public 
service minister, and a CS tribunal. For all these practices there were established 
precedents in the laws of other countries that could serve as inspiration, models, or 
templates for the Maldivian CS Act. One interviewee said, all that was done was 
“fine tuning” to adjust to the Maldivian cultural and societal norms (Interviewee 
FO10). Another said that there was no need to reinvent the wheel and all that was 
needed was modification to suit our society (Interviewee FO4).     
 
With the transfer of concepts and practices from other countries, attempts were made 
to adapt the Maldivian CS Act to be in line with what is considered “best practice”. 
It was an important aspect raised by several MPs during the parliamentary debates. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (section 2.3.3), the OECD (1996) identified a 
minimum of four main objectives needed in such legislation in order for it to be 
aligned with best practice. Table 6.18 shows how these objectives correspond with 
the CS Act of the Maldives.  
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Table 6.18: Correspondence of OECD objectives to the Civil Service Act 
Objective Maldives Civil Service Act 
Raising professional quality of staff; degree 
of independence for civil servants; ethical 
standards.  
Provide leadership and training to civil 
servants (Article 18m); enhance apolitical 
service provision (Article 18b); protection of 
civil servant rights (Article 18c); develop 
monitoring mechanism to enforce the 
regulation (Article 18g)  
Government‟s ability to change 
administration.  
President has the authority to create, abolish, 
and determine the mandate of government 
organisations (Article 64a) 
Enhance legitimacy of the CS Develop a competent CS (Article 18b); 
establishing a transparent system that 
provides reasonable and equal opportunity to 
anyone to apply to positions of the CS 
(Article 4i). 
Develop an attractive CS Develop a career-based service with 
opportunities (Article 18l) 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
 
In some respects, the new CS Act adopted in the Maldives is a significant departure 
from the past. This is mainly due to the political agenda of restricting the power of 
the president in managing public employment. Reflecting the fairly narrowly focused 
political agenda during the CS bill‟s debates, the main disagreements were based on 
a few significant issues (such as scope of the CS), while other significant issues of 
principle (such as the functions of the CSC) received relatively less attention. 
 
The language in the CS Act reveals a degree of policy transfer from foreign statutes. 
Such borrowing may be both a conscious desire to take on board some of the 
principles in a particular model of CS found in other jurisdictions, and also simply 
the convenience of having ready-made solutions from other statutes to specific issues 
of the CS. The result is the Maldivian CS Act which in some respects embodies 
classical CS principles, particularly regarding political neutrality, but in others, a 
relatively open system of employment that reflects past practices in the Maldives.   
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Since its enactment in 2007, the CS Act has undergone substantive amendments (see 
section 7.4.3). This could be interpreted as a measure of its technical quality as a 
piece of law, but in the present uncertain political environment, its future as a means 
of institutionalising a statutory CS for the long term remains in question.   
 
Based on the analysis presented in this chapter, table 6.19 summarises the CS model 
adopted in the Maldives. The next chapter focuses on the impact this model has on 
the democratisation process as well as the impact of democratisation process on this 
particular CS model. 
 
Table 6.19: The civil service model of the Maldives 
Characteristics Application in the Maldivian CS 
Legal basis General principles stated in the constitution. 
Details stated in the CS Act and regulations.  
Horizontal scope of the CS Central government and local government 
part of the CS. Schools and hospitals that are 
not corporatised are part of the CS. Political 
appointees, judiciary, legislature, security 
forces, public enterprises, and any statutory 
organisation stated as not part of the CS, are 
excluded from the CS.         
Overall management of the CS Centrally managed by the CSC.  
Code of conduct Retention of a code covering detailed 
behaviours. More extensive compared to the 
code before the statutory CS. 
Categories of civil servants Permanent civil servants, temporary civil 
servants, contract staff, and volunteers. This 
allows flexibility in hiring. 
Type of merit system Preference on academic results followed by 
experience (often measured in seniority). 
Merit used both for recruitment and 
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promotion. 
Enforcer of merit The CSC appointed by the parliament. 
Type of recruitment system Mixture of career-based and position-based 
systems – the aim is to hire the best 
candidate for each position, either from 
within or outside the CS. Provision for 
lateral entry. No entry examination. 
Centralised approval rigidly enforced by the 
CSC.   
Recruitment practices Use of interview panel with relatively 
uniform guidelines for interviewing.  
Entry requirements In addition to educational qualifications and 
length of service in the public sector, private 
sector experience can be counted for 
approximately same levels of jobs.  
Type of job classification Unified system with features of “rank-in 
job” and “rank-in person” systems – 
positions classified according to differences 
in job duties with equal pay for equal type of 
work; advancement to higher levels based on 
a combination of length of service and 
performance.  
Rewards Salary system includes a base salary and a 
fixed service allowance. A mixture of other 
allowances provided based on the type of job 
and time/place of work. All monetary 
rewards determined by the CSC in 
consultation with MOFT. An annual salary 
increment system based on performance in 
place (not operational yet).  
Promotion Promotions based on a combination of 
length of service and performance. Possible 
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only when a vacant position needs to be 
filled. Internal and external candidates need 
to compete. Educational qualification can be 
used to “jump” to certain grades. 
Performance measured annually using a 
performance appraisal form developed by 
the CSC. 
Political participation Participation in politics limited to ensure 
neutral service provisions.  
Political/administrative interface Little direct control of the CS by the political 
executive. No limit to the number of political 
appointees. Provision for political 
appointments to perform the CS duties. 
President can create, abolish, and determine 
the mandate of government organisations.  
Protection of employment Relatively low degree of protection in some 
sectors. Main threat due to prerogatives of 
the president who can enforce re-
organisations that could result in removing 
parts of the organisation or entire 
organisations from the CS.  
Employment rights Provisions in both the CS Act and the 
Employment Act.  
Restrictions on seeking additional 
employment 
No general restriction on secondary 
employment except for civil servants of 
selected organisations and professions. 
Financial incentives provided for such civil 
servants.  
Disciplinary procedures In normal circumstances following a 
sequence of advice, written caution, 
temporarily reassigning tasks, suspension, 
demotion, and dismissal. Exceptions allowed 
depending on the nature of the offence. 
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Suspension, demotion, and dismissal often 
require approval from the CSC. 
Grievance procedure PS, the CSC, employment tribunal, judicial 
courts can be approached.  
Pension and retirement General pension scheme under the Pension 
Act which covers both public and private 
sector employment. Voluntary retirement at 
age 55 and mandatory retirement at age 65. 
Pension at a reduced rate can be taken by 
retiring at age 55. 
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CHAPTER 7: CIVIL SERVICE IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A statutory CS and modern system of governance based on democratic principles are 
relatively new to the Maldives. Consequently both the CS and democratic ideals in 
the Maldivian context are at a state of evolution. This chapter argues that the model 
of CS chosen for the Maldives has a significant bearing on the democratic process 
and, conversely, the democratic process due to its infant stage hinders the attempt to 
institutionalise a professional CS in the Maldives.      
 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part focuses on the impact that 
the CS model is having on the democratisation process. The second part examines 
how the democratisation process is affecting the CS model. The last section 
examines the features that the Maldivian CS exhibits in the context of an emerging 
democracy. Though such features are not unique to emerging democracies, the 
observations from the interaction between the CS and democratic reforms in the 
Maldives are argued to be directly related to the emergence of democracy.    
 
7.2 Impact of civil service model on the democratisation process 
 
Reform of the CS has been an integral component of the democratic reforms of the 
Maldives. Examination of the administrative practices of the Maldives, as shown in 
Chapter Five, reveals that most of the basic tenets of a CS were present even prior to 
the enactment of a law governing those aspects. Nonetheless, formulation of a 
statutory CS paved the way for the lawmakers and policymakers to shape the CS 
model as they deemed appropriate. The previous chapter showed the chosen model 
to be significantly detached from the political executive but with the previous 
centralised features of administration retained. The model also had provisions in 
which the CS could play an important role in national development. This section 
presents these three aspects of the model and how they influence the democratisation 
process underway. 
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7.2.1 Impact of the independent model. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the CS model chosen for the Maldives provides 
relative independence of the CS from the political executive. The de-linking set in 
motion a process in which both the CSC and the president tested the limits of their 
respective authority. The following sections highlight the major episodes that 
unfolded in this regard. 
 
Challenges at inception. 
 
The effects of de-linking the CS and the political executive were evident even before 
the CS Act came into force. As stated in the previous chapter (section 6.4.10), 
although the CS bill was ratified by the president on May 2, 2007, the Act had a 
provision for one year to fully establish the CS. Soon after the commissioners were 
appointed on October 23, 2007, preparation to take charge of their responsibilities 
started. In this regard, the commission was aiming to take full responsibility 
regarding personnel management of all civil servants by the beginning of 2008 
(Hamdhoon, 2007). However, the chairperson of the commission revealed in late 
January 2008 that the commission had not received a response from the government 
on transferring the work from the PSD to the CSC and accused the government of 
having a “political view” on the matter (Hamdhoon, 2008a). The chairperson also 
said: 
 
This is something that should be done by both the president‟s office and the 
civil service commission. So both parties need to talk in a civilised manner by 
sitting on both sides of the table. If there is a difficult issue, we need to solve it. 
We want to go ahead in a manner where the service given to the public is not 
disrupted. We can transfer something that they have to us, only through 
negotiation. (Hamdhoon, 2008b, translation)  
 
The issue was eventually resolved when the president issued a decree to hand over 
the personnel management functions of the PSD to the CSC from March 2, 2008 
(Presidential Decree No. 2008/1). 
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Disputes between the CSC and government. 
 
A common platform for dialogue between the CSC and the government has been 
absent at times. Consequently, as soon as the CSC had control over the personnel 
management function at the beginning of March 2008, it was arguably determined to 
show its independence rather than subservience to the government of the day. 
Relations between the CSC and government were first tested in early March 2008 
when the government submitted a CS amendment bill (see section 7.4.3) to the 
parliament which aimed at changing the horizontal scope of the CS, thereby 
removing a number of organisations and positions from the authority of the CSC. A 
government minister revealed that although feedback on the bill was requested from 
the CSC, the commission refused to get engaged in any discussion regarding the 
proposed amendments (Nasheed, 2008a).
135
 Later on the commission raised its 
concerns in the media regarding the proposed amendments to the bill (Hamdhoon, 
2008c).  
 
Election of a new government in November 2008 once again led to numerous 
disputes between the CSC and the government. Although the newly-elected 
government was seeking to make the CS smaller through corporatisation and 
redundancies, the commission raised concerns about the policies: in particular, the 
government‟s attempt to enforce the provision for voluntary retirement at the age of 
55 throughout the CS (Hamdhoon, 2009a).  
 
Soon afterwards, in early April 2009, the CSC was summoned to the internal affairs 
committee of the parliament after President Nasheed sent a letter to the parliament 
complaining of what he saw as “lack of support” from civil servants and the CSC in 
implementing government‟s policies (Hamdhoon, 2009b). However, in a press 
release, the commission denied the allegations made by the president and reiterated 
its legal obligation in following the CS Act and regulation as far as personnel 
management was concerned (Hamdhoon, 2009c).   
 
                                               
135  Reference is made here to Mohamed Nasheed who served as a minister in the Gayoom 
government. He was elected to the parliament in 2009. He is an independent MP and a lawyer by 
profession. He is not the former president who has the same name. 
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Relations between the commission and the government did not fare any better during 
campaigning for the parliamentary election in April 2009. After numerous reports of 
abuse and threats towards civil servants by political appointees, the CSC announced 
it would go to the court regarding the threats (Hamdhoon, 2009d). Once the 
parliamentary election was over, a number of senior politicians openly accused the 
commission of challenging the government and creating what they perceived as a 
“state within a state” (Hamdhoon, 2009e, translation). 
    
The appointment of “responsible officers” by the CSC to island and atoll offices was 
also not a popular move as far as the government was concerned. Soon after the 
appointments were made in early 2009, the government expressed its reservations on 
the matter (Hamdhoon, 2009e). However, the CSC reiterated that it was a 
“misconception” that new positions were created: rather they were added 
responsibilities for the highest ranked civil servant in island and atoll offices (“Civil 
Service Commission Responds,” 2009). After the Minister of Home Affairs ordered 
the cancellation of the allowance to the responsible officers, the CSC submitted a 
case to the civil court to order the government to reinstate the allowance (Hamdhoon, 
2009f). On February 9, 2010, the civil court ruled in favour of the CSC (Hamdhoon, 
2010a).      
 
The biggest fallout between the CSC and the government came after the government 
instituted austerity measures in which salaries of all state employees were reduced 
from October 2009. The reduction for civil servants was enforced by an agreement 
between the government and the CSC. According to the CSC the reduced salaries 
would be in place for three months in accord with article 43
136
 of the CS Act (“Civil 
Servants‟ Salaries,” 2009). At the end of the three-month period, the government and 
the CSC provided different interpretations of the agreement between them. The 
government‟s position was that the austerity measures were needed to ensure 
economic recovery, while the CSC claimed that the proposed budget for 2010 
included sufficient revenue to reinstate the previous salaries. As a result, the CSC 
                                               
136 Aricles 43(c) and (d) of the CS Act state respectively that, “Upon consultation with Minister of 
Finance and Treasury, the Commission has the discretion to alter the salary and benefits paid under 
subsection (a) for a determined period regarding an extraordinary condition” and “The decision made 
under subsection (c) shall be revised in every three months. Where the cause of the alteration is over, 
the benefits prior to the alteration must be enforced”.  
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directed government ministries to reinstate the salaries effective from the beginning 
of 2010 (CSC, 2009b). However, when the government refused to reinstate the 
salaries of civil servants but reinstated salaries of other statutory bodies, the CSC 
took the government to court
137
 once again. In retaliation, the MOFT submitted a 
case to the police accusing the CSC of attempting to topple the government 
(Hamdhoon, 2010b).  
 
Disputes between civil servants and politicians. 
 
The dual accountabilities of civil servants to their ministers and to the CS Act have 
often been a source of friction. As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main 
complaints of the first democratically elected government arose from perceived “lack 
of support” from the CS. Government MPs and political appointees raised this issue 
on several occasions. For instance, in a parliamentary session just after the change of 
government in November 2008, MPs aligned with the government accused civil 
servants of being disloyal to the elected government and called on the CSC to take 
disciplinary action against them (Moosa, 2008a). Such political rhetoric against civil 
servants was observed on several occasions.  
 
Disputes between ministers and civil servants have gone public on several occasions. 
In one instance, in June 2009, the Minister of Human Resources, Youth and Sports 
and his PS had a public falling-out regarding an advertisement for a number of 
vacant positions which the minister asserted were contradictory to government 
policies (Haleem, 2009; Interviewee FO3). Although the PS was acting within his 
legal authority, a lack of a common vision for the organisation between the PS and 
the political appointees can often be the reason for such fall-outs.   
 
As stated in the previous section, one the biggest fallouts between the CS and the 
government was during the salary disputes in early 2010. When the CSC and the 
government took diverging stances on the matter, intense pressure was put on some 
                                               
137 The civil court delivered its judgement on April 27, 2010, in favour of the CSC. Government 
appealed the case to the High Court, which once again ruled in favour of the CSC on May 10, 2011. 
The High Court judgement was appealed to the Supreme Court, which also ruled in favour of the 
CSC, on February 16, 2012.   
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civil servants, especially on the finance officers who prepare the organisational 
salary slips (Interviewee FO3). While the CSC, through its permanent secretaries, 
directed the finance officers to prepare salaries based on reinstated salaries, the 
government, through its ministers, ordered those same finance officers to prepare the 
salaries based on the reduced level. At the height of the saga, both the CSC and the 
government threatened those finance officers with legal action (Hamdhoon, 2010c; 
Hamdhoon, 2010d). During this period, contrary to the CS Act, the Minister of 
Defence even suspended his PS when the PS instructed the finance officers to 
prepare the salary sheets based on the reinstated salaries (Hamdhoon, 2010e). 
 
These accounts of disputes over staffing numbers and determining pay call into 
question the legal basis for determining the staffing of government ministries of the 
CS. As explained in section 6.8.3, although the organisational aspects of staffing rest 
with the CSC, the MOFT is arbiter on financial matters. These events are an example 
of a disagreement, fairly common internationally, between a personnel authority with 
control over staff numbers and remuneration in the public sector and a treasury with 
the authority to manage public expenditure through a budget, but they also reflect the 
wider conflict between the CSC and the political executive over management of the 
CS.   
 
Presidentialism and constitution. 
 
It was stated in Chapter Four (section 4.3.3) that establishment of a statutory CS was 
one of the main components of the democratic reforms. Though the CS bill and the 
constitutional amendments were proceeding concurrently, the CS bill became law 
before deliberations on the new constitution were completed. More importantly, the 
Act was ratified on May 2, 2007 before the constitutional assembly decided which 
form of government – presidential or parliamentary – would be enshrined in the 
constitution. As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 6.7), when passing the 
CS bill, MPs also reiterated the importance of amending the Act to align it with the 
new constitution that was yet to be finalised. The detachment of the CS from the 
presidential form of government that was decided upon and the inability to amend 
the CS Act accordingly, as discussed in this chapter, have created friction in the 
attempts to institutionalise a professional CS. As a result, questions have been asked 
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regarding the compatibility of such an independent model of the CS with the present 
presidential form of governance (Interviewee FO5). After the presidential form of 
governance was confirmed by a public referendum, in August 2007, the government 
also raised the importance of re-adjusting the CS to suit presidentialism (refer to 
section 7.4.3). The argument of incompatibility hinges mainly on the detachment of 
the CS from the head of the state.    
 
After the CS came into operation at the start of May 2008 while the 1998 
constitution was still in effect, a stern constitutional test followed. At that stage, ten 
civil servants who were also in the people‟s special majlis challenged the CSC in 
court when those civil servants were ordered to choose between the CS job or the 
majlis seat. While those civil servants argued they were elected under the 1998 
constitution which was still in effect, the commission argued that under the CS Act 
no civil servant could hold an elected seat. Though both the Civil Court and the High 
Court ruled in favour of the civil servants, the commission stood firm. Only when the 
highest judicial authority, the president (see tables 4.2 and 4.3), ruled in favour of 
those civil servants just before the 2008 constitution was ratified, did the commission 
agree to reinstate them, but by then the special majlis was dissolved. This “chicken 
or egg” case of the CS Act and the constitution was regarded as a test of the 
independent nature of the CS from other state institutions. 
 
7.2.2 Impact of the centralised model. 
 
The examination of administration before the formulation of the statutory CS in 
Chapter Five with the examination of the CS model of the Maldives in Chapter Six 
has shown that centralised administrative practices have largely been retained in the 
statutory CS.  
 
The 2008 constitution ensures a high degree of accountability from state officials. 
Parliamentary overseeing of government functions has increased significantly under 
the current governance structure. Several civil servants have been summoned to 
parliamentary committees recently. This was uncommon before the current 
constitution. Previously, ministers were both political and administrative heads of 
their ministries. The change in the accountability framework has come in the wake of 
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the democratic reforms in which the public usually demands a high degree of 
accountability and responsiveness from state officials. With the separation of the 
administrative and political roles within the organisations and the constant public 
demand for better services, elected leaders often in turn increasingly demand faster 
and more efficient service from the civil servants. When the services are not 
delivered in such a manner, tensions arise. Part of this tension is due to the 
centralised model. 
 
The effects of the centralised model are mostly seen in the outer islands. The atoll 
and island councils elected for the first time by competitive elections, appear to be 
under significant pressure from the public to deliver better services. However, some 
councils argue that, in order to match growing public demands, they need greater 
authority in personnel management functions and setting benefits for civil servants 
working in the councils. The present route whereby the councils have to send 
personnel management requests to the central ministry which passes those requests 
to the CSC is the same mechanism that existed before the CS. The time taken during 
the lengthy process may hinder the efforts to provide faster and better services to the 
public.  
 
There are other instances, too, when the centralisation of administration has been 
questioned. For instance, in March 2011, the Male‟ City Council accused the CSC of 
not providing it with technical assistance which, the council said, was hindering the 
services it intended to provide to the public (Naafiz & Ahmed, 2011), though such 
accusations were rejected by the commission (Hamdhoon, 2011). In another 
instance, in July 2009, the Controller of Immigration and Emigration also raised the 
issue of rigidity and difficulties in working within the existing rules and regulations 
of the CS and expressed his desire to remove the organisation from the CS (Ashiya, 
2009a).   
 
These issues are due to the lack of authority given to the organisations. As examined 
in the previous chapter (section 6.8.3), approval from the CSC is required for all 
personnel management functions. Due to such centralised approval procedures, 
politicians often brand the CS as “slow”, while the CSC asserts it is simply following 
the rules.  
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7.2.3 Impact on national development. 
 
As emphasised in Chapter Five (section 5.4.7), for many years government played a 
major role in the social and economic development of the Maldives. As a result, the 
CS was also designed to maintain the provision for the government to deliver 
services to the public as deemed appropriate by the government. According to article 
26 of the CS Act, civil servants were expected to assist the government in 
implementation of the policies and programs of the government.  
 
It can be argued that alternative forms of public organisations such as SOEs are more 
efficient or responsive for some types of services and should not be constrained by 
the rules of the CS. The underlying issue here is which services as a matter of 
principle should be provided by the civil servants directly accountable to the 
government or by SOEs or by the private sector.  
 
Nasheed‟s government embarked on an extensive corporatisation agenda (see section 
6.8.2). Several organisations that belonged to the CS were corporatised. That this 
trend is reversing since his resignation, with some corporations being moved back 
into the CS, indicates that the role which the CS can play in service delivery depends 
entirely on the government of the day (Interviewees FO6, GO4, GO6).  
 
The role of the CS in the national development of the Maldives is evolving along 
with the political changes. Despite the changes, many believe the “knowledge bank” 
that the CS possesses through some of the highest qualified personnel in the country 
can be used as a catalyst for national development (Interviewees FO8, FO9). As one 
interviewee said, “civil service is the brain of the nation and politicians in an 
organised society will base their decision on the professional advice from civil 
service” (Interviewee FO4). Others believe the emphasis should be on service 
delivery, and whether the services are provided directly by the CS or SOEs is 
irrelevant (Interviewee MD1). Currently, the Maldivian CS retains significant roles 
such as provision of municipal functions, education, and a significant portion of 
health services, all of which are important for national development. 
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7.3 Impact of democratisation process on the civil service model 
 
The previous section (section 7.2) examined how the CS model influences the 
democratisation process. This section, conversely, examines how the 
democratisation process affects the CS model. To achieve this objective, the analysis 
focuses on the three types of politicisation of the CS that were described in Chapter 
Two (section 2.4.2): internal-driven politicisation, society-driven politicisation, and 
politician-driven politicisation. The main argument here is that the high degree of 
politicisation is mainly due to the model of CS adopted in the Maldives.  
 
7.3.1 Internal-driven politicisation. 
 
In basic terms, this type of politicisation arises when civil servants themselves are 
involved in political activities. As mentioned previously (section 6.4.5), civil 
servants have no restrictions on becoming a member of a political party although 
they are not allowed to be politically active. Article 53 of the CS Act was the main 
pillar restricting civil servants. However, the constitution that was ratified in August 
2008, only a few months after the statutory CS came into life, provided for political 
freedom for all citizens. Immediately the CS Act was put in the spotlight when a 
number of cases involving political participation of civil servants surfaced.  
 
One of the most high profile case was in August 2008, when the Director General of 
one of the ministries participated in a political rally, where he openly pledged his 
support for President Gayoom. He was subsequently demoted by the CSC, a decision 
challenged in the court without success. As the campaign for the presidential election 
was in full swing, a number of such incidents came into the public domain, resulting 
in a media release by the CSC warning civil servants (CSC, 2008). In total the 
commission demoted six civil servants – including the head of a drug rehabilitation 
centre in the southern island of Gan and the Director General of the Department of 
Medical Services – as well as handing out other disciplinary measures, such as 
advising and reprimanding a number of civil servants (F. Ahmed, 2008; Hamdhoon, 
2008d; Shifleen, 2008).  
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The restrictions placed on the political activities of all civil servants were seen by a 
number of civil servants as violation of their constitutional rights. As a result, a civil 
servant submitted a case to the High Court in September 2008 to nullify article 53 of 
the CS Act. On December 3, 2008, the High Court ruled that article 53 of the Act 
violated the constitutional rights and thus was invalid. The court delayed the 
implementation of the ruling for three months in order for the CS Act to be amended 
so that the restrictions on political participation could be limited to an extent that was 
justified in a free and democratic society (Hanim v. Government of the Maldives, 
2008). Rather than pursuing an amendment to the Act, government appealed the 
decision to the Supreme Court, which also upheld the High Court‟s decision on 
September 19, 2011 (Government of the Maldives v. Hanim, 2008/2011).  
 
Due to the failure to amend the Act accordingly (see section 6.8.11), the chapter on 
political participation in the CS regulation of 2008 was dropped when the regulation 
was revised on 2010. Removal of the chapter did not provide a blanket invitation to 
civil servants to be politically active as significant limitations were still in place 
through the code of conduct (Interviewee GO1). Nonetheless, opportunistic civil 
servants at times challenged the notion by participating in political activities during 
the parliamentary election campaign
138
 in early 2009, local council election 
campaign in early 2011, and on a number of other occasions such as a news 
conference conducted in mid-October 2011 by a group of senior officials at the 
Department of Penitentiary and Rehabilitation Services in which they defended their 
state minister (CSC, 2011b).    
 
The 2008 constitution gave provision for all workers to strike, a right absent in the 
previous constitutions. Strikes were almost non-existent before the new constitution. 
With the newly-given right and the absence of any restrictions for civil servants, they 
too are increasingly participating in strike action. The first major strike, however, 
came prior to the ratification of the constitution. On July 1, 2008, teachers 
throughout the country went on strike demanding better pay and working conditions. 
The second round of strikes followed after the salary was increased for the entire CS 
                                               
138 An example is a civil servant from the N. Maalhendhoo Medical Centre participating in campaign 
(F. Ahmed, 2009a). 
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from the start of 2009. In this instance, state attorneys, lecturers at the Faculty of 
Engineering Technology, and local doctors at the main government hospital went on 
strike in late February 2009 demanding greater pay rises.  
 
The third round of major strikes occurred after the pay disputes between the CSC 
and the government in early 2010. Civil servants from several organisations went on 
strike in early February 2010, after the government refused to reinstate their original 
salaries. Among them were civil servants at the Attorney General‟s Office; Ministry 
of Tourism, Arts, and Culture; and Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. 
Furthermore, numerous petitions were signed by civil servants to either reinstate 
their original salaries or to reduce working hours to allow them to pursue secondary 
employment (Hamdhoon, 2010f). 
 
7.3.2 Society-driven politicisation. 
 
In Chapter Two (section 2.4.2), society-driven politicisation was defined as the 
influence from societal groups outside the CS who “lobby” or influence the decision-
making process within the CS. As shown previously in this thesis (see sections 4.4.1, 
4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.5.1), the newly-found democratic freedom by society has 
created a politically-charged atmosphere in which direct action in pursuit of political 
objectives in the form of petitions or public protests has become common. Civil 
servants as well as politicians have thus become targets of such direct action.   
 
One strategy used by the island communities is to submit petitions to dismiss or 
transfer specific civil servants. Among such petitions include a petition signed by 
over 400 citizens of Lh. Naifaru Island in early July 2009 to dismiss the Imaam
139
 of 
the main mosque in the island (Ashiya, 2009b), a petition in June 2010 by about 450 
parents of a main school in the capital to stop the recruitment of a teacher who was 
accused of sex offences (A. A. Saeed, 2010), and a petition in January 2012 by about 
                                               
139  As mentioned in Chapter Five (section 5.2), a majority of the mosques in the Maldives are 
maintained by the government and almost all imaam are on the government payroll. Before the 
statutory CS, all imaam were government employees. Presently they are contracted staff of the CS, 
but are subject to different rules.       
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100 parents of a school in the island of S. Hithadhoo urging the transfer of the 
principal (“Hithadhoo School Ge Principal,” 2012).           
 
Another strategy used in the islands is to forcefully close down office buildings 
when a group of citizens are unhappy with civil servants. In this regard, the school 
and island office in the island of AA. Ukulhahu was shut down by citizens in early 
February 2009 accusing the organisations of inadequate service (F. Ahmed, 2009b), 
and the island office of Sh. Foakaidhoo was shut down in the same month by citizens 
when the CSC refused to dismiss or transfer the Imaam of the island mosque 
(Ashiya, 2009c). Furthermore, during the pay dispute between the government and 
the CSC in early 2010, a group of ruling party activists entered the office of the CSC 
and intimidated the staff (“Video Footage Shows,” 2010). 
 
7.3.3 Politician-driven politicisation. 
 
Although internal-driven and society-driven politicisation is present to some extent 
in the Maldives, the most significant mode – and the one that has the most impact on 
the CS model – is politician-driven politicisation. This section examines this type of 
politicisation in relation to the literature presented in Chapter Two (section 2.4.2).    
 
Modes of politicisation. 
 
A framework to assess this mode of politicisation was presented in Chapter Two 
(section 2.4.2). It focuses on the approach a new government chooses towards 
inherited senior officials and the field from which new appointments are made. This 
framework is used here, however, to assess the roots of the political appointees in the 
Maldivian ministries. A comparison is made here between the political appointees 
prior to the 2008 presidential election and after the new government came in. Table 
7.1 provides the approximate percentage of changes in the most senior ranks of 
political appointments.  
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Table 7.1: Modes of politicisation 
 Non-
politicisation 
(retained) 
Bounded 
politicisation 
(chosen from 
existing 
bureaucracy) 
Open 
politicisation 
(chosen from 
outside the 
public sector) 
Partisan 
politicisation 
(chosen based 
on party 
affiliation) 
Presidential 
advisers 
- - - 100% (5) 
Senior ministers - - - 100% (1) 
Ministers - 33% (4) - 67% (8) 
State ministers - 43% (24) - 57% (32) 
Deputy 
ministers 
4% (3) 20% (16) - 76% (63) 
Source: PO (2008, 2011) 
Note: The actual numbers are given in brackets. 
 
As the above table shows, a majority of political appointees were replaced when the 
new government came to power. This was despite the retention of a number of 
officials from the previous government. The turnover in political posts shows that, in 
the Maldives, partisan politicisation is most common followed by bounded 
politicisation and a low degree of non-politicisation. The absence of recruiting 
outsiders from a non-political setting shows open politicisation is almost non-
existent.  
 
Thickening of government. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.4.2), thickening involves making political 
appointments into the ministerial bureaucracy. Thickening of government can be in 
the form of appointments for various oversight functions or to functions already 
carried out by civil servants. Such appointments can be a small fraction of the total 
state sector workforce, but in most cases they are a rather significant source of 
layering between elected officials and civil servants. This section examines 
thickening of government in the Maldives.  
 
Article 115(f) of the constitution ratified in August 2008 grants to the president the 
power to appoint “officials necessary for the proper functioning of the duties of his 
office”, considered a “blank cheque” (Interviewee GO6) to the president. As a result, 
immediately after the ratification of the constitution, President Gayoom issued a 
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decree specifying the posts and organisations that he considered as necessary to fulfil 
his duties. In this regard, the most significant organisations removed from the 
purview of the CS were the PO and the presidential palace
140
 (Presidential Decree 
No. 2008/9), which contained a total of 247 and 295 employees
141
 respectively.    
 
The change of government soon afterwards saw the use of this presidential power to 
a greater extent. Some even accused the Nasheed government of abusing this power 
(Interviewee FO10). Rather than confining his appointments through a decree that 
specified the organisations and posts that fell under article 115(f) of the constitution, 
President Nasheed continued appointing personnel to different organisations using 
the constitutional authority. One approach was to appoint personnel to the political 
cadre while the other approach was to appoint personnel to functions that the CS was 
carrying out. By using the latter approach, President Nasheed appointed an 
increasing number of staff to perform duties previously primarily carried out by civil 
servants. Such appointments include (1) advisers to the ministers, (2) co-ordinators 
to the provinces
142
, (3) co-ordinators to Male‟ city council, (4) a senior project 
director to one of the ministries (see section 6.8.2), (5) additional secretaries at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (6) a food security co-ordinator to one of the ministries, 
and (7) councillors. Such political appointees basically had the same job descriptions 
as civil servants (Interviewee FO10). Use of the first approach, vertical thickening, 
was also significantly greater in the Nasheed government compared to his 
predecessor. Table 7.2 shows a comparison of the highest ranked political appointees 
for the two governments.          
 
                                               
140 The PO is the highest public office in the Maldives and acts as the hub of the government. It 
oversees all government functions and advises the president accordingly. The presidential palace is 
the official residence of the president. During the reign of President Gayoom, the staff at the 
presidential palace increased significantly. In addition to staff for maintenance and housekeeping, a 
significant number of staff were hired for administrative tasks at the presidential palace. Such tasks 
included responding to letters sent to the president by the public and granting welfare assistance for 
those who seek assistance from the president. Often such functions were a duplication of the services 
provided by government ministries.  
141 Source: CSC (personal communication, March 21, 2012) 
142 The province was a concept introduced by the Nasheed government. During his reign the country 
was divided into seven provinces, with political appointees heading the provinces. After his 
resignation, the new government abolished the provinces.  
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Table 7.2: Comparison of highest ranked political appointments 
 Gayoom 
government 
Nasheed 
government 
Percentage change 
Presidential advisers 1 5 400% increase 
Senior ministers 4 1 75% decrease 
Ministers 24 14 42% decrease 
State ministers 9 56 522% increase 
Deputy ministers 43 82 91% increase 
TOTAL 81 158 95% increase 
Source: PO (2008, 2011). 
Note: Total number of ministers in Nasheed government was 14. In table 7.1, total number of 
ministers is given as 12 because two portfolios were vacant on May 5, 2011 – that date being when 
the list was derived. 
 
Pressure by political appointees on civil servants. 
 
The most evident manner of politicisation of the CS is through the direct pressures of 
political appointees on civil servants. Some aspects of this have been examined 
previously in this chapter. The focus in this section is on groups of specific civil 
servants who were in the direct path of political pressure and threats. Such an 
overview is presented because as soon as Nasheed‟s government came into power, 
political appointees were openly challenging the CSC as well as openly discrediting 
civil servants in political rallies (Interviewee FO6).  
 
Threats by politicians have been evident at times when civil servants went on strike. 
In this regard, doctors and nurses were warned by leading officials of the ruling 
MDP when the doctors protested and nurses threatened to strike during the pay 
disputes in early 2009 (H. Mohamed, 2009).    
 
Particular threats and pressure by political appointees were observed during 
campaigning for the parliamentary election of 2009. At times, councillors appointed 
by the president ordered civil servants to move to another island for the duration of 
the election. Such incidents were particularly seen in the islands of N. Landhoo (F. 
Ahmed, 2009c), Th. Thimarafushi and Th. Guraidhoo (Hamdhoon, 2009g). 
Furthermore, in a political rally during April 2009, Faafu atoll councillor threatened 
to dismiss a senior civil servant working in the council (Jameel, 2009).  
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In some other instances, elected councils have refused to work with specific civil 
servants and issued motions in this regard. Such incidents were witnessed in the 
islands of Th. Thimarafushi (“Rashu Council Hingumah,” 2011), V. Fulidhoo 
(“Fulidhoo Council Ge Civil Service,” 2011), GDh. Thinadhoo (“Thinadhoo 
Katheebu Ge Eheetheriyaa,” 2011), and Sh. Lhaimagu (“Lhaimagu Chief 
Suspended,” 2012).      
 
At times, senior civil servants have also resigned due to political pressure. A case in 
point was the resignation of the Director General of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, who resigned in protest at political interference when a massive fine was 
imposed on a resort developer who was also running a TV station critical of the 
government (“Police Summon EPA Chief,” 2011). Senior government officials 
confirmed the existence of such political interference in the daily operations of the 
CS (Interviewee GO5). 
 
Such threats and pressure by political appointees and elected officials have been 
found, in most cases, to be contrary to the CS law. As a result, the CSC has often 
defended the civil servants and expressed concerns regarding the continuing 
politicisation of the CS. For example, press statements by the commission in early 
February 2009 and late April 2009 urged political leaders not to threaten civil 
servants (Hamdhoon, 2009h; CSC, 2009c). In some instances, the commission has 
also resorted to the courts in defence of specific civil servants. The most prominent 
case in this respect was regarding the deputy principle of GDh. Atoll Educational 
Centre who was suspended by the province office (Hamdhoon, 2009i). 
 
7.4 Civil service in an emerging democracy 
 
Civil services across the globe can show specific features and face challenges and 
obstacles irrespective of the extent to which democracy has matured and has been 
ingrained in the political culture of that particular nation. Emerging democracies are 
no exception in this respect. The path the CS has followed in the Maldives since 
gaining statutory status has been far from smooth. Such uneasiness can be attributed 
to the newness of both the CS and democracy and the lack of a common 
understanding of how to operate professionally in such a setting. This section 
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examines three main aspects related to this: 1) the law-oriented approach of the CS; 
2) de-institutionalisation of the CS; and 3) frequent amendments to the CS Act. An 
important point here is that these features and challenges are not necessarily evident 
only in emerging democracies. However, what is being witnessed in the Maldives is 
particularly due to the fact that the nation is an emerging democracy and due to the 
chosen model of the CS that is relatively independent of the political executive and is 
highly centralised. 
 
7.4.1 Law-oriented approach of the civil service. 
 
As evident from the previous two chapters, the centralised nature of administration 
prior to the establishment of the statutory CS has been preserved. The enactment of a 
law has predominantly been a nuance as far as the administration setup is concerned. 
The CS Act has been the legal base and the commission can formulate regulations 
governing different aspects of the CS. This legal authority has been used extensively 
by the CSC to regulate all aspects of the CS. Such a law-oriented approach has at 
times been the cause of rigidity and inflexibility in the operations of the CS 
(Interviewee GO6).  
 
The previous chapter referred to several aspects of the CS regulation. An 
examination of the CS regulation shows the CSC‟s desire to regulate each and every 
aspect governing the CS. For instance, the first regulation published by the CSC in 
March 2008 had 19 chapters, which grew to 32 chapters within four years. While one 
might argue the importance of having all aspects regulated by a central agency to 
ensure uniformity, such detailed regulations and guidelines have at times been a 
hindrance to innovation and flexibility by the CS organisations as well as a cause for 
delays due to procedural guidelines.  
 
Such extensive regulation and rigidity has often been a flashpoint when dealing with 
the government as well. In this regard, the interpretation of the Act by the 
commission was put to the test even prior to the full establishment of the CS. The 
CSC was adamant that all judges, except the judges at the High Court belong to the 
CS, while the government insisted that all judges irrespective of the title or the court 
were exempt from the CS. In March 2008, one of the commissioners said: 
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We do not have to interpret the law. The Act mentions fandiyaaru.
143
 The 
constitution says fandiyaaru. It does not mention qaal’ee or magistrates. If 
they belong to the same group, why is there so much difference? Why didn‟t 
the law refer to fandiyaaru and others who do similar work? But the law says 
fandiyaaru and only the High Court has fandiyaaru. (A. A. Saeed, 2008, 
translation) 
 
Eventually the commission backed down under intense pressure from the legal 
community. However, the commission enforced mandatory retirement on a number 
of presidential appointments in May 2008, insisting that the job title of such 
individuals were not listed in the exclusion list of the Act and thus they belonged to 
the CS. Such a literalist and pedantic interpretation by the commission has been 
controversial in a number of other instances, some of which have been highlighted 
previously in this chapter.        
 
The letter-of-the-law approach has also put the commission in the spotlight when 
political pressure mounts. One such case was the attempt by the commission to 
appoint a qualified teacher to one of the main schools in the capital, a teacher who 
was accused of sexual misconduct but acquitted by the court. The school 
management, the school board, and parents were all against the appointment but the 
commission argued that there were no grounds for refusing his appointment as he 
was found not guilty by the court (A. A. Saeed, 2010). In another case, the 
commission was accused of reacting too slowly to take disciplinary measures against 
a senior civil servant in the island of Fuvahmulah who publicly discredited the 
president (Interviewee GO5). Furthermore, in a number of other cases, the 
commission has stood firm on certain civil servants with whom some island councils 
and atoll councils have refused to work. References to a number of such incidents 
were given previously in this chapter. Though the commission followed the set 
procedures on such matters, its alleged inflexibility has been criticised.   
 
                                               
143 In Dhivehi language the term fandiyaaru is commonly used for judges. Previously the term was 
also used as the official title of the chief justice (see section 5.2). For lower level judges, the term 
qaal’ee has been used. Under the present judicial hierarchy, judges at the Supreme Court and the High 
Court are called fandiyaaru, judges at the superior courts are called qaal’ee and judges at the island 
courts are called magistrates.  
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The inflexibility has at times been directed at the civil servants as well. This occurs 
when civil servants are accused of shirking, sabotage, or using extra-procedural 
tactics to delay work. One interviewee described it as “tricks” in the bags of civil 
servants that are used to delay or block some of the government‟s policies 
(Interviewee PL2). As a senior government official indicated, at times civil servants 
object to policies forwarded by the political appointees on the basis that past 
administrative practices do not accommodate the implementation of such policies 
(Interviewee GO5). The official went on to add that administrative practices are “not 
written on stone” and civil servants are at times reluctant to change past behaviours 
and offer alternative solutions to their political masters (Interviewee GO5). As a 
result, civil servants are also found at fault due to their rigidity.    
 
7.4.2 De-institutionalisation of the civil service. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (section 2.4.3), de-institutionalisation: 
 
implies that existing institutional borders, identities, rules, and practices; 
descriptions, explanations, and justifications, and resources and powers are 
becoming more contested and possibly discontinued. New actors are 
mobilized. Outcomes are more uncertain, and it is necessary to use more 
incentives or coercion to make people follow prescribed rules and to sanction 
deviance. (Olsen, 2009, p. 10)  
 
The short history of the statutory CS in the Maldives shows signs of various 
strategies being used to re-define the boundaries of the CS as well as attempts to 
arguably dismantle the CS using such approaches. All of these are directly related to 
the new-found democracy that the country has embraced. The following highlights 
each of the main approaches used in this respect.  
 
Changing the horizontal scope through legislation. 
 
The manner in which the horizontal scope is defined in the CS Act was discussed in 
the previous chapter (section 6.8.2). The employees of any organisation can be 
removed from the civil service by an Act of the majlis, and political leaders have 
232 
 
used this approach in some instances to reduce its scope. Some officials believe that 
such fragmentation of the CS defeats the primary objective for the creation of the CS 
in the first place (Interviewee GO4). Table 7.3 shows the organisations removed 
from the CS in this manner.  
 
Table 7.3: Organisations removed from civil service through legislation 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Police (3120)  Inland Revenue (39) Customs (710) 
 Police Integrity 
Commission (9) 
  University (447) 
 Elections Commission 
(39) 
   
 State Prosecutors (38)    
 Anti-Corruption Board 
(52) 
   
 Judiciary (1053)    
Total 4311 0 39 1157 
Source: CSC (personal communication, March 21, 2012)  
Note: Numbers of staff removed from the CS in brackets 
 
Among the organisations mentioned in the above table, most organisations that were 
granted statutory status in 2008 were perceived by the lawmakers to be legal and 
quasi-legal authorities that should not be subject to direction by the president (refer 
to table 4.3). However, since the option to remove any organisation through 
legislation is available (see section 6.8.2), the possibility of using this strategy is 
always open. A case in point includes the omission of the Maldives Customs Service 
and the Maldives Civil Aviation Authority from the CS when their respective laws 
came into force in May 2011 and January 2012 respectively. As mentioned 
previously (see section 7.2.2), other organisations have also expressed their desire to 
choose this path due to what they perceive as the rigid rules of the CS. Furthermore, 
as the top appointments to most of such organisations are made by the president, the 
incentive for using this strategy is always present.   
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Changing the horizontal scope by corporatisation. 
 
Corporatisation of the CS organisations was one of the main approaches used by the 
Nasheed government in order to curb the CS. Table 7.4 shows the organisations and 
the number of civil servants removed by this approach.  
 
Table 7.4: Organisations removed from civil service through corporatisation 
 2009 2010 2011 
 State Radio (261) Hospitals (1523) Hospitals (2935) 
 State TV (218) Regional Airports (149) Tourism Promotion (15) 
 Construction (58)  Regional Airports (119) 
TOTAL 537 1672 3069 
Source: CSC (personal communication, March 21, 2012)  
Note: Numbers of staff removed from the CS in brackets. 
 
The government retained all the shares after the above-mentioned organisations were 
converted to corporations. The boards of directors of all those corporations were 
appointed by the government and have full authority for personnel management 
within the corporation. As a result, both redundancies and appointments based on 
political affiliations have been witnessed on a number of occasions. Accusations 
have been directed at the government of using such strategies to force employees to 
work “at the mercy of political appointees” (Interviewee FO10). A common 
conception is that, after such employees are removed from the protection offered by 
the CS Act, at times they have been threatened with dismissal if they refuse to join 
the ruling party (Interviewee FO1).  
 
Decentralisation of tasks in the capital to outer islands. 
 
One of the most controversial approaches used by the Nasheed government was the 
decentralisation of a number of the CS functions formerly delivered in the capital to 
the islands by moving some services to islands along with the civil servants 
providing them. The objective of this decentralisation was to strengthen the elected 
city, atoll, and island councils (see section 4.3.3) and deliver services closer to the 
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people - a significant shift from past practices where central ministries controlled all 
aspects of administration (see section 5.4.4).  
 
Some interviewees argued that the government‟s decentralisation policy was an 
attempt to make a number of civil servants redundant (Interviewees CV1, FO7). 
They argued that the government was aware of the difficulties such civil servants 
would face moving to other islands without additional benefits. One of the biggest 
decentralisation initiatives was in early January 2009 when the Ministry of Home 
Affairs sent an application to the CSC to make about 1000 civil servants redundant 
(Hamdhoon, 2009j), though the ministry later insisted that they were simply 
restructuring to provide services at the province level (F. Ahmed, 2009d, 2009e). 
Although most of the redundant civil servants were eventually offered other CS jobs 
in the capital Male‟, the desire by the political masters to restructure was perceived 
by some civil servants as a direct attempt to politicise the CS.   
 
Figure 7.1: Civil servants working in Male’ and atolls 
 
Source: CSC (personal communication, August 27, 2012); DNP (2010, 2011) 
 
Despite the controversies surrounding the attempts to decentralise, as shown in 
figure 7.1, the Nasheed government gained significant success in shifting the balance 
of the number of civil servants working in Male‟ and the atolls. Such a shift can be 
considered important in the efforts towards decentralisation.   
 
2008 December 2009 December 2010 December 2011 December
 12,702  
 10,230   9,478  
 6,950  
 11,567  
 13,855  
 12,367  
 12,175  
Civil servants - Male' vs Atolls 
Atolls
Male'
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Higher salaries at other statutory organisations. 
 
Democratic reform that established numerous statutory bodies has also brought 
fragmentation to the state sector. As each individual statutory body has the legal 
right to set the salaries for its staff, significant differences have emerged. The CS is 
the biggest employer in the state sector. However, other independent bodies in most 
cases set their staff salaries relatively higher than the CS salaries. Table 7.5 shows a 
total salary comparison made by Haveeru Daily where similar designations in 
different organisations were compared to that of the CS for the year 2009. 
 
Table 7.5: Total salary comparison between civil service and selected other 
organisations 
Designation Organisation Salary 
(in MVR) 
The CS 
salary (in 
MVR) 
Salary gap 
(in MVR) 
Deputy Director 
General, 
Investigation 
Anti-Corruption 
Commission 
26,700 14,400 12,300 
Executive Director Elections Commission 25,706 17,560 8146 
Assistant Director 
General 
Prosecutor General‟s 
Office 
19,635 13,065 6570 
Director Dept. of Judicial 
Administration 
17,652.50 10,835 6817.50 
Senior Officer Police Integrity 
Commission 
10,134.50 7610 2524.50 
Administrative 
Officer 
Police Integrity 
Commission 
7974.65 5965 2009.65 
IT Officer Elections Commission 9357 6520 2837 
Labourer Prosecutor General‟s 
Office 
5819 4100 1719 
Source:  A. Saeed (2010) 
 
These and similar discrepancies between the salaries of the CS jobs and similar jobs 
in other state organisations have become a significant issue that has resulted in the 
exodus of professional civil servants to places that offer better salaries (Interviewee 
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GO6). In addition to statutory bodies, the growing number of SOEs has also attracted 
professional civil servants. In reference to this issue, the chairperson of the CSC 
said:   
 
Technical and professional staff in civil service is moving to SOEs [and other 
statutory bodies] because they offer better pay compared to civil service. For 
example, the former Department of Inland Revenue was changed to an 
independent organisation in the name of Maldives Inland Revenue Authority. 
After they changed their legal status, they offer much higher salaries. As a 
result, professionals in the finance field are moving there. (Hamdhoon, 2010g, 
translation) 
 
Several countries have followed similar paths in making similar authorities, such as 
the tax authority, independent organisations, mainly to clean out corruption and 
attract and retain competent professionals such as accountants who would otherwise 
have to take a significant cut in income to become civil servants. In the Maldives, as 
the CS offers the lowest salaries within the state sector, it often loses out in 
competition for limited supply of qualified professionals. Expressing his concerns 
about this exodus from the CS, the chairperson of the CSC indicated that they were 
not able to fill vacancies even at the director‟s level (Hamdhoon, 2010g), which is a 
senior position in the organisation (see figure 6.2).  
 
Political appointees’ role ambiguity.  
 
Before the CS Act, the minister was in charge of all aspects of the organisation, 
including personnel management. As one interviewee stated, at that time the minister 
was the political and the administrative head of the organisation (Interviewee PL2). 
In other words, the distinction between politics and administration was almost non-
existent prior to the formation of the statutory CS. The introduction of a CS that was 
solely focused on administration and delivering the policies of the government of the 
day undoubtedly required a shift in mentality on the part of both civil servants and 
political appointees.  
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A clear demarcation between the CS and politics is probably an elusive goal (refer to 
section 2.4.1). The objective for establishing a distinction between the CS and 
politics thus relies mostly on relative terms. However, the fairly quick speed at 
which the Maldives embraced democracy did not provide adequate time for political 
figures to assimilate into this new system of governance where politicians focus 
primarily on policy and civil servants focus primarily on implementation. A 
“learning period, adjustment period, transitional period, [and an] acceptance period” 
(Interviewee GO4) is required to achieve that.   
 
The inability of the political appointees to adapt to the new relatively demarcated 
role was evident from the early stages. A senior government official summarises the 
picture as follows: 
 
They don‟t know what to do. They don‟t know what their roles are. So they 
come and try to do the same thing the permanent secretary does. They tell 
people what to do, take over certain sections, try to manage things. They do 
exactly the same things that civil servants do. They perform the same tasks as 
civil servants do. (Interviewee GO5)  
 
As stated earlier, the lack of relative clarity on the appropriate role of political 
appointees can also be attributed to the young democracy in the Maldives. Firstly, 
the old ways in which the ministers run all aspects of the organisation have not yet 
been fully replaced (Interviewees GO5, GO6). Secondly, the newly established 
multi-party system brings to the CS organisations politicians who are at times totally 
new to the public sector (Interviewees CV1, FO3, FO4, FO7, FO8, GO6). Thirdly 
some political appointees claim they have the required technical expertise and thus 
reject the CS (Interviewee GO5). Fourthly, some technical experts were elevated to 
political positions but continued their technical role rather than shifting to a political 
role (Interviewee GO5). Due to such practices that are predominantly due to the 
novelty aspect of democracy, considerable time is required to have a harmonious 
system in place (Interviewees FO4, GO3, PL2). Nonetheless, the boundary between 
the roles may always be permeable and contested, although a distinction remains. 
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7.4.3 Frequent amendments to the Civil Service Act. 
 
The CS Act is a relatively new piece of legislation in Maldivian legislative history. 
Nonetheless, it has seen one of the highest numbers of amendments proposed to any 
law. A number of successful and unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend 
the CS Act in the past few years. Most such amendment bills have been driven by 
the political power play between the contending factions in the parliament. Although 
the proposed amendments – passed, failed, or pending – were not intended to alter 
the basic principles of the CS, they affect its stability. The following outlines the CS 
amendment bills, their objectives, and the outcomes.  
 
In a letter sent by the PO to the relevant minister on January 22, 2008, a directive 
was given to submit a CS bill that included provisions to: delay mandatory 
retirement by one year; remove the provision given to the CSC to retire civil servants 
at the age of 55 and give that choice to the civil servants themselves; reduce the time 
for servants to resign before standing for public office from six months prior to 
election date to ten days after the election date is announced; narrow the meaning of 
political participation for civil servants; and include a provision for consultation with 
the political head of the organisation prior to the appointment of permanent 
secretaries (PO Letter, 2008). Government submitted an amendment bill to the majlis 
on March 3, 2010 – a bill that was wider in context than the directives of the PO. 
Additions in the bill included: narrowing the scope of the CS by excluding a 
significant number
144
 of staff from the CS; provision for a civil servant to return to 
his/her previous job after serving in a political post appointed by the president; and 
allowing those MPs who have been working also in the CS at the inception of the CS 
to retain both their jobs until they resign or the parliamentary term expires (Civil 
Service Amendment Bill, 2008a). The CS was to become operational at the 
beginning of May 2008 and this bill turned out to be very controversial. Opposition 
MPs argued that the bill proved the insincerity of the government about establishing 
a statutory CS.       
 
                                               
144 During the parliamentary debates on April 1, 2008, Minister of Legal Reform, Information and 
Arts revealed that an additional 5622 staff would be excluded from the CS if the amendment were 
passed (Nasheed, 2008b).  
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The second reading of the bill proceeded on March 17, 2008. During the submission 
of the bill, Minister of Legal Reform, Information and Arts, Mohamed Nasheed
145
 
focused on two main points – re-adjustment of the bill to suit a presidential form of 
government, and to provide a buffer for about 1700 employees who would be forced 
to retire when the CS was fully established at the start of May 2008 (Nasheed, 
2008c). The parliamentary debate that followed was predominantly fiercely against 
the proposed amendments. Among the many MPs opposed to such amendments, 
Ahmed Nazim who was the sponsor of the CS bill, said “when the time has come to 
implement the Civil Service Act and when [the government] acts in this manner, it 
shows the lack of good faith” (Nazim, 2008, translation). He went on to state that the 
rationale presented by the government was invalid and accused the government of 
failing to attend to the retirement issue since the passing of the bill in April 2007 
(Nazim, 2008). As the constitutional assembly was nearing the completion of the 
constitution and a presidential election was looming, support for rejecting the bill 
was strong despite some valid and necessary changes
146
 that were proposed in it. 
After three days of spirited, passionate, and rhetorical debating by opposition and 
government-aligned MPs, voting on the bill took place on April 1, 2008. After a 
number of government-aligned MPs, citing conflict of interest, abstained from 
voting, the bill failed by a slim margin of two votes. The result was perceived as a 
victory for the opposition after it ran a strong campaign against the bill in the media.  
 
After the disappointing outcome for the government, the following day it announced 
that it would submit another amendment bill that aimed to establish a number of 
different independent organisations that were not part of the CS (Moosa, 2008b). The 
government aimed to re-formulate the structure of the previous amendments by 
proposing several independent organisations such as a judicial administration 
commission, police commission, and a parliamentary service. This strategy was 
deployed because opposition MPs accused the government of removing those 
                                               
145 As mentioned previously (section 7.2.1), he served as a minister in the Gayoom government. He is 
not the former president who has the same name.  
146 Among the sectors and posts that the government proposed to add to the exclusion list of CS were 
state ministers, advisers to the president, state dignitaries, political advisers and secretaries of 
ministers, island chiefs, staff of the PO and presidential palace, police service, judiciary, 
parliamentary service, elections commission, and anti-corruption board. These posts and organisations 
were eventually removed from the purview of the CS after the 2008 constitution and the subsequent 
laws came into force.   
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services from the CS to keep them under the authority of the president. Nonetheless, 
the bill never made it to the parliament as the government was once again pre-
occupied with the rapid political changes underway during that period. 
 
Soon after, on May 1, 2008, the Maldivian CS was established and became fully 
operational. Immediately, 1714 government employees were retired by the CSC 
(Hamdhoon, 2008e). The government had therefore failed in its previous attempts to 
delay the retirement. Regardless of the political setback, on June 9, 2008 government 
once again submitted a CS amendment bill to the parliament. However, this bill did 
not include any of the controversial topics that were included previously. Rather the 
only element covered in the bill was to provide a choice for the retirees to choose 
either to receive full salary for an extra two years or an alternative benefit package 
formulated by the CSC (Civil Service Amendment Bill, 2008b). The first reading of 
the bill was held on June 9, 2008. In the charged political atmosphere of that period, 
there was no lack of political rhetoric during the debate on this bill as well. One MP 
even condemned the PSD for its lack of vision and its failure to propose all the 
required changes to the original CS bill during its long route in the parliament 
(Adam, 2008). Nonetheless, the bill went through the parliamentary process 
smoothly and was passed comfortably on July 21, 2008. Upon ratification by the 
president, the bill became law on August 5, 2008.  
 
One more amendment bill that was politically significant was submitted before the 
end of 2008. It was presented by Aneesa Ahmed, MP from Mulaku Atoll. The bill 
aimed to change article 51(a) of the CS Act which focused on resignation of civil 
servants contesting for public elections. The rationale for submitting the bill was that 
the current six months period stipulated in the Act was not practical as most 
elections, especially bi-elections, were announced much closer to the election dates, 
and so the six months period should be changed to a maximum of three days from 
the date the election was announced (Civil Service Amendment Bill, 2008c). 
Parliamentary debate on the bill commenced on November 26, 2008, after the 
presidential election which were held the previous month. With the new government 
in place, the composition of the parliament also changed as the newly-elected 
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president replaced the eight MPs who had been appointed
147
 by the outgoing 
president. As a result, the new government had a comfortable majority in the 
parliament which it used to reject the bill on February 23, 2009. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter (see sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.3.3), the perception of the CS among the 
newly-elected government was not favourable and so MPs aligned with the 
government were eager to show a negative image of the civil servants and in the 
meantime vowing to “clean” the CS from the influences of the previous regime 
(Afeef, 2008, 2009).   
 
The next amendment bill was considered most significant in terms of re-designing an 
element of the CS model. It was submitted by Ibrahim Muhtholib, MP from Fares-
maathodaa. The bill aimed to shift on the parliament the responsibilities of the 
president in appointing and dismissing the CS commissioners. As the commissioners 
had to be re-appointed prior to the end of the constitutional interim period (August 7, 
2010), both sides of the political divide were eager to gain the upper hand in the 
appointment process. The first reading of the bill was held on October 20, 2009. An 
opposition coalition had the majority in the majlis during that period. The debates 
were split along party lines as the MPs aligned with the government advocated 
keeping the current setup while opposition MPs wanted control brought to the majlis 
where they had the majority. According to opposition MPs, the proposed 
amendments were necessary to de-politicise the CS from the government‟s 
influences thereby making it a fully independent institution (Maniku, 2009). On the 
other hand, MPs supporting the government repeatedly accused the proposed 
amendment of being against the principles of the presidential form of government 
that the nation had embraced (Easa, 2009). MPs aligned with the ruling MDP made 
passionate pleas not to use the parliamentary majority to gather powers towards the 
parliament by what they considered was an amendment against the constitution and 
presidentialism. Nevertheless, on June 21, 2010, the opposition-controlled majlis 
comfortably passed the second CS amendment bill. The bill was then vetoed by 
President Nasheed but went back to the majlis and on July 14, 2010, was passed 
once again with a full majority of the majlis, overriding the presidential veto. 
                                               
147 Though the new constitution was ratified in August 2008, the parliament that was elected under the 
previous constitution remained until the new parliament was elected under the new constitution.  
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Consequently the constitution required the president to give his assent and the bill 
eventually became law on July 21, 2010. 
 
By February 2012, three more amendment bills had been submitted and were at 
different stages of the parliamentary process. Those bills were submitted by Abdul 
Raheem Abdulla, MP from Fonadhoo dhaairaa on November 17, 2009; Moosa 
Maniku, MP from Hulhuhenveyru dhaairaa on October 26, 2010; and Ibrahim 
Latheef, MP from Hithadhoo dhekunu dhaairaa on September 4, 2011. The first bill 
focused on detailing the benefits for civil servants who were made redundant through 
restructuring. The second bill was an attempt to repeal the second amendment to the 
CS Act that removed the president‟s powers in appointing and dismissing the 
commissioners. The more contentious bill appeared to be the third one, which 
removed all the barriers to running for political office for both commissioners and 
civil servants: candidates would not need to resign though they would have to leave 
if elected. During the parliamentary debates, some MPs expressed concern that the 
amendment would effectively remove the professionalism of civil servants and 
dismantle the whole concept of the CS (Waheed, 2011). This bill failed at the first 
parliamentary reading on June 6, 2012.  
 
The most comprehensive amendments proposed to the CS Act have been from the 
CSC. According to article 74 of the CS Act, the commission is obliged to submit a 
report along with proposed amendments to the Act after one year of full 
implementation. Although the commission sent a detailed amendment bill to the 
parliament, it did not reach the floor of parliament due to the fact that a MP is 
required to submit bills to the floor.
148
 The changes proposed by the commission did 
not include any changes to the principles of the CS or the CS model. Proposed 
amendments included removing contradictions within the Act and contradictions 
between the CS Act and the Employment Act, providing greater clarity on a number 
of aspects such as political participation and the responsibilities of permanent 
secretaries, aligning a number of articles with the 2008 constitution, providing 
                                               
148 All bills are required to be submitted by a MP, either affiliated with the government or opposition. 
Under the current parliamentary regulations, unfortunately no mechanism exists in which 
amendments proposed by statutory organisations can be submitted to the parliament floor. 
Government is often reluctant to submit such bills through the ruling party MPs. 
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greater protection for civil servants when restructuring, and provision for the CSC to 
make changes to the CS needed to accommodate the policies
149
 of the government of 
the day (Civil Service Amendment Bill, 2009). 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focuses mainly on the primary research question
150
 of the thesis. It 
examines the impact the CS model has on the democratisation process and 
conversely the impact of the democratisation process on the CS model of the 
Maldives. The chapter also examines the Maldivian CS in the context of an emerging 
democracy.         
 
The Maldivian experience shows that, on the positive side, the ills of the past where 
personnel management was driven by political patronage have been put to rest 
(Interviewee FO3). The CS is incrementally developing into a professional body. 
Nonetheless, the democratic polity appears to progress at a slower pace. The 
nascency of democracy in the Maldives has created a politically-charged 
environment where political rationality dominates. As the CS and democracy operate 
in the same domain, the domination by politics of the CS has at times proven to have 
an adverse effect on the attempt to create a professional CS. Therefore, democratic 
maturity is paramount to establish a fruitful link between the two processes so that 
the CS and democracy can go hand-in-hand in the intended manner.   
 
The chapter also shows that one of the reasons for the current anomalies in the 
interaction between the CS and democracy is the independent model of the CS 
chosen in the Maldives. The detachment of the CS from the control of the political 
executive has been found particularly troubling when the implementation of different 
aspects of the CS is considered. As a result, the political executive devises numerous 
strategies in its attempt to limit the role of or bypass the CS by “thickening” or 
moving functions out of the CS into SOEs.   
 
                                               
149 For instance, public-private partnerships. 
150 What effects has the current model of CS had on the democratisation process and vice versa? 
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The statutory CS inherited a centralised administrative model. The decision to 
continue with such centralised administrative practices did not complement the 
decentralised political model. The political leaders perceived this incompatibility as 
an inflexibility of the CS, resulting in further politicisation of the CS.    
 
The next chapter provides an overall conclusion to the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The primary purpose of this study has been to analyse a case of the development of 
a CS model as part of a process of democratisation in the Maldives. A secondary 
purpose was to examine how the process of democratisation and choice of the CS 
model was different because the Maldives was a small-island state. The theoretical 
framework used to operationalise these objectives was centered on the concepts of 
civil service, democratisation, and small-island states. Although these concepts are 
discussed widely in the contemporary literature, they have not as yet been presented 
in an integrated manner and this thesis attempted to fill this gap. By examining the 
case of the Maldives, this gap was addressed by: 
 
a) Describing the CS model of the Maldives in relation to the options 
available for its development; 
b) Analysing the process by which the political actors in the Maldives arrived 
at the current model of CS during the transition to a multi-party democracy 
and the reasons for the choices they made;  
c) Analysing the interaction between the political executive and the CS in the 
context of developing new democratic institutions in the Maldives; and 
d) Describing the features of the Maldivian economy and society that seems 
specific to relatively small and isolated countries and assess whether such 
features had influenced the democratisation process and the decisions on 
the choice of the CS model in the Maldives.  
 
Rather than presenting a summary of the previous chapters, this chapter provides an 
overall conclusion of the thesis. This chapter is divided into four parts: main research 
findings based on the research propositions; contribution to the literature; lessons for 
the Maldivian CS; and implications for future research.      
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8.2 Main research findings 
 
1. The development of a new CS model and negotiation of a CS Act were part 
of the democratisation process between 2005 and 2008 but were clearly in the 
hands of political elites and involved no wider public participation at all; To 
that extent the process fitted Welzel‟s model of mass responsive 
democratisation and Huntington‟s transplacement model: that while mass 
protests and other expressions of opinion are important in triggering 
democratisation processes, these processes are at some stage moved forward 
by negotiation or consensus within or between elites.   
2. The CS Act that emerged was a mix of pre-existing codes of practice which 
had some specifically Maldivian elements but drew on other regional 
administrative codes, together with borrowings based on research into the 
current CS laws of other countries. But the result was a law which was 
founded on some principles commonly described as “Weberian” but adapted 
to the Maldivian circumstances.  
3. The choices that the lawmakers made regarding the CS model were 
motivated by a number of different considerations. The first was the 
dominant agenda of securing a politically neutral CS largely insulated from 
the direct patronage of the political executive. This was a result of a wider 
elite negotiation on the future extent of executive power. The issue in 
drafting that turned out to be most important was setting the boundary 
between the political arm and administrative arm of the executive. The 
second point was that many detailed provisions that were not relevant to the 
dominant agenda were carried over from previous Maldivian codes or drawn 
from the codes of other jurisdictions, in either case with little debate. 
4. Transition to democracy is not complete in the Maldives. The process is still 
relatively unstable and fragile. In particular, although the CS is now more 
firmly founded in law and there is less scope for arbitrary political 
intervention, there is a continuing contest between the political arm and the 
administrative arm of the executive over the boundaries between them. This 
ongoing contest continues to be critical for the prospects of stable 
democratisation.    
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5. Islandness and smallness did not have a major direct bearing on the process 
of democratisation in the Maldives. However, islandness was to some extent 
a factor in the design of the constitutional architecture. Furthermore, 
smallness and social cohesiveness is presently not enough to counter the 
growing polarisation of society which may constitute a threat to the stability 
of this fragile emerging democracy. The Maldives being a small-island state 
did not have a significant impact on the choice of the CS model. Nonetheless, 
the social closeness of the small Maldivian society may inhibit the separation 
of public and private life that is important for institutionalising a professional 
CS. 
 
8.3 Contribution to the literature 
 
This research has examined the path the Maldives underwent and the influences 
evident in the development of the CS as a public institution. It is arguable that small-
island states share some similar significant characteristics that may influence the 
formation of public institutions such as the CS, and consequently the relationships 
between that institution and other institutions of the state in a democracy. This 
section outlines possible characteristics in this respect that were evident from the 
Maldivian case.  
 
The democratisation process witnessed in the Maldives has similarities to that of 
other nations. A combination of longer-term changes in Maldivian society and 
economy underlie the process and some significant political events triggered its 
acceleration. Similarly, reform of state administration has been one of the 
components of the reform agenda. Although there are features of public 
administration evident in small-island states such as the greater difficulty of 
separating public and private life that may potentially deter a professional CS, they 
have not so far been a major hindrance to establishing a politically neutral CS. 
However, attempts to politicise the CS, initiated mainly by the political executive, 
have been a countervailing influence. This is compounded by a lack of a legally clear 
linkage between the CS and the political executive.   
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Establishment of a statutory CS that is relatively detached from the political 
executive has been a deliberate act by the policy makers of the Maldives. One of the 
reasons for choosing such a model has been to disallow past practices of patronage 
appointments used by the president. However, this focus on trimming the powers of 
the political executive in a small society where politics are played out at a personal 
level, rather than focusing on building an efficient CS, has probably contributed to 
the ongoing instability of relationships between the CS and political executive.   
 
The retention of the existing centralised administrative system in the new statutory 
CS has been a convenient option for policy makers of the Maldives, and was mainly 
a consequence of the lack of attention to substantial issues of efficiency and 
effectiveness in the CS model together with a greater focus on other democratic 
reforms. A decentralised mode of administration would have been a better fit for an 
archipelagic nation which initiated democratic reforms that included political 
decentralisation.      
 
8.4 Lessons for the Maldivian civil service 
 
This section examines the possible lessons for the Maldivian CS that may be needed 
to embed the values of a stable career CS based on a principle of neutral competence 
in the Maldivian polity.  
 
The Maldives presently lacks a modern general legal administrative environment 
with the degree of legal certainty required to increase predictability and reduce 
arbitrariness within the CS. This is consistent with Cardona (2001, p. 6), who states 
that, “in order to complete the administrative system, other actions, apart from 
drafting the civil service law, are also important and should be carried out either 
simultaneously or immediately after the enactment of the Law on Civil Service”. 
Cardona (2001) has identified two pieces of legislation, absent in the Maldives, 
required to complete the legal administrative framework: a general law on 
administrative procedures and a law regulating administrative processes.  
 
A law on administrative procedures is needed to enable “the civil service and, in 
general, public institutions to operate under clear rules in their relationships among 
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themselves and with the public at large” (Cardona, 2001, p. 6). On the other hand a 
law regulating administrative processes is needed to provide clear “ways and means 
for the judicial review of administrative actions and decisions to operate” (Cardona, 
2001, p. 6).  
 
Reference has been made in this thesis to two laws that contribute to the material 
scope of the CS: Official Kanthah [Issues] Chapter 1 (law no. 1/68) that grants 
presidential powers on setting the mandate of government organisations and the 
general responsibilities of government employees, and Official Kanthah [Issues] 
Chapter 2 (law no. 2/68) that covers the procedures for writing official letters and 
reports. Both these laws are insufficient and do not fulfil the challenges in the 
present day environment. For instance, some provisions, such as the rules for official 
correspondence seem excessively prescriptive and references to the general code of 
conduct overlap and conflict with the CS Act.  
 
A weakness in the CS Act is the CSC‟s dual role of not only regulating the CS, 
including staff conduct, but also investigating staff grievances. As mentioned 
(section 6.4.1), the lawmakers opted to maintain both roles within the commission. 
Retention of these roles within the CSC can create conflict of interest. Additionally, 
it can remove the “independent” factor when investigating grievances directly related 
to the CS, although provision for appeal beyond the CSC is available. A legal review 
of the roles of the commission is thus needed. Furthermore, establishment of an 
Ombudsman, currently not present in the Maldives, may need to be considered 
(Interviewee FO5).     
 
Another potential area for improvement is the provision for greater legal protection 
against arbitrary dismissal of civil servants in particular. With changes of 
government likely to be a normal feature of the new democracy, as discussed in this 
thesis, newly-elected governments can use different measures in order to resize the 
CS as well as removing organisations out of the CS thereby removing the legal 
protection of the CS Act. Although both the CS Act and the Employment Act 
provide appeal mechanisms, substantial legal protection prior to any changes (such 
as resizing and restructuring) is presently lacking in both Acts.  
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8.5 Implications for future research 
 
This study examined the development of a statutory CS in the Maldives and outlined 
the effects the model and the democratisation process had on each other. The 
literature on the main concepts of civil service, democratisation, and small-island 
states and the research framework developed from this scholarship has proved to be 
a useful object of this case study and should be useful for other case studies with 
similar objects. 
 
Small-island states are more likely to share common features than with other states 
on matters of political development. As a result, further studies of similar processes 
of political and the CS reform in other small-island states using the framework 
developed in this research can add to the exemplary knowledge from this research 
and lead to a stronger generalisation for other small-island states.  
 
This study was undertaken only a few years after the governance reform that 
included the introduction of a multi-party democracy and a new statutory CS. Re-
examination of the effects that democratisation and the CS have had on each other 
after consecutive changes of government in the future, can also help to reveal the 
extent of institutionalisation of the reforms in the Maldives.     
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The Maldives is an emerging democracy. The continuous challenges the state 
institutions are facing are evident. Inception of a new statutory CS in such an 
environment has so far revealed mixed results. This case study is appropriately 
confined to a particular phase in the history of the Maldives and is a window on 
some stages of a process of democratisation that, from subsequent events, clearly has 
an uncertain future. But it casts light on how one small country sought to 
institutionalise its citizens' expressed desires for democracy and therefore, perhaps, 
what will be some important conditions for its future consolidation.    
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Coda to the research 
 
This thesis covers events up until March 2012. There is a brief epilogue of events 
from then until June 2013 when this thesis was deposited. Following the disputed 
resignation of President Nasheed, his Vice-President, Dr. Mohamed Waheed Hassan 
Maniku assumed power. Dr. Waheed‟s government is a coalition that includes all the 
major political parties that opposed Nasheed.  
 
A commission of national inquiry was established to investigate the legality of 
President Nasheed‟s resignation. The commission was backed by the 
Commonwealth. The commission published its report on August 30, 2012. The main 
findings of the report were: 1) The change of President in the Republic of Maldives 
on 7 February 2012 was legal and constitutional; 2) The events that occurred on 6 
and 7 February 2012 were, in large measure, reactions to the actions of President 
Nasheed; 3) The resignation of President Nasheed was voluntary and of his own free 
will. It was not caused by any illegal coercion or intimidation; and, 4) There were 
acts of police brutality on 6, 7 and 8 February 2012 that must be investigated and 
pursued further by the relevant authorities (Commission of National Inquiry, 2012, p. 
2). 
 
The prosecutor general charged Nasheed with the unlawful arrest of the judge which 
sparked the events that eventually led to his resignation. Initially, Nasheed refused to 
attend the court hearings – leading the court to issue an arrest warrant for Nasheed. 
In the face of imminent arrest in February 2013, Nasheed sought refuge in the Indian 
High Commission in Male‟ where he stayed for 11 days. Refusal to attend court once 
again led to another arrest warrant, which was carried out in March 2013. Nasheed 
was released after the court hearing. The court case is still on-going but is boiled 
down with pre-trial procedural matters. It is unlikely that the trial will begin before 
the presidential election set for September 2013 in which Nasheed is also expected to 
compete.  
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7
th
 April 2010 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Project Title: Civil service in an emerging democracy – The case of the Maldives 
 
Researcher: Mohamed Faizal, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, 
New Zealand 
 
I am a PhD Student in Public Policy, at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. 
My thesis is focused on analysing civil service in an emerging democracy, with a focus on 
the Maldives. I intend to describe the civil service model of the Maldives and analyse the 
process by which the political actors arrived at the current model during the transition to a 
multi-party democracy. Furthermore, the study aims to study the impact the civil service has 
on the democratisation process and will consider what light the Maldives experience can 
shed on the role of a civil service in the context of a small-island state. The University has 
agreed on my areas of study and granted ethics approval to carry out the research.  
 
The practical details for the interview are covered in the consent form. The interview will be 
conducted based on the preferences that you choose in the consent form. They include your 
choice of language to be used during interviewing and your consent on tape-recording the 
interview. The interview will last for a maximum of 2 hours. It is very important to point out 
that the participation in this research is voluntary and based on the participants‟ willingness. 
Participants have the right to withdraw from the research within one month of the 
completion of the interview.   
 
The information gathered from the interviews will be the prime source of data. Names of 
individuals will not appear in the analysis, the thesis or any articles. While it is not possible 
to guarantee absolute anonymity, I will endeavour to the best of my ability to ensure that, if 
you are quoted directly, you are not identifiable from the way I use your words in the text. 
The consent forms, hand notes, tape recordings or any other material collected in connection 
with the interview that may reveal your identity will be kept confidential to me. If 
information about the interviews is supplied to my supervisors or other researchers (that is 
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form that will not directly or indirectly disclose your identity. The thesis will be submitted to 
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information gathered will also be used for one or more articles that will be submitted for 
publication in international journals. Such articles may be presented in academic or 
professional conferences. The information gathered will be destroyed 3 years after the full 
completion of my doctoral degree.  
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Your sincere responses during the interview will be appreciated. 
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Project Title: Civil service in an emerging democracy – the case of the Maldives 
 
I have been provided with adequate information relating to the nature and objectives of this 
research project and I have understood that information. I have been given the opportunity to 
seek further clarification or explanations regarding the research and they have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I may withdraw from this study within one 
month of this interview without giving any reason, and in such cases all data related to me 
shall be destroyed.   
I understand that my personal identity will be kept confidential to the researcher and that 
information from this interview will not be made available to any other person in a form 
which would identify me. I also understand that the published results will not use my name, 
and that no opinion will be attributed to me in any way. I understand that the electronic 
recordings and all documents related to this interview will be destroyed 3 years after the 
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possible to guarantee absolute anonymity, I will endeavour to the best of my ability to 
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Preferred time for interview: ………………………… 
 
Preferred venue for interview (please choose a secure & quite place): …………….. 
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Annex 3: List of interviewees  
 
Code Category Date of Interview 
CV1 Civil society June 2, 2010, Wednesday 
FO1 Former senior government official May 16, 2010, Sunday 
FO2 Former senior government official May 20, 2010, Thursday 
FO3 Former senior government official May 31, 2010, Monday 
FO4 Former senior government official June 3, 2010, Thursday 
FO5 Former senior government official June 12, 2010, Saturday 
FO6 Former senior government official June 15, 2010, Tuesday 
FO7 Former senior government official June 15, 2010, Tuesday 
FO8 Former senior government official June 25, 2010, Friday 
FO9 Former senior government official July 5, 2010, Monday 
FO10 Former senior government official July 14, 2010, Wednesday 
FO11 Former senior government official August 10, 2010, Tuesday 
GO1 Senior government official May 23, 2010, Sunday 
GO2 Senior government official May 30, 2010, Sunday 
GO3 Senior government official June 28, 2010, Monday 
GO4 Senior government official June 30, 2010, Wednesday 
GO5 Senior government official August 8, 2010, Sunday & 
August 16, 2010, Monday 
GO6 Senior government official September 8, 2010, 
Wednesday 
GO7 Senior government official October 4, 2010, Monday 
MD1 Media personnel July 22, 2010, Thursday 
PL1 Senior government political figure June 14, 2010, Monday 
PL2 Senior government political figure July 6, 2010, Tuesday 
Note: Government political figures mean political appointees of the government that lasted from 
November 11, 2008 to February 7, 2012. Former senior government officials mean officials of the 
government prior to November 11, 2008. Senior government officials include senior civil servants 
and commissioners of statutory organisations.  
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Annex 4: Timeline of important events 
 
1153 A.D.  Converted to Islam 
1887 A.D.  Signed a protectorate agreement with Britain 
December 1932 First written constitution proclaimed 
January 1953  Start of the First Republic 
March 1954  Monarchy reinstated 
July 1965  Gained political independence from Britain 
November 1968 Start of the Second Republic 
November 1978 Gayoom elected as president 
November 1982 NOPAR established 
January 1998  A revised constitution came into effect 
September 1999 PSD established 
September 2003 Civil unrest in Male‟ 
June 2004  Democratic reform policy announced 
July 2004  Constitutional assembly convened 
August 2004  Civil unrest in Male‟ 
June 2005  Formation of political parties allowed 
October 2005  A civil service bill submitted 
May 2007  Civil service bill became law 
August 2007  Referendum on form of government   
May 2008  Civil service formally established 
August 2008  New constitution came into effect  
November 2008 Nasheed elected as president 
February 2012  Resignation of President Nasheed 
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Annex 5: Government organisation chart – July 1979 
Ministry of 
Transport
Office of the President
Ministry of Home 
Affairs
Ministry of 
Provincial Affairs
Ministry of Health
Ministry of 
Education
Ministry of 
External Affairs
Ministry of Public 
Safety
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Ministry of 
Fisheries
Ministry of Justice
Marine Division
Airport Office
Air Maldives
Dept of 
Mechanical 
Transport and 
Services
Prisons Division
Public Maintenance 
Division
Sultan Park
Sports Division
Elections Division
Land Registration 
Division
Special Welfare 
Division
Post Office
Northern 
Regional Office
Atoll Office
Island Office
Southern 
Regional Office
Atoll Office
Island Office
Atolls Development 
Advisory Board
CCD Division
T.B. Clinic
Filaria Clinic
Malaria Clinic
Water & 
Sanitation 
Authority
Male’ Health 
Centre
A.H.S.T.C
Government 
Hospital
Public Health 
Division
W.H.O Office
Iskandaru 
Montessori 
School
Aminiya School
Majeediyya 
School
Educational 
Development 
Centre
Passport Office
Foreign Aid 
Coordination 
Unit
Police Court
National Security 
Service
F.P. Division
Atoll & Island 
Courts
Theft Trials 
Division
Marriage 
Registration 
Division
Mercantile 
Division
Debts Division
Breach of Law 
& Political 
Trials Division
Property & 
Ownership 
Division
Dept of Finance Dept of Tourism & 
Foreign Investment
Dept of Information & Broadcasting
Food Control Dept
Port Commission & Public 
Works Dept
Customs
Shipping Dept
Treasury Division
IMF, WB, IDA, ADB Unit
State Trading Organisation
Accounts Division
Rental Division
Exports Division
Guest Houses
Tourist Resorts
Museum
Majeedee Library
T.V. Maldives
Radio Maldives
National Planning Agency
Telecommunication Dept
Audit Office
Attorney General Office
Citizen’s Majlis Chamber
Dept of Electricity
Vocational Training Centre
Architectural Section
Maldives
Structure of Government
as of July 31, 1979 Source: WB (1980, p. 93)
 
